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Abstract 
This thesis critiques the concept of narrative coherence through an in-depth 
inquiry into the lived experience of narrative incoherence in counselling and 
psychotherapy. It questions whether lived experience necessarily requires narrative 
structure and the extent to which a coherent narrative is essential for psychological and 
emotional well-being. It thus attempts to depathologise the experience of narrative 
incoherence, instead honouring those moments in therapy when words quite literally 
fail us.  
Adopting writing as inquiry as its methodological foundation, the thesis 
continuously moves between experiential self-searching and intellectual engagement 
with theoretical insights. I draw particularly on conceptual resources offered by Butler, 
Foucault, Wittgenstein, Winnicott, Freud, Leader and the theory of the dialogical self. 
I write into my personal experiences as a client in therapy and as a therapist and this 
analytical work is complemented by reflections on my experience of a short-term 
sandplay process, undertaken specifically for this research project, which aimed to 
surface the interstices of language and the non-verbal therapeutic process.   
Parallel to its questioning of the demand for narrative coherence is this thesis’s 
challenge to the linear, well-structured and well-articulated scholarly voice of 
traditional doctoral thesis work. Methodologically and stylistically, this thesis stays 
close to that which is inarticulate and unstructured, which is often termed incoherence. 
Instead of presenting a planned linear process, I argue that the research process of this 
thesis is an unforeseeable and unpredictable journey into the unknown in which I 
encounter rather than choose the conceptual resources I use.   
This thesis concludes with three main points, namely ‘letting go’, ‘holding on’ 
and ‘to play’. I encourage therapists to let go of the obsession with and demand for 
coherent narrative as these can silence, alienate and pathologise individuals. 
Meanwhile, the research process also highlights the necessity of telling one’s story to 
a caring other, and the predicament between the impossibility of expression and the 
necessity to tell and to be known. In relation to this, I encourage therapists to stay with 
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and listen to what is unsayable and unnarratable without demand. Lastly, this thesis 
puts forth the value of playfulness when working with the concept of narrative 
coherence and incoherence, calling for a blurring boundary between the two. 
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Lay Summary 
In the field of counselling and psychotherapy, narrative coherence is often 
regarded as positively related to the client’s well-being and it is often viewed as 
therapeutic to tell a coherent story of oneself. In comparison, narrative incoherence is 
often portrayed as pathological. This thesis seeks to challenge this dominant view. It 
asks the questions, do we always experience life in a narrative form, is a coherent 
narrative always necessary and essential for a good life, and could the demand for 
narrative coherence also bring negative effect in counselling and psychotherapy? 
Using myself as an instrument to gain knowledge and regarding writing as a way to 
think and to know, I explore my research topic through writing about my life 
experience, my experience as a therapy client and a therapist, as well as my experience 
of a short-term sandplay process. These writings are interwoven with my reading and 
thinking about theories. In this continuous cycle of writing, reading and thinking, I 
seek understanding of the concept of narrative coherence in counselling and 
psychotherapy and the realm of experience that is beyond narrative coherence. While 
recognising the necessity to tell our stories to a caring other, this thesis delves into the 
inadequacy of telling a coherent narrative of oneself. I argue that the obsession with 
and demand for narrative coherence without caution can silence, alienate and 
pathologise individuals. I encourage therapists to stay with and listen to what is 
unsayable and unnarratable in a linear form without demand.    
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
By the end of my training to be a counsellor/psychotherapist1, as part of the 
final assessment, I was asked to offer a coherent account of my personal and 
professional development. I wanted to tell the story of my development over those two 
years of training, but to my surprise, it was more challenging than I ever expected. 
Although I knew without any doubt that my training had huge impact on me and 
changed me as a person, I found myself unable to satisfactorily articulate my change 
and development. The words I could choose, for example, mature, grounded and 
confident, while holding some truth, always felt inadequate. I was unable to tell a 
‘proper’ story of my development, that is a story with a story line: how I started, what 
I experienced, and where I landed by the time I finished my training. I presented 
something but it did not feel right. As I listened to my peers’ stories about their 
development, I admired and was envious of their ability to offer such clear and 
touching narratives of their development over the two years. In comparison with others, 
I was left feeling ashamed and in doubt of myself. I had been content with the personal 
and professional development that I deeply felt. Yet, subjected to the demand for a 
coherent narrative, I felt inadequate. By then I had already experienced struggles in 
my personal therapy regarding telling a story of my own and articulating my 
experience. Instead of telling stories with beginning, middle and end, I told fragments 
of memories. I was often frustrated in not being able to tell the therapist how I truly 
felt because the words often felt inadequate or I could not explain my feelings. My 
experience of the presentation and personal therapy brought me a dreadful thought: ‘I 
have no story to tell’. Though had not been researching into narrative then, I was 
familiar with the idea that narrative coherence is seen as closely related to one’s sense 
of self and identity (e.g. Adler, 2012; Baerger & McAdams, 1999) and that narrative 
coherence is seen as an indication for psychological well-being (e.g. Baerger & 
                                                 
1 There are debates upon the use of the terms ‘counselling’ and ‘psychotherapy’. Some use these terms 
interchangeably, while others argue that they are different (Osagu & Omolayo, 2013). In this thesis, I use the terms 
counselling and psychotherapy as well as counsellor and psychotherapist interchangeably.   
2 
 
McAdams, 1999). This led me to doubt myself: if I cannot tell a coherent story of 
myself, does it mean that I have a fragmented sense of self? If so, can I still be a 
counsellor/therapist? This thought not only brought me a sense of shame but also a 
crisis. I was distressed.  
However, at the same time, I felt a sense of rebellion against the thesis that a 
coherent narrative is essential for a coherent sense of self and identity. I had felt content 
with myself and my development. It was when a coherent narrative was required of 
me that I started to feel ashamed, inadequate and to doubt of myself. I did not need a 
presentation by the end of my training; I saw that specific narrative account as given 
for others, not for me. This brought me to think about my personal therapy. I also had 
a sense that sometimes I spoke for my therapist and wanted to be a ‘good’ client who 
brought ‘proper materials’ for my therapist to work with. Then I had a second thought: 
is coherent narrative always necessary for a coherent or integrated sense of self, does 
incoherent narrative always indicate inadequacy, pathology and distress, or in sum, is 
incoherent narrative always bad and undesirable? Isn’t there other (good) ways of 
being and living that do not necessarily involve coherent narrative at all times? Is 
narrative coherence always for the sake of the client? 
I revealed this distress in terms of my lack of stories to a peer after the course 
finished. Somehow, I started to talk about sandplay with her. I remember I told her the 
reason why I was drawn to sandplay so much was that I felt contentment in sandplay 
that I hardly felt in talking therapy. I experienced no demand on telling stories in a 
meaningful and coherent way. I could touch the sand without making sense of anything 
at all. I felt connected to the world of sand as well as myself without having to know 
and tell.  
Nonetheless, as a practitioner, I do believe in the power of stories. Through my 
work with my clients, I have seen the power of telling one’s story, having it heard, and 
making sense of it. I have witnessed and been touched by many stories, which I always 
see as a privilege.  
All these factors entangled with each other, contributing to my ambivalent 
attitude towards narrative and narrative coherence. I was uncertain and confused. And 
this is where the inquiry started. It came from a personal and professional longing to 
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explore and to know. I do not wish to understand just myself. It is a striving to 
understand the phenomena of narrative, narrative coherence and their relation to life 
and lived experience.  
I had felt alone in my struggle of telling stories. In the process of doing this 
research project, I have found companionship and comfort in entering dialogue with 
some thinkers. I hope that this research project can also be a companion to those who 
have similar experience. At the same time, I hope it can offer those who do not share 
the same experience a potential different way of looking at life and lived experience. 
While storytelling is such a main theme in the field of counselling and psychotherapy, 
I do this research project with a hope to offer practitioners insight into the inner world 
of clients who, like me, experience struggles in offering a coherent narrative account. 
By deconstructing what is regarded as coherent narrative, I hope this thesis can assist 
practitioners to see incoherence beyond pathology and start to rethink what has been 
often taken for granted. 
Therefore, this thesis is conducted with the aim to deconstruct the concept of 
narrative coherence in the context of counselling and psychotherapy, through which I 
seek to understand the relation and interplay between narrative, narrative coherence 
and experience in and of life and explore the potential value of incoherence.  
As will be made clear in a later chapter, this research process is not a linear 
one. It is an organic process of searching, losing and returning. The use of 
methodology as well as theories are more of encounters in the research process. When 
I looked back at the research process in later stages, I realised it has elements of 
interdisciplinary exploration. It situates itself in the context of and contributes mainly 
to the field of counselling and psychotherapy, yet it also reaches beyond theories 
within counselling and psychotherapy and use them to make sense of my experience 
then bring them back to the field of counselling and psychotherapy. Therefore, in 
chapter 2, I will offer an interdisciplinary literature review on narrative and narrative 
coherence, and restate my research questions in the end of this review.  
In chapter 3, I will show the journey of how I came to my onto-epistemological 
position and methodological choice. I will explain the rationale for my decision to 
engage in sandplay sessions as a pathway to gain knowledge of the research topic, and 
4 
 
the rationale for my data generation, analysis and presentation. Sandplay sessions 
arrangement and ethical consideration will also be given in this chapter.  
Chapter 4 to 6 will be collections of my pre-sandplay writings, writing about 
sandplay sessions and my post-sandplay writings respectively. Each of these pieces of 
writing will look at the theme of narrative coherence from different theoretical and 
experiential angles. I will deliberately present these pieces without clear structure with 
the intention to offer the flow of my thinking and experience, as I see imposing 
structure and order that are not part of my writing as contradictory to my questioning 
into the very concept of coherence.  
Additionally, the discussion of narrative coherence and incoherence in this 
thesis is not only written in its content but is also presented in its structure and 
methodology. Parallel to the emphasis on coherence in counselling and psychotherapy, 
there is also a requirement for coherence that includes linearity and order in academic 
writing. In thinking about doing and presenting this thesis, I see this piece of research 
itself as a methodological experiment which looks for other ways of doing research 
that is different from traditional rigorous scholarly voice and reach towards the poetics 
of research (Hope, 1971; Romanyshyn, 2013). Therefore, I have chosen to present a 
relatively long and more detailed methodology chapter. And here, I would also like to 
offer some methodological introduction to this thesis.  
In July 2018, I submitted a paper on this research topic to a journal where I 
raised my questions about narrative coherence in counselling and psychotherapy and 
deliberately chose not to offer ‘solutions’ to those potential troubles. Instead, I wanted 
to stimulate readers’ own thinking and wondering. I relinquished the attempt to put the 
paper into rigorous structure but allowed the writing to proceed as my thoughts did, 
which gives the paper a taste of montage.  
The paper was sent out to three reviewers. It interestingly received very distinct 
feedback from each of them. The first reviewer highly disapproved of the fact that I 
offered nothing on what the therapist should do with the client’s experience that defies 
articulation and narrative, which piques almost no interest on this reviewer as s/he has 
seen no concrete guidance on therapeutic practice. The second reviewer saw the paper 
as well-argued and publishable. The third reviewer found it ‘extremely’ and ‘deeply’ 
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interesting and it provoked a great deal of thinking in him/her. This reviewer thus 
offered very long comments that included his/her thoughts in response to mine, 
offering alternative ways of looking at the topic. At the same time, as this reviewer 
found that his/her thinking mainly took the form of a dialogue with me, s/he also 
provided detailed in-text comments that are dialogic in nature.  
The editor summarised that the main concerns about my paper were that it lacks 
clearly articulated thesis and structure and it needs more rigor and thoroughness for a 
published journal paper. What initially hit me the most was the editor’s comment that 
the paper often reads like ‘a casual conversation’ in which I am ‘thinking aloud about 
interesting topics’.  
However, as I lay on bed that evening thinking about these comments, I 
realised, although I do not agree with the word ‘casual’, yes, what I was doing in that 
paper and what I will be doing in this thesis are ‘thinking aloud’ and a ‘conversation’.    
Implicit in the concerns that the editor raised is an assumption about or an 
image of scholarship as rigorous, structured and articulate. In fact, more than an 
assumption, these have become a requirement for scholarship. Implicit in the first 
reviewer’s dissatisfaction are the expectation and requirement for the scholar to know 
and to offer solutions to problems. It is not enough that you think and question, but 
you must think and present yourself in a particular way in order to be accepted. If I 
were to make major revisions and resubmit my paper as the editor suggested, I would 
need to make my paper rigorous, neatly structured and clearly articulated. I would need 
to be what the ‘academic world’ wants me to be in order to be included and accepted. 
If my research interest had not made me challenge the taken-for-granted requirement 
for coherence and the rigorous scholarly voice, I would have developed an ‘academic 
self’ that strives to perform as certain, intelligent, reasonable and organised – as often 
required of scholars – without seeing any alternatives. There is a parallel here between 
this and my argument later that connects disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977) and the 
therapeutic relationship. In both cases, if we do not think twice about what is taken for 
granted, certain knowledge would be produced and privileged as ‘truth’ and some 
others would be excluded and silenced.  
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‘Thinking aloud’ indicates a process: a thinking process that is shared and laden 
with uncertainty. And this is exactly my journey of this research project. What would 
be lost and silenced in the certain scholarly voice are both this research journey and 
me as the person who has embarked on this journey, who has stepped into the unknown 
and trusted the process though not without struggles. In the language of Winnicott 
(1965a) whose work I will refer to later, when I put this experiencing-self at bay to 
perform the well-articulated, clear and reasonable scholar that is required of me, I am 
showing a ‘false self’ that complies to what is expected from me rather than the I who 
actually experiences. While the presence and congruence of the therapist are stressed 
as so important in counselling and psychotherapy (e.g. Greenberg & Geller, 2001), I 
wonder why counselling and psychotherapy researchers, especially practitioner-
researchers, have to hide aspects of ourselves that are relevant to what we are 
researching. In my case, it is the inarticulate, the unstructured and what might be called 
as incoherent.  
It has been argued that counselling and psychotherapy research methods that 
are consistent with the type of therapy that is being researched need to be developed 
(McLeod, 2001). I would like to argue that if the type of therapy that we do is process-
oriented and relationship-oriented, there should be space for a type of research that is 
process-oriented and relational. So, yes, this research project is ‘thinking aloud’ 
(process-oriented) taking you through a journey that I do not claim to have mastery 
over and that is full of uncertainty and hard to plan or predict, just like therapy. And 
yes, this research project is a ‘conversation’ (relational) where I want to meet you as 
hopefully a genuine enough person with my thoughts, feelings, strength and 
vulnerability, like we do in therapy.  
I still do not necessarily agree with the word ‘casual’ attributed to my work, 
but it can depend on what it exactly means. If it means no theoretical engagement, I 
would disagree. If it means that it lacks the type of research rigor that indicates absolute 
certainty, organisation and tidiness, then I argue for a different type of rigor. As the 
third reviewer recognised in my way of writing and the argument I made in my paper 
a different type of coherence that might not be valued by academic community, 
reviewers and editors, I argue for a different type of research rigor that breaks the wall 
around academia that separates or privileges academic community from others. If 
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‘casual’ means to have a conversation that is accessible to and engages those who are 
not in academia, then it is exactly what I try to do.  
When reading this thesis, you might feel as frustrated as the first reviewer of 
my journal paper, or you might appreciate it as the second reviewer, or you might feel 
intrigued as the third reviewer and wish to participate in wondering about this research 
topic yourself. Now, I invite you to join this journey of emotional, intellectual and 
embodied engagement with questions about narrative coherence and its relation to life, 
lived experience and therapy, and to find out for yourself what it will bring to you.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
In the field of counselling and psychotherapy, narrative has taken a significant 
role. This significance can date back to as early as Sigmund Freud’s time – in the 1980s, 
Schafer (1980) and Spence (1982) explicitly pointed out the narrative perspective of 
Freud’s work. As Meier (2012) describes, narrative is the trunk of the tree from which 
all the branches of psychotherapy develop. It provides a meeting point for 
psychotherapy of different traditions (Angus & McLeod, 2004a). As McLeod (1997) 
acknowledges, narrative in psychotherapy has become a massive topic. It will be 
beyond the scope of this thesis to review all the related theories on narrative. Therefore, 
not without struggles, I have chosen to review the aspects of narrative and narrative 
coherence that are most relevant to my topic.  
In this chapter, I will offer an interdisciplinary literature review on narrative 
and narrative coherence, drawing on main theorists from not only counselling and 
psychotherapy, but also history, psychology and philosophy whose works are often 
drawn on when narrative is discussed in relevant literature. 
Firstly, I will present the widespread view on narrative that it is not only a tool 
to make sense of or represent experience, but it is also an act of creating self and 
identity. Secondly, tracing back to its historical origin, I will present the predominant 
view on the connection between narrative coherence and mental health which is 
usually presented by relevant literature as coherent narrative being related to 
psychological well-being whereas incoherence is seen as related to illness or distress. 
Then I will take a close look at the concept of narrative coherence. Since I recognise 
that temporality and causality are commonly identified as the main aspects of coherent 
narrative, I will review these two aspects and the critiques to them in more details. At 
the end of this chapter, I will restate my research questions and inquiries. 
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Narrative and Story 
Before delving into narrative and narrative coherence, I would like to clarify 
the use of the terms ‘story’ and ‘narrative’.  
The concept of narrative itself is slippery and there lacks a simple, clear-cut 
definition (Byrne, 2003; Riessman & Speedy, 2012). The definition of narrative varies 
from referring to an entire life story to a discrete unit of discourse (Riessman & Speedy, 
2012). Riessman and Speedy (2012:430) identify a definition of narrative that is 
specifically situated in the context of psychology and sociology: it includes ‘long 
sections of talk – extended accounts of lives in context that develop over the course of 
single or multiple interviews (or therapeutic conversations)’. I see this as particularly 
relevant to the meaning of narrative in the context of counselling and psychotherapy.  
Defining narrative becomes even more complicated and contentious when it 
comes to differentiating ‘narrative’ and ‘story’ (Byrne, 2003; McQuillan, 2000). The 
distinction between ‘story’ and ‘narrative’ is fuzzy and a lot of the time they overlap 
(McLeod, 1997; Neile, 2013). According to McLeod (1997:31), a story is ‘an account 
of a specific event’, whereas a narrative is ‘a story-based account of happenings, but 
contains within it other forms of communication in addition to stories’. Arthur Frank, 
a main figure in the field of story-telling especially story-telling related to illness, in 
an interview with Neile (2013), also similarly distinguishes story and narrative by 
‘specific’ and ‘general’. For Frank, story is when specific events happen in specific 
settings whereas narrative describes in general terms the types of stories we tell. Both 
these views seem to coincide with the view that story constitutes one part of narrative 
(Prince, 2003). Polkinghorne (1988:13), one of the pioneers and leading figures in 
narrative theories, defines his use of narrative as ‘the kind of organisational scheme 
expressed in story form’. In all these definitions, narrative includes elements of story 
in its nature. In addition, both Frank (in Neile, 2013) and McLeod (1997) acknowledge 
that a main distinction between these two terms is that ‘story’ is more accessible to 
people in everyday level while ‘narrative’ is usually used in academic discourse. I 
agree with Frank (in Neile, 2013) on that it is not easy to maintain a strict difference 
in these two all the time and there are circumstances where these terms can be 
legitimately used interchangeably. In this thesis, recognising both the differences and 
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the inseparability between these two terms, I do not seek to maintain clear or strict 
distinction between these two. I see story as under the wider scope of narrative. As in 
the definitions mentioned above, I also regard story form as in the nature of narrative. 
Thus, when I talk about story, I am also talking about narrative; when I talk about 
narrative, there are inevitable elements of story. In fact, if we search through literature 
about either narrative or story-telling, we will hardly find writings that strictly separate 
these two and talk about one without another.  
Narrative and Life 
Regarding the relation between narrative and life, lived experience and sense 
of self, there are radically different views which are based on different ontological 
understandings of them. There are considerable debates on whether narrative is an 
inherent quality of human life (Andrews, 2010). This is also one of the questions I ask 
in this thesis. Therefore, in this section I will review literatures related to this aspect, 
following a brief introduction to the development of interest in narrative in social 
science.  
Scholars widely recognise a ‘narrative turn’ in social science that took place 
around the 1980s which refers to the growing attention given to people’s narrative or 
the stories people tell ((Brockmeier, 2004; Brown et al., 1996; Hyvärinen et al., 2010; 
McLeod, 1997). In 1992, Kreiswirth (1992:629) already recognised the ‘virtual 
explosion of interest in narrative and in theorizing about narrative’. It happened in 
various disciplines such as history (e.g. White, 1980), education (e.g. Connelly & 
Clandinin, 1990), psychology (e.g. Bruner, 1986), and psychotherapy (e.g. Schafer, 
1980; Spence, 1982). (More detailed reviews of the narrative turn are presented by 
researchers such as Kreiswirth (1992) and Bochner and Riggs (2014)).  
Psychologist Jerome Bruner is one of the pioneers who draw attention to the 
knowledge that can be gained through stories. He distinguishes two modes of thought. 
The first is the paradigmatic mode, which employs categorisation and 
conceptualisation and attempts to fulfil a ‘mathematical system of description and 
explanation’ (Bruner, 1986:12). It is a logical and scientific way of knowing. It leads 
to theory, analysis, arguments, empirical discovery and reasoned hypothesis (Bruner, 
1986). The second mode of thinking, the narrative mode, leads to stories, gripping 
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drama and historical account; what it deals with are human and human-like action and 
intention (ibid).  
There would be little doubt that in the world of counselling and psychotherapy, 
compared to the paradigmatic mode of knowing, we are more concerned with the 
narrative mode of knowing that Bruner proposes. Therapists recognise the crucial 
potential of narrative in therapeutic change. For instance, narrative therapy (White, 
2007) is an approach developed upon the power of re-authoring one’s life story from 
a perspective different from previous dominant stories one tells themselves about 
themselves.   
If narrative is so crucial to our lives, what is the relationship between narrative, 
human life and our experiences of life? Louis Mink (1987), a philosopher of history, 
argues that when past events and actions are narrated, they are imposed by a narrative 
form that they do not inherently possess. In Mink’s (1987:186) opinion, ‘[…] our 
experience of life does not itself necessarily have the form of narrative, except as we 
give it that form by making it the subject of stories’. He sees narrative as unable to 
represent life and past events, and that we can never refer to past events but only 
‘events under a description’ (Mink, 1987:199). In his words, ‘[s]tories are not lived 
but told. Life has no beginnings, middles and ends’ (Mink, 1970:557). For Mink (1970), 
rather than being transformed to art from life, narrative qualities are seen as 
transformed from art to life. Historian Hayden White (1980) takes a similar stance to 
argue that narrative becomes a problem when we try to make events in life get into the 
form of a story. Barthes (cited in Carr, 1991:14) also asserts that in life everything is 
‘scrambled messages’. Because of the belief that life does not possess a narrative form 
with linear proceeding of beginning, middle and end, for theorists like Mink, to 
attribute real events narrative coherence is ‘wishful thinking’ at best (Carr, 1991:13).   
This view presents a discontinuity between narrative and life as lived (Carr, 
1991). It also sees life as experienced as existing beyond and before narrative and 
language.  
Philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s (1991; 1984) work intends to cross the gap between 
narrative and life brought by the view that stories are told but not lived and life is lived 
but cannot be told which more or less puts narrative and life in opposition. For Ricoeur 
(1991), without being interpreted, life is merely a biological phenomenon, and 
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narrative plays a mediating role in interpretation. Ricoeur (ibid) sees narrative as an 
essential part of self-understanding: life can only be understood through the stories we 
tell about it. Through the network of the ‘semantics of actions’, we come to understand 
what action and passion are (Ricoeur, 1991:28). And through narrating, we are able to 
distinguish and bring together different components of our experience and lives, to 
reach to the ‘synthesis of the heterogeneous’ (ibid). Ricoeur (1991:29) believes that 
there is a pre-narrative quality of human experience that needs narrative, and that life 
is ‘an activity and a passion in search of a narrative’. This indicates that life is 
embedded in narrative or entangled in (untold) stories before any narrative is told.      
Whereas Ricoeur (1991) regards life as in quest of narrative, some other 
theorists advocate for not only the assertion that narrative is a means of sense-making, 
but also the view that there is an inherent narrative quality in human life and experience 
of life (e.g. Bruner, 1986; Carr, 1991; Crites, 1971; Crossley, 2003)   
Bruner (2004a:692) writes that ‘[n]arrative imitates life, life imitates narrative’. 
In writing this, he argues that life has the same structure of narrative. Similarly, 
criticising Louise Mink’s and Hayden White’s views on narrative imposing structure 
on real life, Carr (1991) argues that narrative form is inherent in human experience and 
action. To have subjective experience, for Carr (1991:62), is an attempt to ‘surmount 
time in exactly the way the story-teller does’, to ‘dominate the flow of events by 
gathering them together in the forward-backward grasp of the narrative act’. Instead 
of being fragmented and discontinuous, experiences interlock, and this configurational 
process is what is analogous to narrative (Carr, 1991; Pellauer, 1991). Terrell and 
Lyddon (1996) also argue that since human make meanings through stories, which in 
turn prepares as well as constrains future understanding, the narrative structures 
become the framework for our experience of life. This argument connects to the more 
radical view of some theorists who argue that narrative is life and our narrative of 
ourselves is our sense of ourselves.            
As the title of his article Life as Narrative suggests, for Bruner (2004a), there 
is no such thing as ‘life itself’. Our life and our experience of life are constructed 
through our telling about our lives. He  argues that our sense of self is closely linked 
to our narratives (Bruner, 2004b). In fact, he argues that our sense of self is created 
through our self-narratives to either ourselves or others (ibid). In Bruner’s (2004b) 
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opinion, there does not exist a self inside us ready to be told through words. Instead, 
through telling ourselves and others about ourselves, we constantly construct and 
reconstruct our sense of self, and we make up stories about who we are. According to 
him, self-making is ‘a narrative art’ (Bruner, 2004b:4). Bruner (2004a:694) writes that 
‘[i]n the end, we become the autobiographical narratives by which we ‘tell about’ our 
lives’(Italics original). This view is shared by Sacks (1986) when he writes that each 
of us is a story, a singular narrative that is continuously being constructed.   
What these views on narrative and self suggest is that narrative is not merely a 
representation of life or experience, not merely a tool that helps people make sense of 
life and experience; more importantly, they claim that narrative determines our 
experience and that we live by our self-stories (Payne, 2006). Strawson (2004a:428)  
summarises that there is a widespread agreement in a variety of disciplines claiming 
that ‘human beings typically see or live or experience their lives as a narrative or story 
of some sort, or at least a collection of stories’. He calls this view about the nature of 
human experience the psychological Narrativity thesis. (He uses Narrativity with 
uppercase N to denote this specific psychological outlook).  
According to these viewpoints, as narrative is so closely related to the sense of 
self, or it is our sense of self, the way one narrates oneself then certainly reveals and 
affects the psychological well-being of the individual. What is conveyed in these 
theories is that a coherent narrative indicates a coherent sense of self, and conversely, 
an incoherent narrative indicates an incoherent sense of self and identity (Brockmeier 
& Medved, 2010). 
Narrative Coherence and Mental Health 
As Hyvärinen et al. (2010) point out, narrative is always conceptualised with 
regard to coherence. There is a dominant view that a coherent story is a ‘good’ story 
(McAdams, 2006). Narrative coherence occupies a paramount position in mental 
health discourse (Borg, 2018).  
In the field of counselling and psychotherpay, the very first connection between 
the client’s mental health and the degree of coherence in the client’s narrative was 
made by the very first psychothanalyst Sigmund Freud. In his Fragment of An Analysis 
of A Case of Hysteria, Freud (1953) identifies the incoherence of his patient’s narrative 
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as an indication of hysteria: the connections, even the ostensible ones, are unclear, and 
the sequence of events is uncertain. Freud’s assumption about the connection between 
narrative coherence and mental health is evidenced further in one of his footnotes in 
this paper where he describes an event of assessing a potential patient referred to him. 
In the first meeting with the patient, Freud (1953:16) had her tell him her history, and 
‘[w]hen the story came out perfectly clearly and connectedly in spite of the remarkable 
events it dealt with, I told myself that the case could not be one of hysteria’. For Freud 
(1953:16), his patient’s ‘inability to give an ordered history of their life’ is the 
‘characteristic of the neurosis’. What is indicated here, according to Marcus 
(1976:413), is an assumption of narrative coherence, the nature of human life and their 
relation: ‘[o]n this reading, human life is, ideally, a connected and coherent story, with 
all the details in explanatory place, and with everything […] accounted for, in its proper 
causal or other sequence. And inversely, illness amounts at least in part to suffering 
from an incoherent story or an inadequate narrative account of oneself’.  
One of the earliest research projects that explicitly raises the connection 
between narrative coherence and mental health and well-being is the Adult Attachment 
Interview (George et al., 1996). Drawing from philosopher Grice’s (1975) criteria of 
coherence in rational discourse, Adult Attachment Interview indicates that adults speak 
about their early memories more coherently in the interview has a secure attachment 
style whereas a less coherent narrative is associated with insecure attachment style 
(Hesse, 1999). Main (1991) also suggests that parents who can tell a coherent history 
of themselves have securely-attached infants, while in comparison, infants of those 
who offer an incoherent narrative of their history are insecurely attached. 
Other early research in the area of narrative coherence and mental health 
includes Baerger & McAdams’s (1999) investigation on life story coherence and its 
relation to psychological well-being. Through their study, they argue that life story 
coherence is significantly and positively related to psychological well-being. They also 
argue that adaptive psychological functioning is the conscequence of a coherent 
narrative of one’s life.   
These accounts argue for the positive relationship between narrative coherence 
and well-being. Nowadays, it has become a widely accepted view that narrative 
coherence acts as an indicator of the client’s well-being in psychotherapy (Angus & 
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McLeod, 2004a). Coherence is thought of as linked to an individual’s ability to sustain 
continuity, directionality and meaning in life (Brockmeier & Medved, 2010). As 
Brockmeier & Medved (2010) point out, there is extensive agreement that individuals 
who speak coherently about themselves have higher levels of psychological well-being 
and people who offer incoherent accounts of themselves have more or less 
psychological difficulties. In mental health literature, incoherent narrative is often 
written in association to psychotic states (e.g. Lysaker & Lysaker, 2002), trauma (e.g. 
Guilfoyle, 2018; Neimeyer et al., 2006), and illness (e.g. Frank, 1998; 2013), which 
serves to portray narrative incoherence as somehow undesirable.  
Narrative coherence is thus viewed as a positive outcome of or the goal of 
psychotherapy (Angus & McLeod, 2004a). As McAdams (2006) suggests, therapists 
and clients co-construct – taking the constructivist point of view – new narratives to 
replace incoherent or disorganised narratives, and moving towards a more coherent 
narrative is the ideal direction of therapeutic movement. It is often assumed that talking 
about past experience in a coherent way brings benefits (Waters & Fivush, 2015). 
Especially in the case of trauma, it is suggested that a main function of therapy is to 
transform chaos into coherence, to story the unstoried (e.g. Guilfoyle, 2018; Neimeyer 
et al., 2006). 
Therefore, as Hyvärinen et al. (2010:1) summarise, coherence is often seen as 
a virtue, the ‘ultimate guarantor of the quality of narratives’, and is assumed to be ‘a 
norm for good and healthy life stories’.  
The Concept of Narrative Coherence  
Then what exactly does ‘narrative coherence’ mean? Interestingly, while 
narrative coherence is given a paramount place in discussion of mental health, it is 
loosely and not explicitly defined. Nonetheless, there are some social science scholars 
who have explicitly offered various definitions of narrative coherence and what 
constitutes a coherent narrative (e.g. Baerger & McAdams, 1999; Habermas & Bluck, 
2000; Linde, 1993; Shapiro & Hudson, 1991). 
Shapiro and Hudson (1991) define coherent narrative as a narrative that is 
temporally and causally organised into a sequence that is meaningful to the teller and 
the listeners. In this definition, narrative coherence is concerned with the overall 
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structure of the narrative. The sequence of events need to interrelate in a meaningful 
way (for both parties). Temporality and causality stand out as two main elements of 
coherent narrative in this definition. As can be seen later as this literature review 
proceeds, temporality and causality are indeed what are generally regarded as core 
elements of narrative coherence despite different definitions and descriptions of 
narrative coherence.  
Baerger and McAdams’ (1999), Habermas and Bluck’s (2000) and Linde’s 
(1993) contributions on the constitution of narrative coherence are among the most 
cited literature in this area.   
Baerger and McAdams (1999) propose a model of life story coherence that 
includes four features: orientation (the narrative provides a beginning with orientation 
that offers the listeners background information that is necessary to understand the life 
story), structure (the life story offers a culturally recognised story structure), affect (the 
emotional aspects of the story-telling), and integration (the narrator’s ability to 
organise pieces of a life into a story which is congruent with the narrator’s history, 
motivation, central conflicts, aspirations, etc.). Elaborating the requirement of 
structure, Baerger and McAdams (1999) recognise that in lots of narrative traditions, 
a primary device that establishes narrative coherence is temporal or sequential ordering. 
According to Baerger and McAdams (1999:73) what temporal ordering necessitates 
for life story is that it needs to ‘display some degree of linear, chronological, or causal 
structure’. Although temporality and causality are not explicitly listed in Baerger and 
McAdams’ (1999) model of life story coherence, as illustrated, they are addressed in 
the structure feature of a coherent life story.  
In Habermas and Bluck’s (2000) proposal of four types of global coherence of 
life story, together with the cultural concept of biography and thematic coherence, 
temporality and causality are listed as two of the main types of coherence. Similarly, 
Linde (1993) sees temporal order as a fundamental principle for narrative. According 
to Linde (1993), narrative ordering acts as the basis for two coherence principles: 
causality and continuity. 
As Pals (2006) summarises, the concept of coherence often highlights both the 
structure of narration including temporal sequences and the more interpretive aspects 
including explanation of the cause of events and the evaluative significance of events 
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for the narrator. In other words, coherence indicates that the narrator ‘interprets a past 
experience as having a causal impact that endures over time and contains self-defining 
significance or meaning in his or her life’ (Pals, 2006:177). 
The notion of coherence, as Brockmeier and Medved (2010) point out, dates 
back to Aristotelian narrative which is a well-structured story. Brockmeier and Medved 
(2010:19) describe it as having ‘a clear, temporally ordered plot with a dramatic 
complication that eventually is solved’ and having in its components ‘an act (with a 
beginning and an end), a scene, an agent, agency, and a purpose’. It is a classical or 
traditional narrative with a beginning, middle and end. Although in contemporary 
literature, narrative coherence is more narrowly defined (Brockmeier & Medved, 
2010), the trace of Aristotle’s criteria of a good story is present. As Andrews (2010) 
raises, there is a certain pressure for us to deliver our stories within an Aristotelian 
narrative configuration which demands connection between events and congruence, 
between conclusion and episodes.     
Regarding the Aristotelian concept of coherence, Hyvärinen et al. (2010) 
comment that whereas Aristotle’s aesthetic and normative concepts of coherent story 
are originally only concerned with good drama particularly tragedy, in modern society 
these concepts started to be applied to narrative and narrativity in general, which limits 
the understanding of narratives. 
Since temporality and causality are regarded as the main parameters of 
narrative coherence, I would like to take a closer look at these two notions and critiques 
towards them respectively.  
Temporality, Ordering and Organising 
Temporality is usually characterised by sequentiality and order. This is 
evidenced in Linde’s (1993:107) argument: ‘[…] a story has a beginning, middle, and 
end, and is properly told in that order. Without a sequence of events, we do not have a 
story. We may have something – a description, an explanation, a mood piece – but we 
do not have a story’. McLeod (1997:34), elaborating Bruner’s work, writes that 
‘[n]arrative is [...] the mode of communication and representation that best captures 
the experience of temporality, of living in time’. This corresponds to Ricoeur’s (1984:3) 
notion that ‘[t]he world unfolded by every narrative work is always a temporal world’. 
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Habermas and Bluck (2000) identify that in coherent narrative, events are 
temporally related to one another. As Brockmeier (2004) summarises, in narrative 
studies, coherence is always conceptualised as an issue of temporal organisation and 
of ordering a story in time. He goes on to point out, as Hyvärinen et al. (2010) also do, 
that ‘temporal ordering is commonly considered to be one (if not the) basic feature of 
narrative’ (Brockmeier, 2004:286). It is worth noting that in saying temporality, though 
it is usually referred to as linear time, it does not necessarily equal linearity. In 
Ricoeur’s (1985, 1984) famous discussion of time and narrative, he raises the 
paradoxes of time, the triple present of the past, present and future. He thinks that 
‘[e]mplotment is never the simple trump of ‘order’’ (Ricœur, 1984:73). As Hyvärinen 
et al. (2010:8) summarise, for Ricoeur, narrative is ‘above all an attempt to cope with 
the ‘discordant’ aspects of acting and suffering’. Nonetheless, the ‘ordering’ aspect of 
narrative is stressed when Ricoeur (1991:28) argues that through the network of 
narrative, we reach ‘the synthesis of the heterogeneous’. To be more percise, this 
indiates the function of narrative as organising the disparate elements of our lived 
experience. Although Carr (1991:65) criticises Ricoeur’s work, I see their similarities 
in viewing this aspect of narrative when he writes that narrating is our ‘primary way 
of organizing and giving coherence to our experience’. This view is also taken by 
Crossley (2003:291) who sees narrative as constituting an ‘organising principle’ for 
human action and life.       
In fact, it is this supposed ‘ordering’ and ‘organising’ feature of narrative that 
is often regarded as a main therapeutic function of narrating (e.g. McAdams et al., 
2006; Pennebaker & Seagel, 1999). According to McLeod (1997:37), ‘re-casting 
chaotic experiences into causal sequences’ helps the client to ‘gain an understanding 
of how and why something happened’. (This view also indicates another principle of 
coherence – causality – as Linde (1993) suggests). Through narrative, people 
understand the past and plan for the future (Polkinghorne, 1988), and synthesise 
episodic memories to convey who they are, how they come to be and where their future 
life is going (McAdams & McLean, 2013). This sense of control narrating can offer is 
seen as empowering, especially for traumatised clients (Borg, 2018).  
In Strawson’s (2004a:428) language, he calls the view that ‘experiencing or 
conceiving one’s life as a narrative is a good thing, a richly Narrative outlook is 
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essential to a well-lived life, to true or full personhood’ the ethical Narrativity thesis, 
which is often coupled with the psychological Narrativity thesis mentioned earlier. 
Strawson’s (2004a, 2004b, 2010) challenge to these claims mainly rests on the 
temporality and continuity of narrative. He distinguishes between two types of self-
experience – Diachronic and Episodic self-experience – to challenge the idea that 
coherent narrative being in time is predominantly good, and to propose that there are 
deeply non-Narrative people and there are ways of being that are also good. Although 
his division of two types of self-experience runs the risks of oversimplification and 
dualism, it provides alternative ways of looking at narrative coherence and the 
possibility of a ‘good life’ without necessary emphasis on narrative. Thus, I would like 
to elaborate here on his critique of coherent narrative and narrativity. 
Strawson (2004a:430) defines Diachronic self-experience as seeing oneself as 
having ‘relatively long-term diachronic continuity, something that persists over a long 
stretch of time, perhaps for life’. Strawson (2004a) thinks that people who are 
Diachronic, which most people are, are also Narrative in their outlook on life. In 
comparison, if one is Episodic, s/he does not figure him/herself as what was there in 
the further past nor will be there in the future, though being perfectly aware of his/her 
long-term continuity considered as a whole human being. Strawson sees Episodics as 
having less tendency to see their life in Narrative terms.  
It is necessary to elaborate on what Strawson means by Episodic self-
experience and Episodic life. For Episodic, they know perfectly well that they have a 
past and they have factual knowledge and memories about their past. However, they 
do not have a sense of their lives as narrative with or without form, and there is no 
great deal of interest or concern for the past and/or the future (Strawson, 2004a). 
Taking himself as an example, Strawson (2004a:433) explains that ‘[…] it seems clear 
to me, when I am experiencing or apprehending myself as a self, that the remoter past 
or future in question is not my past or future, although it is certainly the past or future 
of GS [G. Strawson] the human being’. When he is considering himself as a self, he 
says, ‘I have no significant sense that I – the I now considering this question – was 
there in the further past’ (ibid). For Episodics, though with perfect knowledge that they 
are the same human being in the past, present and future, they do not register the past 
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as happening to the currently experiencing me (ibid). This experience of being in time 
breaks the assumed temporal continuity of a coherent narrative and narrative identity.  
For Strawson, being Episodic is not inadequate nor pathological. It is simply a 
way of being and experiencing life. Responding to the dominant claim that narrative is 
necessary, that we are the stories we tell about ourselves, that we understand our lives 
and experiences in narrative form, and that a good life must include a good self-
narrative, Strawson  (2004a:436) asks ‘why on earth, in the midst of the beauty of being, 
it should be thought to be important to do this’. He thinks that people who propose this 
claim are motivated by their own significance which is not necessarily present for other 
human-beings, and the psychological Narrativity thesis is speaking about themselves 
or people alike. However, though it is true for them, it is not necessarily true for others, 
and ‘many are likely to be thrown right off their own truth by being led to believe that 
Narrativity is necessary for a good life’ (Strawson, 2004a:437). Aligning with Strawson, 
I will argue in this thesis that to claim all human-beings live in narrative form and a 
good life must contain coherence narrative is to make a truth claim which, as any 
propositions that claim something to hold truth do, serves to suppress what is outside 
of its reign; it is to deny, silence and do violence to what can be different.   
Causality, Explanation, Control and Meaning 
Habermas and Bluck (2000) equal causal coherence to explanatory coherence. 
Indeed, causality usually entails explanation. They argue that causal coherence is used 
to explain changes in the narrator (ibid). Linde (1993) sees adequate causality as a 
chain of causality that is accepted by the listener of the narrative as a good reason for 
some events. When there is inadequate causality in the life story told, the individual’s 
life is viewed as proceeding at random and thus as meaningless (Habermas & Bluck, 
2000; Linde, 1993). What is beneath the argument that a main function of narrative is 
to help people to make sense of their experiences (e.g. Pennebaker & Seagel, 1999) is 
the causality or explanatory principle. When we say we can make sense or understand 
something, it usually implies that we know more or less the reason for something. If 
the listeners struggle to make sense of it, a narrative may be regarded as not plausible 
enough and the narrator needs to render further explanation to increase plausibility 
(Habermas & Bluck, 2000; Linde, 1993). As narrators (of our life stories), in being 
able to offer causality or explanation, we gain a sense of control (Pennebaker & Seagel, 
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1999), purpose (McAdams, 1985; McAdams & McLean, 2013) and thus meaning. A 
meaningful life then seems to be a plausible story or can be told as a plausible story.  
The sense of control offered by a coherent story proffers the narrator the status 
of being the author of one’s own life, which is often regarded as serving to empower 
the narrator (Borg, 2018). What is implicit in the causal and explanatory aspects of 
coherence is that one can construct a narrative of oneself with full autonomy and that 
one can potentially have full knowledge of oneself. Yet, it is this act of rendering 
individuals as fully accountable for their narrative and coherence that is based on 
mastery and control that Butler (2004; 2005) criticises. This is the critique that my 
writings in later chapters will draw on.  
Butler (2004; 2005) argues against the proposition of an autonomous self who 
can give a full coherent account of oneself. Her argument is based on her belief in the 
fundamental relationality and sociality in our being (ibid). She starts her argument with 
human vulnerability that we cannot argue against (Butler, 1997, 2004). In her earlier 
work, she raises linguistic vulnerability (Butler, 1997). We are given a name, and 
addressed by language that is prior to our existence and beyond our control. Later, 
Butler (2004) furthers linguistic vulnerability to fundamental human vulnerability, 
meaning that we are exposed to injury, loss and violence, and that we are 
impressionable. This follows from ‘our being socially constituted bodies, attached to 
others, at risk of losing those attachments, exposed to others, at risk of violence by 
virtue of that exposure’ (Butler, 2004:20).  
Butler develops her argument against an autonomous self with mastery and full 
control on the base of human-being’s exposure to loss and grief. In the face of losing 
an other we do not simply undergo separation from the other, but also the attachment 
with the other that in part constitutes who we are. We are faced with the questions of 
whom I am without you, and what I have lost in losing you, which perhaps cannot be 
fully explained (Butler, 2004).This exposes our ‘unknowingness’ and the ‘unconscious 
imprint of [our] primary sociality’ (Butler, 2004:28) In grief, one cannot choose, plan 
or predict, rather (Butler, 2004:21): 
One is hit by waves, and […] one starts out the day with 
an aim, a project, a plan, and finds oneself foiled. One 
finds oneself fallen. One is exhausted but does not know 
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why. Something is larger than one’s own deliberate plan, 
one’s own knowing and choosing.  
What Butler (2004) argues here is that loss shows us the fundamental 
relationality of our being. We are not only done by the relation to others but also 
undone by it; we are vulnerable to the dispossession whose meaning we cannot fully 
explain. Something gets hold of us, which claims that we are not the master of 
ourselves. The primary and fundamental tie to others that constitutes us cannot always 
be recounted or explained, which challenges our notions of ourselves as autonomous 
and in control. In her discussion, Butler (2004) proposes a conception of self that is 
impressed upon and by others, that is not fully in our own control or clearly predictable. 
As she writes (Butler, 2005:37): 
The ‘I’ can tell neither the story of its own emergence 
nor the conditions of its own possibility without bearing 
witness to a state of affairs to which one could not have 
been present, which are prior to one’s own origins that 
one can narrate only at the expense of authoritative 
knowledge.   
According to Butler (2004:29-39), denial and fear of the human vulnerability 
and self-unknowingness drive us to ‘a fantasy of mastery’ and ‘a fantasy that the world 
formerly was orderly’.  
If, as much literature suggests, a coherent narrative has in it causality and 
plausible explanation, in my opinion, it is to ask for the mastery that we do not have 
over ourselves. It is to hold us fully accountable for ourselves and to deny the limit of 
self-knowledge or the unknowingness in our formation. Perhaps it could be 
empowering to tell a coherent narrative. However, requiring a coherent narrative of 
oneself at all times can be a violent act to an individual as a relational being whose 
primary relations are not all the time available to conscious knowledge (Butler, 2005).  
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Social and Relational Dimension of Coherent Narrative 
Following Butler’s (2004) argument of the fundamental relationality of our 
being and the impossibility of full mastery, I would also like to briefly review the 
aspect of social and relational demand in coherent narrative.   
The social and relational dimension of narrative has indeed been widely 
addressed in literature (e.g.Baerger & McAdams, 1999; Bruner, 2004b; Linde, 1993). 
Many narrative theorists take a social constructivism stance. Narrative is seen as a 
practice of social interaction (Brockmeier, 2004). Ricoeur (1991) believes that a 
story’s completion lies on the living receiver’s reading, which emphasise this 
interactive aspect of narrative. Narrative coherence then also has a strong, if not 
fundamental, social and relational dimension. 
Life story or narrative in general as psychosocial is widely accepted. However, 
the violence that can be induced by requiring a coherent narrative is not widely 
discussed.      
According to Baerger and McAdams (1999) and McAdams (2006), there are 
collective assumptions regarding certain rules a story should follow (though it might 
vary in different cultures). When these rules are violated, the story told may strike the 
audience as incoherent (McAdams, 2006). Such a story is often confusing and 
disconcerting for the audience (McAdams, 1997). Therefore, when the assumed rules 
of a coherent story are broken, as the audience, we tend to reorganise it, to fill the void 
ourselves or to ask for more details or information in order to make sense (McAdams, 
2006). As the audience, we have the need to hear coherent stories, to not to be confused 
or disconcerted. We also tend to remember better the stories that have a higher 
percentage of events on the causal chain (Trabasso et al., 1984).  
As Linde (1993:3) writes, ‘[i]n order to exist in the social world with a 
comfortable sense of being a good, social proper, and stable person, an individual 
needs to have a coherent, acceptable, and constantly revised life story’. As mentioned 
earlier, in order to not present one’s life as proceeding at random which brings a sense 
of meaninglessness to others and ourselves – or perhaps ourselves who live through 
others’ gaze – we need to offer a plausible coherent enough story giving plausible 
enough explanation. Hyvärinen et al. (2010:7) comment that the requirement for a 
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canonical model of story runs the risk of transforming one’s narrative as a ‘curriculum 
vitae demanded by others’.  
To conclude, coherent narrative is a social demand. This demand more or less 
renders us as accountable for the events of our lives, demanding the mastery that we 
do not possess and denying the opacity of our formation (Butler, 1997, 2004, 2005).  
Conclusions and Inquiries 
Discussion in this literature review makes clear the predominant view on the 
positive relation between narrative coherence and psychological well-being as well as 
the portrayal of narrative incoherence as undesirable. It also reveals existing debates 
about the relation between narrative, life and lived experience. 
In the predominant literature and theories about narrative, Hyvärinen et al. 
(2010) recognise what they call the coherence paradigm which asserts that 1) 
competent narratives always proceed linearly and chronologically with beginning, 
middle and end and with thematic closure; 2) the function of narrative and story-telling 
is to create coherence to experience; 3) individuals live a better and more ethical life 
when they have a coherent life story. To challenge the coherence paradigm, Hyvärinen 
et al. (2010:7) pose the question: ‘Can narrative coherence be a harmful phenomenon, 
how, and in which context?’ This is also part of my inquiry in this thesis.  
As Jackson and Mazzei (2013:265) write, ‘[w]hat is central is at the expense 
of what is marginal’. In centralising narrative coherence as desirable and claiming 
narrative form is necessary for life and lived experience, what is outside of this realm 
and what does not fit this specific claim are marginalised and pathologised, which 
Strawson’s (2004a, 2004b, 2010) argument suggests. To insist on a coherent, mastered 
self-narrative on oneself at all times, according to Butler (2004, 2005), can do violence 
to the individual’s actual experiencing and one’s innate self-unknowingness.  
In existing critiques and questionings on narrative coherence, there is a lack of 
discussion that engages with this toptic from a reflective and experiential first-person 
place. For example, Hyvärinen et al. (2010) critique the coherence paradigm 
theoretically, methodologically and ethically from multiple disciplines, but how 
narrative incoherence is experienced and what it is like to be required of coherence are 
not shown. Although Strawson (2004a, 2004b, 2010) writes in a first-person voice, his 
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experience is taken as an example for his philosophical argument and the world of 
incoherence is not present. In the field of counselling and psychotherapy which is 
concerned with human experience, reflective and experiential texts, especially those 
that give insight from the client’s perspective, make a profound contribution to the 
development of knowledge and practice in the field. Currently such texts in the topic 
of narrative coherence and incoherence in the context of counselling and 
psychotherapy are lacking. This is one of the reasons why I believe my thesis can make 
a unique contribution to the field.  
Starting from a personal place, aligned with Strawson (2004a, 2004b, 2010), 
Hyvärinen et al. (2010) and Freeman (2010), I ask the following questions: Do life and 
lived experience necessarily require narrative structure? To what extent is a coherent 
narrative essential for psychological and emotional well-being? Does coherent 
narrative always serve well for the narrator or the client? How can we think about 
narrative coherence and incoherence anew? 
In asking these questions, I seek to deconstruct the concept of narrative 
coherence that is often taken for granted. My thesis is not anti-narrative nor against 
coherence. To desconstruct the concept of narrative coherence is not to replace 
coherence with incoherence. Deconstruction, according to Derrida (1997:6), is made 
of ‘the tension between memory, fidelity, the preservation of something that has been 
given to us, and, at the same time, heterogeneity, something absolutely new, and a 
break’. The deconstruction of the concept of narrative coherence in this thesis is not a 
destruction of coherence or narrativity, but a constant engagement with this tension 
between the preservation of them and heterogeneity, the newness, the break to see how 
the dominant interpretation and emphasis on narrative coherence have been produced 
(Jackson & Mazzei, 2012). Derrida (1997) sees deconstruction as to show that things, 
whether it is beliefs, concepts, texts or anything else, do not have definable and stable 
meanings. Deconstruction is to stretch beyond boundaries, to push against limits, and 
to disturb tranquillity (ibid). In this sense, doing this thesis itself is already to think 
about narrative coherence anew, to think about coherence in a way that does not equal 
unity, harmony, closure and linearity (Freeman, 2010). In this way, the binary between 
coherence and incoherence can be broken.  
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For the time being, when I discuss narrative coherence in this thesis, I am 
referring to the concept of narrative coherence that puts emphasis on temporality, 
causality and what both of them entail. 
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Chapter 3 Coming into My Methodology and Onto-
Epistemological Position 
In this chapter, I will offer an account on locating my research focus and 
methodology, through which the rationale for my critical engagement with writing as 
inquiry as methodology will be explained. Because my research topic is concerned 
with narrative and lived experience and my methodology involves substantial amount 
of writing, it is necessary to clarify my onto-epistemological position in terms of 
language, experience and the relationship between them. In writing about how I have 
come to locate my research focus and methodology, I found myself unavoidably also 
speaking about my onto-epistemological position. Therefore, I have decided not to 
state my onto-epistemological position in a separate chapter, but to integrate my 
discussion on ontology, epistemology and methodology in this chapter.  
I will firstly offer how I have come (back) to this research topic which is 
consistent with my ontological and epistemological positions. Reflecting on the 
journey of locating my research topic, I recognise that I have engaged in the searching 
for the ‘right’ research question and the internal knowing through tacit knowledge and 
that I have engaged in writing as a way to know and think, which led me to consider 
the use of writing as inquiry in this research project. I will also explain my rationale 
for going into sandplay sessions myself as a pathway to gain knowledge of my research 
topic. This is followed by an introduction to sandplay therapy, a brief account of the 
sandplay sessions arrangement and ethical considerations. In the last section of this 
chapter, I will make explicit what counts as ‘data’ and how the processes of data 
generation and analysis are inseparable in this research project. I will also explain in 
this section my decision of presenting my thesis as a collection of writings on my 
research topic rather than a systematic whole and how this way of data presentation is 
consistent with my research topic. 
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Methodology and Onto-Epistemology  
Returning to the Heart 
We shall not cease from exploration 
and the end of all our exploring 
will be to arrive where we started 
and know the place for the first time. 
                                          T.S. Eliot 
 
Locating my research focus and methodology has not been a linear process. It 
has been a process of wondering and searching, losing and returning.  
I had travelled a long journey in deciding on this research topic. Looking at it 
retrospectively, I realised that it was a bumpy journey on attuning to the internal call; 
a call from inside to know what has not yet been known (Sela-Smith, 2002). I had most 
of the time followed the lead of my academic brain, not my heart. My research topic 
moved from theoretical exploration regarding lived experience and language to 
researching others’ experience of sandplay therapy regarding playing and talking. I 
settled on one topic, started to research into it but then found myself unable to continue.  
The mismatch between the personal internal call and the research topics I 
previously engaged with created tension that stopped me from engaging with the 
research wholeheartedly. This tension drove me to change my research focus again 
and again. 
After talking and thinking about the personal meaning of the research project 
in my personal therapy, I started to engage with the difficulty in talking about my 
experience. As explained in the introduction, this difficulty and struggle regarding 
telling my own stories and being articulate, have brought me a strong sense of shame. 
This might have prevented me from engaging with my research project on a personal 
level. Realising this, I gradually started the road of attuning to the internal call and 
integrating my professional, personal and research lives. 
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Sandplay, a powerful pathway to the psyche (Kalff, 2004), touches my soul in 
my every wordless encounter with it as a ‘sandplayer’. I previously decided to research 
clients’ experience of sandplay therapy. While holding in my heart questions and 
ambivalence regarding the use of language and the arguments for narrative coherence 
in therapy, which I was not aware of then, my striving for my research project had all 
been establishing an order and coherence that were supposed to bring the comfort of 
certainty. 
Yet this striving brought agonising discomfort. In the search of the step-by-
step order and coherence, I moved further and further away from what stands in my 
heart. I tried to force a shape into the shapeless that I intended to explore – the 
unspeakable, the incoherence and the possible need for not making sense. This striving 
for putting my research ‘in place’ and into linearity is doomed to be a turning away 
from heart.  
As Polkinghorne (2005) recognises, there is contested philosophical debate 
regarding the relationship between language and experience, in the continuum from 
experience precedes language (e.g. Husserl) to experience is constructed by language 
(e.g. Derrida). Because of my personal experience, for instance, my sandplay 
experience, I hold a view that experience holds preverbal elements and is more 
complex than words. When I came across Gendlin, his work touched me as if I found 
a bosom friend. For Gendlin (2004), our bodies carry implicit intricacy. It is implicit 
in the way that it cannot yet be articulated or symbolised. Very little of what we feel 
is in the form of explicit verbal symbol (Gendlin, 1997a). This is the ontological 
common ground that I share with Gendlin.  
However, there is something unsettling for me. Gendlin (2004) sees a close 
relationship between language and body. Knowing, for him, is a process that is both 
embodied and languaged (Todres, 2007). The physically felt experiencing is concrete 
as it is what we can inwardly point to or pay attention to (Gendlin, 1997a). In this 
inward searching, the kind of language that is bodily engaged can come. Gendlin is 
not at all advocating that experience can or should be ‘accurately represented’. For 
him, language is more complex than a representation of experience (Gendlin, 2004). 
What he argues for is the healthy relationship between language and the embodied 
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knowing. He advocates for the coming of language that is embodied, for the searching 
of the ‘good words’ that carry the meaning forward (Todres, 2007). The body and the 
implicit knowledge it carries knows the language; it seeks for what needs to be said 
precisely (Gendlin, 1995). ‘Our bodies imply what we want to say’, as he writes 
(Gendlin, 1997b:28). I have experienced the bodily relief Gendlin talks about when 
the ‘good words’ were found.  
For Gendlin, the bodily experience one lives through can be more than words 
can say, yet it looks for words or symbolisation (Todres, 2007). However, for me, the 
silenced doubt about the assumed necessity of searching for or coming to 
symbolisation hovers. Here are some examples. I tried numerous times, with other 
people or by myself, to talk about my personal development through my counselling 
training, but I still have not yet come to symbolisation that provides me with the relief 
I look for. I talked about the family loss due to an abortion in groups, supervision, 
personal therapy and with friends and colleagues; I wrote letters to my unborn sibling. 
However, I have never felt this experience of family and personal loss that haunts me 
has been satisfyingly told or even can be satisfyingly told and understood by others 
and myself. I have had several chances to do sandplay myself and each time it offered 
me powerful experience that I am not able to describe. In spite of my research and 
learning on sandplay, communication with sandplay therapists and my reflection, I am 
still not able to give my sandplay experience satisfactory voices, not to mention ‘full’ 
voices. What I do know is that I feel content during the play. If it is not for the purpose 
of research, learning or communication, I do not feel a strong need to verbalise these 
profound experience. 
Though suggesting a more dynamic and interactive relationship between lived 
experience and symbolisation, Gendlin’s theory, at least in my reading of it, carries the 
belief on the therapeutic effect of coming into symbolisation, of giving lived 
experience a form, no matter if it is language, image or other creative forms. My doubt 
about this has always been in my heart but I had felt pressure, in terms of time and 
academic rigor, to settle myself onto-epistemologically in order to carry on my 
research methodologically. Settling myself onto-epistemologically on Gendlin’s 
philosophy about language and lived experience and conducting heuristic inquiry 
sounds coherent. It is coherent to a good extent, except that I muted the part of me that 
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does not sit quite well with the epistemological position Gendlin takes, that doubts the 
very thing that we often do in therapy room as clients and therapists – telling stories, 
making sense, giving order to chaos and the fragmented. I told myself that I am 
establishing coherence in my ontology, epistemology and methodology for my 
research project not for my life. So perhaps this is what needs to be muted.  
Thankfully, writing a conference paper about narrative and psychotherapy later 
on gave me a chance to find the part of myself from which this thesis’s inquiry starts. 
It gave me a chance to temporarily step away from the research project. I allowed 
myself to write about my doubts, uncertainty, questions and shame. I wrote into my 
experience in response to relevant literature. While dialoguing with literature, the part 
of me that finds relief, comfort, contentment, containment and companionship in 
narrating and the part of me that feels frustrated, forced, discontent and agitated in 
having to generate coherent narrative also constantly interacted with each other. In this 
back and forth process, I drew on my personal, professional and research experiences. 
Although it was unsettling, it was the first time that I felt the coming together of these 
parts. I was not only using my academic brain but also my experiencing-self in writing. 
This suits a core belief and striving of mine as a counselling and psychotherapy 
researcher and practitioner – these two parts need to come together if we aim at 
generating knowledge that informs better practice.  
As Pelias (2004:9) writes, ‘[t]he alchemy that separates the head from the heart 
finds no gold’. When I previously ignored and hid my epistemological unsettlement, 
it had caused a separation between the research project and myself, between the self 
in life, in practice, and the self in research. I had come to a point where I treated my 
research project as merely a wearisome task that just needed to be finished on time, so 
that I could move on with my life. 
When I was able to write about what is closer to my heart, which is what stands 
closer to the onto-epistemological position I hold, I rediscovered my eagerness to 
explore the idea of narrative and narrative coherence in psychotherapy about which I 
had gained embodied, though implicit, knowledge in my life and in sandplay, but had 
been lost. It was in the following research supervision meeting where I saw the 
possibility, or even the necessity, to relinquish the previous striving and free myself to 
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do research in a way that is consistent with my onto-epistemological position. I was 
then able to go into the incoherence and fragmented not only theoretically and 
experientially, but also methodologically by letting go of what I have perceived as the 
neat, organised, and rigorous way of doing research.  
In his book The Wounded Researcher – Research with Soul in Mind, 
Romanyshyn (2013:4)  proposes that research with soul in mind is a process of ‘re-
search’, a process of remembering what we know but had forgotten or discovering 
what we already have known but without knowing it. Laying in the relationship 
between the researcher and the research topic is ‘a weight of history that waits to be 
spoken’ (Romanyshyn, 2013:4). Knowing for me in this thesis indeed is remembering 
and returning.  
‘Losing an object is the psyche’s way of finding it’, as Mogenson (2016:18) 
writes. Looking back at the process of coming to my research topic, I have a strong 
sense of the research topic finding me as much as I find it. It is a process of finding, 
losing and returning with different insight and experiences. 
 
Writing the Heart 
This is how I write: as if the secret that is in me were before me.  
                                                                                            (Speedy, 2008:137)  
This process of turning to the self of the researcher resonates with Heuristic 
Inquiry proposed by Moustakas (1990) which stresses the importance of finding the 
‘right’ research question. The research question, for Moustakas (1990), is deeply felt 
and has an emotional effect on the researcher that cannot be ignored.  
The discovery of the research topic is an inner search, an internal calling from 
the self (Sela-Smith, 2002). In Moustakas’s (1990:39) words: 
All heuristic inquiry begins with the internal search to 
discover, with an encompassing puzzlement, a 
passionate desire to know, a devotion and commitment 
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to pursue a question that is strongly connected to one's 
own identity and selfhood.  
The starting point of heuristic inquiry is an initial engagement with searching 
for and clarifying the topic that we want to research (West, 2001). This search comes 
from an intuitive place (Sela-Smith, 2002) and the process of it cannot be hurried 
(West, 2001). As Sela-Smith (2002:65) puts it: this phase ‘is like the attention-getting 
circumstance pointing to something that cannot yet be seen but has the smell of 
significance that draws any scientist into inquiry’. The researcher perhaps does not 
even know what needs to be done, but there is a sense that something of significance 
is calling out from the inward that cannot be dismissed (Sela-Smith, 2002). As 
explained previously, this indeed is my experience of locating my research topic.  
An essential component of heuristic inquiry is the concept of tacit knowledge 
suggested by Polanyi (1983). The belief brought by this concept is that ‘we can know 
more than we can tell’ and much of the knowledge we have cannot be put into words 
(Polany, 1983:4). A widely used example of tacit knowledge is that we can recognise 
the face of a friend from a crowd of people yet we are usually not able to articulate 
how we do that (Polany, 1983). Polanyi (1983:15) writes: 
‘Our body is the ultimate instrument of all our external 
knowledge, whether intellectual or practical. In all our 
waking moments we are relying on our awareness of 
contacts of our body with things outside for attending to 
these things.’ 
The tacit dimension of knowing is the internal place where feelings, experience 
and meaning join and together form a more whole picture of the world and a way of 
navigating the world (Sela-Smith, 2002). Asserting that the internal pathway of self is 
the way to know, heuristic inquiry encourages connectedness and intimacy with the 
phenomenon being studied (Douglass & Moustakas, 1985). In heuristic inquiry, the 
phenomenon is being understood within the researcher. The research process starts and 
ends with the researcher’s inner being (West, 2001). Heuristic inquiry ‘opens to 
knowledge that is embedded and integrated within the self through understanding of 
the self in relation to and in context of the dynamic whole’ (Sela-Smith, 2002:55).  
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The emphasis on the self of the researcher and the internal pathway to know 
makes heuristic inquiry a match for my research project. In fact, instead of deciding to 
do heuristic inquiry, I recognised my research process in my reading of heuristic 
inquiry. My narrative above illustrates the finding of the ‘right’ research question in 
heuristic inquiry. 
Although I find resonance in the rationale of heuristic inquiry, I find that the 
heuristic phases (initial engagement, immersion, incubation, illumination, explication 
and creative synthesis) suggested by Moustakas (1990) does not give enough space for 
the uncertainty and ambivalence involved in my research project. From my perspective, 
the suggestion of these phases indicates a belief that there is an essence to be shed light 
on, to be explicated. The phases seem to suggest a sense of organisation or ‘putting in 
order’, whereas in my inquiry, I question the necessity of order and explication. 
Starting from a place of ambivalence and uncertainty, this thesis intends to shed light 
on the pathway to think explicitly about the implicit emphasis on narrative coherence, 
but I do not expect a promising ‘answer’ to the searching. I do not wish to turn this 
ambivalence into certainty or offer resolution. I wonder how we can give pre-
determined phases to a journey without a set destination that wanders into the unknown.  
Referring back to the process of writing the conference paper, I recognised it 
was indeed a process where ‘thoughts happened in the writing’ (Richardson & St. 
Pierre, 2005:972) that writing as a method of inquiry stresses. I arrived at places that I 
did not expect before. I came up with associations and thoughts that I did not have 
prior to the writing. I felt what I was not aware of during the writing. The knowing did 
not come from design. While heuristic inquiry seems to offer a ‘promise’ that the 
essence of the researched phenomena can be known through being lived in the 
researcher, writing as inquiry allows more space for uncertainty. Writing as inquiry 
‘assumes and expresses a curiosity or even a thirst for knowledge about the contents 
of the study, but has no illusions that this might speak for itself. It leaves much unsaid, 
uncertain, and incomplete’(Speedy, 2008:138-139). These words capture the nature of 
my inquiry in this thesis.  
In heuristic inquiry, the knowing happens intuitively and bodily, and the 
writing or creative synthesis is a process of bringing together the experience and 
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understanding emerged in the research (Kenny, 2012). In other words, in heuristic 
inquiry, writing is the representation of what has been known by the researcher. In 
comparison, in writing as inquiry, writing itself is a process to know.  
My process of writing the conference paper was a process of coming to know. 
It was coming to know more about both the subject of research – narrative in/coherence 
in the context of counselling and psychotherapy – and my own position towards the 
subject. Instead of ‘writing-up’ in which the author knows what they want to compose, 
I engaged in the ‘writing into’ in which the author comes to realise their beliefs and 
finds the language that crystallises their thoughts (Pelias, 2011). In this process, I came 
to know what I know through writing (ibid). Deep inside, I have always known the 
crucial impact my ambivalence towards language and narrative has in my personal life, 
professional practice and research. However, it was only in writing which is also the 
process of thinking that these came together.  
Writing as inquiry is a process of realisation which can emerge as ‘is-ness’ or 
‘perhaps-ness’ (Pelias, 2011:660). I find this feature of writing as inquiry relieving 
because of the ambivalent nature of my inquiry. The fact that writing as inquiry 
challenges the assumption of linearity and taken-for-granted written forms (Speedy, 
2005) particularly suits my tentative challenge towards narrative coherence and linear 
stories in psychotherapy. 
Writing as inquiry shares with heuristic inquiry the valuing of the self of the 
researcher; it is ‘writing from our Selves’ (Richardson, 2000:924). As Pelias (2011:659) 
writes, ‘when I write, I am asserting a self, insisting that I matter’. The writing 
researcher is the instrument; the knowing of the self and the knowing of the researched 
phenomena is intertwined (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005). When writing as inquiry 
acts as personal realisation, it tells the writer about themselves, their beliefs and their 
sense-making; and ‘their writing becomes a location for readers’ consideration’, acting 
also as public argument (Pelias, 2011:660).  
Sela-Smith (2001, 2002), bringing forth a crucial critique to Moustakas’ 
heuristic inquiry, argues that to avoid the personal pain connected to the research topic 
and process, the heuristic researcher can move from concrete experience to the 
abstraction of thinking about experience (Sela-Smith, 2001). She recognises two 
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ambivalent and conflicting processes within Moustakas’ method in his study of 
loneliness. The first one is a self-search based on the feeling self of the researcher, 
while the second one moves away from the experiencing self to the phenomena as if it 
is an object outside of the self. Sela-Smith (2001) critiques that this second process 
loses the internal focus of the researcher as the feeling person. When this happens, 
what is learnt is from an observational perspective rather than from within the 
experience, which is in contrast with the fundamental stance of heuristic inquiry.  
Different from Sela-Smith who is against the observational perspective of the 
researcher and Moustakas who seems not to recognise this position, for me, the moving 
away from and coming back to myself are crucial. I recognise that writing for me is 
also a process of entering into dialogue, not only with myself but also with the 
literature. The observer stance, which allows space for me to think, is equally 
important as the experiential connection to the self. I am being both the active writing 
subject and the written object who interact with each other (Ronai, 1995) and with the 
literature. This brings the discussion about my relation to theory in this thesis. Instead 
of thinking about and interpreting research data using theory, I exercise what Jackson 
and Mazzei (2012, 2013) propose as using theory to think with data and use data to 
think with theory. Jackson and Mazzei (bid) argue that this breaks the binary between 
theory and research practice and show how these two constitute or make each other. It 
is easy to interpret writing as inquiry as reflective writing from experiential places only 
and exclude its engagement with theory. This view generates a separation and binary 
between reflective writing and analytical writing, in writing as inquiry, writing is both 
the process of data collection/generation and data analysis (Richardson & St. Pierre, 
2005), which indicates that there is no separation between theoretical analysis and 
reflective writing. Richardson (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005:974) encourages 
researchers who intend to use writing as inquiry to try to produce ‘seamless’ text in 
which ‘previous literature, theory, and methods are placed in textually meaningful 
ways rather than in disjunctive sections’. Such a ‘seamless’ text is what I will present 
in this thesis. My writing as inquiry is not merely writing in its literal way, but also a 
continuous circle of writing, reading, and writing with and about readings. As 
Bochner’s (1997) endeavour in blurring the line between theory and story, my use of 
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writing as inquiry also disrupts the line between theoretical analysis and reflective 
writing.        
What also strikes me about writing as inquiry is its endeavour in engaging the 
reader. It puts a smile of resonance on my face while I read Richardson’s (Richardson 
& St. Pierre, 2005) writing about the boringness of some of the qualitative research. 
Both Speedy (2001) and Bondi and Fewell (2016) recognise the disconnection 
between counselling research and practice and that practitioners often find the research 
papers inaccessible or intimidating to read. In a three-day counselling and 
psychotherapy research conference I went to, I was shocked to see that while most of 
the researchers presenting in the conference were practitioners, I did not hear much 
from the reflexive voice of their practitioner-selves in their presentations. I was 
presented with a lot of numbers, categories and theories that I found difficult to 
understand, to take in and to relate to my practice. This experience left me wondering 
for a long time. If counselling and psychotherapy research could not reach the majority 
of counselling and psychotherapy practitioners, then what is the value of our research 
whose ultimate aim is to enhance counselling and psychotherapy practices? 
In the other conference where I was able to bring my uncertainty, questions, 
doubts and shame into my presentation, audiences approached me afterwards and said 
that my paper made them think. I did not promise any answers, but the audiences 
engaged in the questions. This is the impact that I would like this thesis to have. I do 
not want my research to be the ‘flat piece’, a ‘cold dinner’ that is forced down (Pelias, 
2011:666).  
I agree wholeheartedly that ‘[q]ualitative research has to be read, not scanned; 
its meaning is in the reading’ (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005:960). Writing as inquiry 
is committed to capturing the reader’s attention, to engaging them in conversation 
(Speedy, 2008) and reaching beyond academia (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005). It 
‘attempts to provide sufficient substance to contribute towards scholarship in the field 
as well as sufficient space to engage the reader’s imagination’ (Speedy, 2008:139). 
This is what I try to do methodologically. 
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Writing as Elegy  
[I]n that space of transition and transience, where light fades into darkness 
and darkness begins to shimmer with light, something of the soul is always left behind 
and needs to be mourned. 
(Romanyshyn, 2013:30) 
Given my questions about narrative and language in psychotherapy, one might 
argue the conflict between this and the underlying belief of writing as inquiry which 
is ‘language matters’ (Pelias, 2011:660). Another idea perhaps embedded in writing is 
to establish order: ‘[s]imply to line up words one after another upon a page is to create 
some order where it did not exist, to give recognisable shape to the sadness and chaos 
of our lives’ (Smith, 2007, cited in Pelias, 2011:660). This quote cited by Pelias, one 
of the pioneers in writing as inquiry, suggests that the process of writing is ordering 
and giving shape to our experiences. This is similar to the widely suggested and often 
accepted therapeutic effect of narrative and story-telling in counselling and 
psychotherapy. Therefore, there can be inner conflicts between what I am questioning 
and the methodological choice I make. This section aims at discussing these potential 
conflicts and my approach to them. 
I would like to start with my disbelief in exactitude. Poet Louise Glück (2000, 
cited in Pelias, 2004:72) says there is nothing more crucial or exciting than being able 
to say fully and exactly about something and to get to the bottom of something. 
However, I resist the lure of exactitude and relinquish the attempt to reach to the 
bottom of the psyche. For me, a sense of loss is always located at the core of languaging 
or writing lived experience, which I will explore now through psychodynamic theory, 
especially in relation to symbolisation, the development of the third position and the 
unconscious.    
In psychodynamic theory, the development of the capacity to symbolise is 
viewed as closely related to the development of the third position (Bondi, 2013). In 
early infancy, the child’s needs are met without language; having his/her needs 
accurately responded to gives the child a sense of omnipotence and mergence with the 
world and the mother or carer (Bondi, 2013; Winnicott, 1960). Later in the infancy 
development, after the external reality is experienced by the infant, the links that 
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connect the infant to each of the parents separately are confronted by the link between 
the two parents in which s/he is an excluded third (Britton, 1993). The child comes to 
realise that each of the parents are separate others who do not solely exist for him/her 
(Bondi, 2013). This position as an observer rather than a participant is the third position 
(Britton, 1993). Its establishment provides us the capacity for ‘reflecting on ourselves 
whilst being ourselves’ (Britton, 2004:48). And the achievement of the movement 
between immersion in lived experience and the third position brings the capacity to 
symbolise and reflect on our experience (Bondi, 2013).  
The concept of the third position and its crucial place in the development of 
the capacity for symbolisation and reflexivity indicate a separateness, or to borrow 
Balfour’s (2005:51) phrase, a ‘linked separateness’. As Bondi (2013) points out, there 
is always a gap between the being in the experience and the reflection on or being 
curious about the experience without which symbolisation is not possible. Thus, there 
is an implicit acknowledgment in symbolisation that the experience being symbolised 
has gone and we are no longer at one with that experience (ibid). As Colman (2007:22) 
writes, ‘a symbol cannot be a symbol of something unless it represents something other 
than itself. Therefore the thing that is symbolised must be absent from the symbol.’ 
Language as a form of symbolisation intrinsically carries the sense of absence and loss 
with it.  
Moving to the third position is a key developmental experience, from the 
psychodynamic perspective, yet at the same time, it is also ‘suffused with unavoidable 
pain and loss’ (Lanman, 2005:147). It shatters our fantasy of a world as an absolute 
oneness with the mother or carer in which language is not necessary. Obtaining the 
capacity to reflect on our experiences is to know that ‘we have lost an archaic sense of 
one-ness with the world and with ourselves’ (Bondi, 2013:15). Language entails this 
pain and loss.  
In addition, Romanyshyn (2013) points out the complex relation between the 
discipline of psychology and what it studies – the soul2. The difference between ‘the 
standpoint of consciousness’ and ‘the reality of the unconscious’ determines the 
                                                 
2 The use of the word ‘soul’ in Jungian theory, on which Romanyshyn’s writing is based, has its ambiguity 
and I interpret Romanyshyn’s use of soul here as the totality of psychic world and process (Samuels et al., 1986) , 
including the unconscious. 
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problem of language (Romanyshyn, 2013:26). The belief of the unconscious 
determines that our psychic world is always beyond the reach of language 
(Romanyshyn, 2013). Drawing on poet Brendan Kennelly’s reflection on his struggles 
to write down his experience with the figure ‘the man made of rain’, Romanyshyn 
(2013:30) raises that writing down the soul might be similar to applying the language 
of ‘the daylight view of conscious’ to the things in ‘the nighttime view of unconscious’. 
Language use in research that concerns with our psychic world is a way of ‘speaking 
of meaning as a presence that is haunted by absence’ (Romanyshyn, 2013:29). This 
links back to the sense of absence embedded in language, as discussed previously.  
As can be seen through my discussion so far, the development of the capacity 
to reflect and to symbolise, and the inadequacy of language in speaking the fullness of 
our experiential world which includes the unconscious, entail a profound sense of loss. 
Thinking about this loss, I am particularly drawn to one of Romanyshyn’s (2013) 
proposals for researchers to keep soul in mind while writing down the soul: writing as 
elegy. In this proposal of elegiac writing, he honours the sense of mourning for what 
has slipped away, what has been ‘lost, forgotten, left behind, abandoned, and yet 
haunts our efforts to know the world and ourselves and to say what we know’ 
(Romanyshyn, 2013:313). He sees the researcher as the ‘failed poet’ who ‘stands in 
the gap between the fullness of experience and the ‘failure’ of language to command 
it’, who ‘is able to bear the tension between knowing and not knowing’ (Romanyshyn, 
2013:9-10). 
There is tension between the nature of this research project, my epistemology 
position and the adoption of writing as inquiry. However, instead of seeing this as 
contradiction, I see it as elegy, a hymn of lament (Romanyshyn, 2013) for what has 
been lost in language. When writing what I can write, I also hold in mind what I cannot 
write and the mourning for it.  
This sense of mourning is also brought by the ordered and linear nature of 
writing. I came to realise this through my struggle in writing or typing on the computer.  
As I walked to the library on a morning which was to be devoted to my thesis 
writing, I felt a sense of reluctance. I was puzzled because I had been feeling excited 
about finding a research direction that felt right to me and eager to read and write. 
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While I attended to this feeling, what appeared on my mind was the computer screen. 
I imagined myself sitting in front of the computer with the Word document open, 
struggling to type on the blank screen. I imagined myself starting to type, feeling 
unsatisfied, deleting and then re-writing. Sometimes I spent a long time ‘rehearsing’ 
in my mind before I could type even just one sentence. This is an anxiety-provoking 
process. However, I then realised that while typing drains me, when I write with pen 
and paper, it is usually a lot more relieving. When I have a spark of inspiration, I have 
to go for pen and paper even when I have a computer right in front of me. Thus in that 
morning, I started to wonder (with pen and paper) what this is about, what is my trouble 
with writing on the computer. I had both my notebook and the word document in front 
of me, and then I noticed how neat the words looked on the computer screen.  
The words on the screen stand one after another, neat and tidy, straight line, 
equal spacing. There is no trace of crossing, shifting, inserting; no trace of my process, 
struggle or excitement. When something is deleted, it is gone. When something is 
amended, it looks like it has always been how it looks like in the present time. So much 
is left out in the neat screen text. On searching my way to the current research focus 
and methodology, I hand wrote most of the materials. I wrote here and there, with all 
the crossing, adding and grammar and spelling mistakes. They were ‘all over the place’. 
I wrote thoughts that crossed my mind. I copied the quotes that I love. I wrote my 
responses to them. They were bits and pieces. After I put them in order on the computer 
screen, the text can never tell this ‘all over the place’ and ‘bits and pieces’. Sometimes 
I am surprised when I read the Word documents I typed previously by how ordered 
and logical they appear to be. When I read them, I see a person with a clear mind who 
knew exactly what she was doing, whereas in my memory I was not like this at all. 
These texts do not tell the struggles, the putting together, the adding in, the clutter and 
my messy writing process. There is an academic requirement for me to write in a 
presentable manner, to cut out the parts that do not fit. It is comforting to see my 
thoughts come together as a whole, and that I am making sense thus others can 
understand me and give feedback, which makes communication possible. However, 
the parts of me and my process that these neat texts cannot tell are left out and 
abandoned. 
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Just like the keyboard and computer screen leave behind the messy writing 
process, writing itself can leave behind the non-linear and messy aspects of the 
experience. This is the potential paradox in my research – to use writing, which usually 
is embedded with order, to discuss or question the predominance of order and 
coherence. I have no solution to propose for this paradox. It is another inevitable 
painful loss to be mourned in writing. It is writing down as well as leaving out and 
cutting off. Writing as elegy is also homage to this aspect of loss. 
However, this failure of language does not mean that our writing in the field 
concerning lived experience is doomed. Pelias (2004:78) sees exactitude and closure 
in writing as tasks that can never be accomplished, yet he also writes, ‘it is the search 
that matters’. While humbly acknowledging the losses and unbridgeable gaps, many 
researchers have made heart-warming and valuable efforts to write down the soul, to 
show lived experience, to know, to convey meanings and at the same time to allow 
themselves to be transformed by the writing (e.g. Richardson, 1997). I am joining them 
in this endeavour. I write for possibility, not for promise. 
Lastly, I would also like to point out that writing itself in this research project 
is an immersion in the inadequacy of language and narrative including what is brought 
as well as left out by the order and coherence in language and narrative. When I write, 
I am not only seeking to know, but also experiencing the failure of language. Together 
with sandplay which is mainly embodied and non-verbal, it offers me a glimpse into 
the unspeakable.  
Sandplay, A Pathway to the Researched 
Having discussed ontology, epistemology and methodology, I will now move 
to discuss in detail the research method I use to approach my research topic based on 
my methodological choice.  
My immersion in the topic of narrative coherence started before my research 
project took clear form. It was present in my daily life, in my personal therapy and in 
my work with clients. However, when I explicitly located my research topic, I 
wondered how I could engage even more with it, especially with the unnarratable and 
unspeakable. Sandplay came to mind immediately.  
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Sandplay has always been one of the reasons that motivate me to undertake 
this research project. In each of my encounters with sandplay, it offered me something 
that talking therapy failed to offer. Having experience of sandplay in research and 
practice contexts as well as experience of few years of talking therapy as a client, I 
have had a sense of the differences between these two approaches especially regarding 
speaking and the unspeakable, and narrating and the unnarratable. Sandplay’s 
embodied, non-verbal nature and the space it gives to silent play in which coherent 
narrative is not emphasised offer me a chance to fully engage with a space and time 
where language and narration, including the pressure of narration from myself and/or 
others, are absent. At the same time, the presence of a sandplay therapist can offer me 
a chance to talk if I wish. Therefore, it not only provides me with the experience of 
silence, embodiment and the non-verbal play, but also allows me the chance to try to 
verbally share my experience and stories if I wish. This means that I have access to 
what talking about the embodied, unnarrated or unspeakable is like, and what this 
talking can offer and fail to offer me. I see sandplay as a pathway to know or at least 
an attempt to know that I am researching.  
For these reasons, I decided to engage with sandplay sessions as the 
‘sandplayer’ to gain the unique experience that I would not get otherwise. 
A Brief Introduction to Sandplay Therapy 
Having explained my rationale for using sandplay as a medium to gain 
knowledge of my research topic, before moving into information about the sandplay 
sessions arrangement and the ethical consideration, I would like to offer a brief 
introduction to sandplay therapy  for readers to understand my choice of method.  
The Use of Terms 
Since the use of sandtray and miniatures has been integrated into therapeutic 
practice of different theoretical orientations (Carey, 1999; Day & Day, 2012; Kosanke 
et al., 2016) and has been given different names by various modalities, it is necessary 
to firstly clarify the use of terms in this thesis.  
I use the term ‘sandplay therapy’ in this thesis to exclusively refer to the 
Jungian approach to sandplay developed by Swiss Jungian Psychoanalyst Dora Kalff, 
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and use the term ‘sandtray therapy’ to refer to the therapeutic work involving the use 
of sand and miniatures in general (Carey, 1999; Day & Day, 2012). 
The client’s creation on the sand is usually named by sandplay therapists as the 
sand picture (e.g. Ammann, 1991; Kalff, 2004). Some authors also refer to it as sand 
world (e.g. Rae, 2013; Zhou, 2009). I prefer to adopt the term ‘sand world’ because of 
the following reasons. First of all, compared to ‘sand picture’, the term ‘sand world’ 
better conveys the three-dimensional feature of sandplay. Moreover, as the creation on 
the sand is regarded as a concrete manifestation of the client’s inner state (Zhou, 2009) 
which contains material that is ambiguous and flowing (Ammann, 1991), the word 
‘world’ emphasises the ever-changing nature of experience whereas ‘picture’ might 
suggest a static image. In her introduction to sandplay therapy, Kalff (1991:1) also 
describes the sandplay process as the client setting up ‘a world corresponding to his or 
her inner state’. Therefore, I find it sensible to name the client’s creation on the sand 
as a ‘sand world’.  
Sandplay Therapy 
Inspired by British child psychiatrist and paediatrician Margaret Lowenfeld’s 
‘World Technique’ (Boik & Goodwin, 2000), Kalff developed her own method of 
working with sand and miniatures which she calls ‘Sandplay’, based on Jungian 
psychoanalysis (Turner, 2005). Initially, sandplay therapy was developed for therapy 
with children, but later it started to be used for adults. Nowadays, it is widely used for 
various age groups, from children (e.g. Maree et al., 2012; Nasab & Alipour, 2015), 
young people (e.g. e.g. Zhang et al., 2011) to older adults (e.g. Suri, 2012). It is also 
used for couple therapy (Albert & Paulo, 2015) and family therapy (Carey, 1994). 
Different forms of sandplay therapy have been utilised in various areas, including, to 
name a few, depression (e.g. Ammann, 1991; Maree et al., 2012), dementia (e.g. Suri, 
2012), autism (e.g. Lu et al., 2010) and interpersonal issues (e.g. Zhang et al., 2011). 
The Process and Material of Sandplay Therapy 
As indicated by its name, sandplay therapy involves playing in the sandtray 
during therapy (Kalff, 1991). The sandtray is approximately 30 × 20 × 3 inches in size 
(Zhou, 2009), filled with sand. Sometimes, there are two trays, one with dry sand and 
one with wet sand (Kalff, 1991; Turner, 2017; Zhou, 2009). The interior of the sandtray 
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is painted blue, so that by moving the sand and revealing the blue colour below, the 
client is able to create symbols such as sky and water (Kalff, 1991; Turner, 2017). The 
sandplay therapy room usually contains a relatively large collection of miniatures. The 
variety of the miniatures usually include a cross-section of inanimate and animate 
beings that we can encounter both in external and imaginary worlds (Kalff, 1991), for 
example, people, animals, natural objects (stone, trees, shells, etc.), buildings and 
vehicles (Kalff, 1991; Zhou, 2009). 
Sandplay therapy usually consists of two central stages: non-verbal play and 
verbal communication (Zhou, 2009). In non-verbal play, the client usually constructs 
a world of their own on the sandtray using miniatures (Turner, 2017; Zhou, 2009). In 
this stage, the therapist is silently present to witness the work (ibid). After the sand 
world construction, if the client would like to, the second stage of sandplay therapy 
involves the client verbally sharing their sand world with the therapist, usually through 
telling its story (Zhou, 2009).  
Therapeutic Function of Non-verbal Aspects of Sandplay 
As a type of expressive therapy (Kukard, 2007), sandplay therapy is non-verbal, 
non-rational, visual, and sensate in its nature (Donelan, 1999; Weinrib, 2012). This 
nature allows sandplay therapy to have its therapeutic function which is unique from 
other forms of psychotherapy including psychotherapy that is also based on Jungian 
tradition, for instance, Jungian dream analysis. The uniqueness of sandplay therapy is 
usually addressed in aspects including speaking the language of the unconscious and 
making it visible in three-dimensional form and the bodily involvement during the 
process. 
From the perspective of Jungian therapy, image is the language of the 
unconscious (Weinrib, 2012). Expressive forms, for instance dreams, depict the 
conflicts the unconscious holds and point out the potential and direction of resolution 
(Donelan, 1999). It is believed that focusing on rational and directed thinking runs the 
risk of losing the connection to the unconscious and instinctual life (Donelan, 1999). 
Therefore, giving the unconscious contents and emotions visual shape is crucial in 
Jungian tradition (Sandner, 1991). This is indeed what sandplay offers. In sandplay 
therapy, through creating a scene on the sand, the unconscious contents find their 
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expressions in symbols (Kalff, 1991). The habitual abstract intellectual thinking is 
avoided (Ammann, 1991). The sand world constructed by the client allows us to 
‘consciously peer into the psyche and record in some form the symbolic images we 
see there’ (Sandner, 1991:xii). Sandplay not only allows the unconscious to express 
itself but also offers opportunity for the conscious mind to interact with the 
unconscious. Thus, it is sometimes described as a ‘waking dream’ (Ryce-Menuhin, 
2015). Ryce-Menuhin (2015:11) writes about the use of sand in sandplay and I see it 
as a beautiful analogy for how sandplay allows the encounter between the conscious 
and the unconscious, and the expansion of the conscious ego: 
Sand and its use as the earth-medium in sandplay is 
important as nature’s transitional material at the depths 
of the seabed, bordering onto the conscious landscape as 
it rises from the sea. (Italics original)   
The concrete visual image in the sand world carries the immediacy of 
experience which can be diluted by words and avoids the semantic difficulties brought 
by words (Weinrib, 2012). After the therapeutic hour, the materialised imagination – 
the sand world – is taken within by the client and continues to affect the psyche 
(Ammann, 1991). 
Another unique feature of sandplay therapy is its physical dimension. As Aite 
(2007) recognises, imagination is first staged in body experience where emotional life 
begins to take shape. The body knows and reacts before we are consciously aware of 
the fact that an emotion is taking hold of us; the body has its own conscious without 
connection to rational thinking (Ammann, 1991). As Ammann (1991:2) writes: ‘The 
deeper the emotions and feelings are covered up, the more distanced from 
consciousness memories and a part of our personality have become, the less likely it 
is that we can find the words to express them.’ In sandplay therapy, the client touches 
the sand, makes shapes and builds a world in the sand with their own hands. This 
bodily engagement in sandplay allows the unconscious content of the psyche and 
emotions that we find difficult to verbalise to find a way of expression and 
communication not only in visual but also in three-dimensional form. Additionally, 
bodily engagement in sandplay takes the client back to ‘the time when visual imaging 
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predominated over verbal conceptualization’ (Bradway & McCoard, 1997:71). 
Through this physical involvement, sandplay promotes a healing process which does 
not actively involve intellectual understanding (Donelan, 1999). It is believed by some 
sandplay therapists that the healing and transformation process promoted by sandplay 
may not need active involvement of intellectual understanding nor words (Ammann, 
1991). This indicates that the non-verbal process of sandplay in the presence of a 
therapist itself is healing and therapeutic even when the intellectual understanding 
which can be logically put into words is absent.       
Sandplay Sessions Arrangement 
In the process of doing this research project, I engaged with six weeks of 
sandplay sessions in the presence of a therapist who is experienced in using sand and 
miniatures in her practice. I would like to highlight that the engagement with sandplay 
in this context is not therapy. The sandplay sessions were for me to gain the sandplay 
experience in order to engage with the realm of experience that is unspeakable or 
beyond narrative. I did not go into sandplay sessions as a client with the intention to 
work through specific issues or for self-development. I did not look for therapeutic 
effect from these sandplay sessions. Instead, both the therapist and I were clear at the 
start that these sandplay sessions were set up merely for research purposes. For this 
reason, I will refer to these sessions as ‘sandplay sessions’ in my later writings without 
referring them as ‘sandplay therapy’.   
The set-up of these sandplay sessions were identical to a sandplay therapy 
session. Each sandplay session was an hour long. I started with a stage of silent play 
with the sand and constructing a sand world using the miniatures and other materials. 
When I felt ready, I would verbally share my world with the therapist. Because of the 
non-verbal nature of sandplay, the sandplay sessions were video recorded for my 
reflection afterwards. I took pictures of my sand world after each session. The therapist 
also took pictures of each sand world I built after I left the room.     
I continuously wrote, read and reflected during the time of conducting this 
research project as a way of inquiry. During these six weeks of sandplay, I usually 
wrote my reflection on the session immediately after it finished. I looked at the pictures 
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of my sand world and the videos of each sandplay session during the week and 
continued to write between the sessions. I also wrote about my experience of making 
sense of my sandplay experience.   
After six weeks of sandplay sessions, the therapist and I met for a half an hour 
review session where the therapist brought the pictures she had taken of each of my 
sand worlds. We shared with each other how the process was for us and the sense we 
had made of the sandplay sessions. 
Ethical Consideration 
The nature of the therapist’s participation in this research project is not as the 
research participant but the facilitator of the sandplay process. The focus of my 
reflecting and writing are on my own experience and my process of making sense of 
my experience. Therefore, I see myself as the only research participant in this research 
project 
The therapist was informed that this process is initiated for research purposes, 
upon the first contact. The therapist was contracted to work within the ethical 
framework which her practice and training are based on. We contracted before the first 
session in terms of the time, payment, frequency of the sessions and confidentiality. 
The sandplay sessions were run as sandplay therapy sessions would in a natural 
therapy setting. The video recordings were only focused on the sandtray and my hands. 
The therapist and the therapy room were not included in the video recording nor the 
pictures. No identifiable information about the therapist are revealed in this thesis.   
I acknowledge that in the process of sandplay, which is not therapy but could 
have therapeutic effect, the material that would emerge was not foreseeable regardless 
of my intention. Personal material related to others might come up during the sandplay, 
but my research would not focus on my relationship with any others. I could not control 
the process of sandplay, but I have made decisions regarding what to include in my 
thesis. I have not included any identifiable information of anyone else in my thesis. 
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Sandplay involves working with the unconscious and unexpected content 
might come up. I expected that, during the sandplay sessions, the therapist with 
professional capacity would be able to support me, were this to occur.  
The subject that I am investigating in this research project, though coming from 
a personal place, is not an area that I approach emotionally for the first time nor an 
area that is currently overwhelmingly painful. I have been processing it in my therapy, 
during my training and my reflections before I located on the current research focus.  
My personal therapist at that time was aware of my research plan and design. 
We discussed the effect of the sandplay sessions on our relationship and our work 
together. She continued to work with me during that process as a support in case any 
distress would be brought up by the sandplay sessions. At the same time, I had the 
support of my research supervisors during the research process. Therefore, I had the 
supports that I might need in place if the research project were to churn up any 
emotional difficulty or discomfort. 
Last but not the least, I would like to acknowledge that the process of writing 
in this thesis can be challenging and emotional. However, as McCormack (2014) 
acknowledges, it at the same time helps me to process and contain the rawness of my 
experience, and thus it is also a way of self-care and self-support.  
Having explained the sandplay arrangement and ethical consideration, I will 
now move on to the last section of this chapter regarding data generation, analysis and 
presentation. 
Data Generation, Analysis and Presentation 
Instead of being presented as a systematic whole sectioned by themes, my 
research data and analysis will be presented as a collection of writings on my research 
topic which, drawing on a music concept, I regard as ‘variations’ on the theme of 
language use and narrative coherence in counselling and psychotherapy. These pieces 
of writing will be presented in chronological order. This section of the thesis will 
explain my rationale for making such a decision. Meanwhile, it will also illuminate 
how in my research the data generation, analysis and presentation are not separable.  
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As made clear in a previous section, the core feature of writing as inquiry that 
I adopt for this research project is to allow the writing, including reflective writing and 
dialogue with literature, to take me to previously unknown places without assumption, 
expectation and design.  
During the research process, I live with the research question. My thinking and 
reflection about the research question penetrate my personal and professional lives. As 
Moustakas (1990) proposes, there is immersion with the research question in my 
everyday life. However, this immersion is not experienced as a ‘stage’ of the research 
project as Moustakas’ heuristic inquiry suggests. For me, the immersion is the research. 
This immersion determines that my research data comes from a variety of places: not 
only my experience and reflection of my sandplay sessions, but also my personal 
realisation evoked by life events, my counselling practice, my personal therapy and 
my thinking about relevant literature. I write about all of these, and the writing itself, 
which is a process of striving to know and explore, not only is the analysis but also 
becomes the data. The content of this thesis is also its process (Romanyshyn, 2013).  
Chronologically, my writings in this thesis consist of and are presented as three 
parts: pre-sandplay writing, reflective writing about sandplay sessions and post-
sandplay writing. There are different qualities to these writings in different stages. In 
the pre-sandplay stage, I engaged in reflecting on my experience in personal therapy, 
my personal life and professional experience, and literature reading. This stage before 
sandplay is the stage where words were all I had in my reflection on and thinking about 
my research topic. I have made a decision to include this part of writing not only 
because it contributes to my discussion on narrative coherence, but also because it 
contributes to showing my shifts and changes before and after sandplay. During the 
six-week period of sandplay sessions, my writing mainly focused on my experience in 
and after the sessions, and what was stimulated in me by the sandplay. I also wrote 
about my writing about the sandplay sessions. Because of the rich and intense 
embodied experience I gained in these weeks, I focused more on writing about myself 
than engaging with literature. When I produced my post-sandplay writing, I closely 
read my previous writings with the light of relevant literature. However, it is not 
correct to say that my pre-sandplay writing and writing about sandplay are the ‘data’ 
and my post-sandplay writing is the analysis. Almost each piece of writing contains 
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both ‘raw’ material, e.g. personal and professional experience and analytical writing. 
Then each of these pieces also became a source for later analysis. I see this as ‘layered 
account’ (Ronai, 1995) where I put myself and my writing into theories and literatures. 
I also call it ‘layered analysis’ where analysis also becomes data for further analysis. I 
would say that my earlier section about how I came into my research epistemology 
and methodology which talks about writing the unspeakable or unnarratable is already 
a piece of analytical writing on my research topic. Therefore, as for St. Pierre (1997) 
who feels that data collection, analysis and interpretation happen all at once in her 
research, it is also impossible for me to divide my research process into data generation, 
analysis and presentation. And this inseparability is exactly what the process of writing 
as inquiry would bring (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005).  
Again as for St. Pierre (1997) who found that she first identified the data, then 
went backward to identify the data collection method, then went forward again to think 
how these data produced knowledge, I also only identified the process and the methods 
I have used after the data generation and analysis. My data generation started as soon 
as I started to read and write. I have divided my writings into three parts because it 
gives the readers the context of my writings, shows the shifts, changes and 
transformations occurred to me during the research process and invites the readers to 
join my research journey.     
Mostly my later pieces of writing were built on and inspired by my earlier 
pieces of writing. Because of this interrelationship between my writings, readers of my 
thesis would need to read one text in relation to other texts. This is one of the reasons 
why I have chosen to present these pieces of writing in the order they are written 
instead of mingling them with each other. Yet, more crucial are the following reasons.  
The immersion and openness towards the process of writing determines that I 
wrote from the place where I was at in the time of writing. Each piece of my writing 
involves aspects of my life related to my research topic that stood out to me. Because 
of the unpredictable flow of experience and realisation that cannot be foreseen nor 
repeated, each of these pieces of writing has a life of their own. Each of them has a 
unique standpoint from which the research question is looked at and examined.  
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Over the process of producing these writings, I have struggled to figure out 
how to put all these pieces of writing into a coherent and structured whole. I have felt 
reluctant to start copying, pasting, cutting and re-arranging to put all the writings into 
one. As I see each piece of writing as having a life of their own, doing so seems to 
exercise an act of ‘killing’.  
St. Pierre (1997:179) describes the ‘linear nature of the narrative of knowledge 
production’ in research as ‘ruthless’. As she writes in another paper (St. Pierre, 
1995:114): 
This project has transgressed its legitimate bounds into 
the realm of the unnamed, and the requirement of this 
format to represent a clear, linear process of research 
which can be judged as worthy becomes violent, 
coercive, and distortive. 
While my research deconstructs the usually taken-for-granted narrative 
coherence in counselling and psychotherapy, forcing a structure onto either the process 
or the content of my research potentially contradicts my questioning into order and 
coherence.  
Tamas (2009) questions the common reasonable, tidy and sequenced voice in 
research. She sees tidy and reasonable scholarship regarding messy experiences as ‘an 
exercise of alienation’ (Tamas, 2009:paragraph 18). What we might need to do, Tamas 
(2009) proposes, is to write what and how we actually feel. She describes this speaking 
from within (Tamas, 2009:paragraph 20) as: 
If I were interested in feeling these things, I would have 
to write as the person I am in my lover's arms or on my 
therapist's couch, not in this smooth public voice. Any 
knowledge produced would come slowly, obliquely, and 
well salted with tears. My words would not strike some 
gong of resonance that marked them as true but they 
could make you feel something. […] These sorts of 
stories may be difficult to defend on grant applications. 
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They would require us to take seriously and enact our 
theoretical commitment to unknowing and refusal of 
mastery.  
My requirement for myself to produce a traditionally rigorously structured 
thesis comes from an inward desire to master and for certainty as well as external 
requirements as explained in the introduction. I needed a masterful voice, a clear and 
systematic structure to secure my identity as an academic. 
However, the actual journey of doing this research is a journey without clear 
stages nor a clear destination. It is to get lost and try to find a way. It is times of 
confusion and sparks of realisation. It sometimes feels like stepping into a dark forest, 
but the philosophers, therapists and theorists whom I will draw on in later chapters 
come as floating lights allowing me to see the paths. The roads are never straight and 
I do not have a bird’s eye view to see and show a clear map of the forest. What I can 
show is merely the paths that I have travelled.  
Breaking my reflective and analytical writing into pieces then reassembling 
them into a certain and clear structure betray my argument against a forced coherence 
that includes order, closure and linearity.  
Additionally, along the research journey is a process of transformation which 
is recognised and emphasised by researchers of writing as a method of inquiry (e.g. 
Richardson, 1997). As I write into my research topic drawing on my sandplay, personal 
and professional experiences and seek assistance from various philosophers and 
theorists, I become more and more aware of aspects of myself. Some of the realisations 
are so crucial that I regard them as transforming me as a person. This process of 
transformation, of travelling to different places, would be lost in the cutting and 
reassembling.  
It is perhaps not a coincidence that Wittgenstein (1972:vii), whose work I refer 
to in my later writing, also speaks about his unsuccessful attempts to bring his 
philosophical remarks in Philosophical Investigations into an organised whole: 
It was my intention at first to bring all this together in a 
book whose form I pictured differently at different times. 
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But the essential thing was that the thoughts should 
proceed from one subject to another in a natural order 
and without breaks. 
After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results 
together into such a whole, I realized that I should never 
succeed. The best that I could write would never be more 
than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon 
crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction 
against their natural inclination.  
And the sentences that follow particularly touch my heart as if he is speaking 
for me: 
– And this was, of course, connected with the very nature 
of the investigation. For this compels us to travel over a 
wide field of thoughts criss-cross in every direction. – 
The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a 
number of sketches of landscapes which were made in 
the course of these long and involved journeyings.  
In addition to the individual life of each piece of writing that I refuse to break, 
there is also a criss-cross relation between these pieces of writing. Wittgenstein 
(1972:vii) talks about his work in Philosophical Investigation as ‘the same or almost 
the same points were always being approached afresh from different directions, and 
new sketches made’. This is similar to my approach to my thesis. There are dominant 
points that I make again and again in my pieces of writing. However, each time, they 
are approached from different angles with insight from different philosophers or 
theories and my ever-changing lived experience. Sometimes the work from the same 
philosophers and theories are drawn into different writings but from a fresh 
understanding that might be built on my previous writing and reflection.  
I would like to see my writings as variations on the theme of narrative and 
narrative coherence in counselling and psychotherapy. In classical music, variations 
of the main melody, that is the theme, ‘have an overarching form, often beginning with 
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the simplest and closest to the theme, then moving progressively farther and farther 
away from the recognisable, and concluding with a section that brings the theme 
forcefully and unforgettably back to mind’ (Knouse, 2007:41). The progressive feature 
of my writings is not as clear as Knouse’s description of variations in music which 
indicates a clear beginning and end. However, my arguments develop further and 
clearer as my writings progress over time. Similar points are addressed, yet my 
writings are not merely going around repetitive circles. Each time these points are 
revisited with different and unique engagement with literatures and lived experiences. 
I see this revisiting as an exercise of holding the research question in mind at all time.  
Writing and Thinking with Theorists and Theories  
I have stated in an earlier section the relation between writing and the use of 
theory in general in this thesis. Now, I would like to justify the use of specific theories 
and theorists in this thesis.  
Instead of a conscious choice, the use of theories in this thesis comes from an 
organic place of encountering. Returning to the dark forest metaphor I have given 
earlier, these theories and theorists are among the various lights that I see in my journey 
into the dark forest. They appear like the moonlight, glittering stars or fireflies along 
the journey which I have encountered. In different times of this unpredictable journey, 
I find different theorists speaking to my experience in those particular periods or 
moments, and I want to engage in dialogue with them, which often helps me to make 
sense of my experience. In my inquiry in this research project, I often need to treat 
myself in the way I would treat my clients in therapy. In my work with my clients, 
each week I greet them without certain expectation and wait for whatever they would 
bring. Sometimes the same materials are brought in week after week and it could feel 
like we are running a futile circle or moving forward in a spiral. Sometimes clients 
come with a different perspective they gain on what was previously mentioned. 
Sometimes they come in with totally new materials that have never been brought up 
before. I follow and accompany them to where they need to go. Most of the time, 
neither of us know where that place would be. As a practitioner trained in the dialogue 
between person-centred and psychodynamic approaches, I often gain help from great 
thinkers and therapists from these two approaches. However, I also turn to 
transactional analysis, emotion-focused therapy and existential therapy theories when 
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I find particular parts of these approaches help me to think about and understand a 
particular client. In my research, I need to give myself space to be where I need to be 
without limiting myself theoretically or experientially. In different periods of my 
experiential journey, I seek dialogue with theorists that I not only theoretically but also 
emotionally relate to the most. For example, when I struggled with explaining myself 
and noticed the obligation that comes with the role as a client, I found Judith Butler’s 
critique on giving an account of oneself and Foucault’s disciplinary power helped me 
to think. When I encountered my childhood trauma and found myself engaged in 
imaginary dialogue with an imaginary other, I thought about the theory of the 
dialogical self. While I looked back at my experience in therapy where talking and 
narrating felt unnecessary, Winnicott’s concept of being alone in the presence of 
another and the unintegrated state came to my mind. Later, reading Freud’s and 
Leader’s writing on melancholia enlightened again my understanding of some of my 
experience that I have written previously. However, this research is not merely 
roaming around purposelessly. The research focus is always held in mind. Perhaps my 
drawing on Wittgenstein is the most peculiar of all. Just as his writings are always 
presented as philosophical remarks instead of an organised whole, I find that I meet 
his thinking here and there like encountering sparks of flashing lights in the journey.   
Having reviewed relevant literature in narrative coherence and explained my 
onto-epistemological position and methodological approach, the following three 
chapters are my writings into the inquiry about narrative coherence/incoherence.  
In the two pieces of pre-sandplay writing in the next chapter, reflecting on my 
daily experience and my experience as a client and therapist, I will think about and 
challenge the concept of narrative coherence, drawing on Judith Butler and 
existentialism. In Chapter 5, I will present my writing during the process of six weeks 
sandplay sessions. I will present my more ‘immediate’ sandplay writings in italic. They 
are excerpts of my thoughts, feelings and a short story I wrote soon after the sessions. 
I will present the writings that I find most relevant to my thinking about my research 
topic. In Chapter 6, I will return to my pre-sandplay and sandplay writing with 
reference to Butler, Foucault, Wittgenstein, Winnicott, the dialogical self theory and 
theories about melancholia as discussed by Freud and Leader to make sense of my 
experience with regard to narrative coherence. 
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To stay consistent with my refusal to force structure onto what lacks a certain 
shape, I deliberately present my writings as they flow without imposing on them 
beginnings and closures, introductions and conclusions. As my readers, you might 
appreciate it or you might be left feeling uncomfortable by its unstructured-ness. I 
invite you to pay attention to and reflect on your reactions. I would like to see your 
reaction to this as a part of the unwritten work of this thesis.   
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Chapter 4 Pre-Sandplay Writing 
Piece 1, March 2018 
There was a session in my personal therapy when I did not want to talk at all. 
I sat there holding a soft toy from the therapy room and felt myself traveling all the 
way back to a fantasised childhood early sunny afternoon. Wearing my shorts, I lay on 
my bed holding my soft toy. The bamboo mat under my body took away the afternoon 
heat. I was asleep yet awake at the same time. I was aware of my surroundings. I knew 
it was sunny, it was just after noon, and I was on my bed. I knew my mum was 
somewhere around, so I was perhaps by myself on the bed but I was not alone.  
My mind was in this state, this asleep yet awake state where comfortably 
retreated into myself yet somehow connected with another. I did not need to talk. In 
there, any words would feel awkward – they would not only be awkward but also would 
be breaking something. I tried to explain to my therapist this image that I immersed 
myself into at that moment, but each time I talked, it pulled me away from the 
immersion like scratching an old stubborn sticker off a cardboard. I struggled to 
narrate this moment to my therapist just as I struggled to narrate this struggle. Every 
word came out from my mouth yet they felt as alien as if they were from outer space. I 
started to feel anxious sitting in front of my therapist not wanting to say anything, 
though she did not push me to speak. I explained how I felt but then the explanation 
felt inadequate. 
I really did not want to talk or I really could not talk at that specific moment. 
Sometimes I am tired of words which at those times only serve to tear my experience 
apart. In times like this, my therapist encouraged me several times to talk in my mother 
tongue. As much as I appreciate her effort to help, I did not think that she understood 
my occasional struggle with and resistance to words, which is not about the 
inadequacy of my English. It is about talking itself. 
 
The ‘scratch off’ and ‘tear apart’ I mentioned above would perhaps remind you 
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of the connection between the ‘third position’ and language I wrote about in the last 
chapter. The development of language and the capacity to narrate not only relates to 
the separation from the other(s) but also from oneself. To tell a story about what we 
have experienced is to have ‘a reflexive grasp on it’ which entails a distance (Frank, 
2013:97). As Tamas (2009) acknowledges when she writes about researching our own 
lived experiences, we cannot observe our experiences and be inside ourselves at the 
same time without splitting of some sort. Frank (2013) describes the person living in 
lived chaos as imprisoned and there is no distance from this experience. As for me, I 
wonder whether each of us at some time of our lives, not only in chaotic moments or 
periods but also in daily life and perhaps in therapy, are gently ‘imprisoned’. Here by 
‘imprisoned’, I mean not as constrained or tamed, but as being inside our immediate 
experience without distance. This can be as troubling as experience of illness or can 
be as gentle and warm as my daydream of laying on a bamboo mat on a sunny 
afternoon in the therapy room.  
It makes me think about how legitimate the question we as therapists often ask 
our clients is: ‘how do you feel now?’ The client is encouraged to attend to their 
immediate feelings at the present moment. If symbolisation requires the capacity of 
reflection in retrospection, then how could one be present with the experience and at 
the same time talk about it without splitting? We are separated from that experience in 
order to talk about it; if we are completely at one with it, we are not able to talk about 
it. The ‘talking’ can function therapeutically as bringing the client in contact with the 
‘reality’ in some contexts as the capacity to be reflexive is crucial. However, at other 
times, perhaps it takes the client further away from their experience to serve the need 
of the other – the other’s need to understand, to listen, to be in contact, to be the other 
in a dyad. This brings me to what Butler (2005) says about our ‘obligation to others’ 
and the relational dimensional of language as well as the formation of our being. 
Unlike the third position theory, Butler brings forward Laplanche’s suggestion that 
instead of moving from the world of one to the world of others and moving beyond 
narcissism, the problem for the infant is to build an ego starting from too much 
otherness. The speech of the adult world, to the infant, is impingement and is 
overwhelming. While the child tries to tell a story of their own, there is a story already 
at work in them. The infant is unable to tell the ‘I’ and ‘you’ which inhabits and 
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dispossesses the infant’s desire from the outset, which contributes to the opacity of 
self-knowing that cannot be articulated. Butler (ibid) points out here the limits of self-
knowing and self-telling. If the process of psychotherapy is a ‘literary affair’ (Lieblich 
et al., 2004:4), together with the separation and splitting innate in language as I 
discussed, does psychotherapy also entail a separation from lived experience which is 
paradoxically in contrast with the ‘in-contact-ness’ that it always promotes? 
My experience in the therapy room as if I was laying on bed, by myself yet not 
alone, might be an experience of ‘holding’, a concept introduced by Winnicott (1965b), 
in the quality of the therapeutic relationship. In a holding environment which protects 
the client from external impingement, the client, like the new born baby, is able to 
gradually develop a continuity of existence of their own rather than developing a false 
self that reacts to external impingements (Winnicott, 1965b). As Butler (2005:59) 
writes ‘there are expressive dimensions of that ‘holding’ that cannot be described 
through narrative means’. Describing it pulled me away from the contact with that 
holding and from the wholeness, including the indescribable dimension of that holding.  
As I did in my therapy as described, many clients explain themselves, their 
thoughts, feelings and events, to the therapist in therapy. As Frank (2013:107) argues, 
the act of ‘explaining’ imposes a purpose on behaviour. This, for me, resonates with 
Nietzsche’s philosophy about how we become reflective and positioned to give an 
account of our actions, as explained by Butler (2005). Nietzsche argues that we become 
conscious of ourselves in the face of suffering and punishment. After someone suffers 
as a consequence, the sufferer or their advocate seeks to find the cause of the suffering 
for a just punishment of the one responsible and we are asked whether we might be 
that cause. This question entails a causal agency and responsibility of the self. Due to 
this query, we start to give an account, offering an ‘I’, to own up to the cause of 
suffering or define ourselves against it. Thus it is in the face of the other, of the query 
for causal effect and responsibility that we start to narrate ourselves (Butler, 2005). 
Focusing on the therapeutic setting, it seems to me that this query is what often 
happens on the interpersonal and intrapersonal level. Psychotherapy is originated from 
Freudian psychoanalysis which tries to bring light to the unconscious and find the 
childhood origin of the psychological suffering. This implicitly entails a cause or a 
reason and that something can be solved once the cause of the suffering is found. The 
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clients were and are encouraged to tell their stories, record their childhood memories 
(mainly in psychodynamic approach), and make links (or make sense of the links made 
by their therapists). Intrapersonally, the client usually strives to find the cause of the 
suffering and failing to do so always increases the suffering. As Butler (2005) argues, 
‘a narrative that responds to allegation must [….] accept the possibility that the self 
has causal agency, even if […] the self may not have been the cause of the suffering in 
question’. Sequence and causality thus are embedded in these therapy narratives. To 
quote Frank: ‘Narrative is fundamentally an ordering of people, material objects, and 
maybe imaginary beings, depicting them as acting upon each other in various ways. 
Stories enable us to order the confusion to find what is narratively causal, that this kind 
of thing happens in consequence of this other thing’ (in Neile, 2013:268). 
As Tamas (2009) points out, there is comfort in seeing ourselves as coherent, 
knowledgeable and safe. Though she mainly refers to the field of research, this can be 
extended beyond research to everyday life. Both Tamas (2009) and Frank (2013) 
recognise that there seems to be a usually unspoken expectation and desire for 
traumatic and chaotic experience to make sense. Not doing so somehow indicates 
inadequacy and failure (Tamas, 2009). Again, I extend this to everyday life. Not 
making sense and not giving a coherent narrative which demands sequence and 
causality somehow indicates a sense of inadequacy.  
 
My therapist told me that our two years therapy together needed to come to an 
end. Since then, it has been difficult to be in therapy with her. There has been such 
pain in this process of walking to the ending. I can give only one violent analogy of the 
process towards separation – it is like boning the flesh. I do not understand this 
intolerable pain. Approaching the termination of therapy perhaps has pressed a 
crucial button. I do not know where it comes from. I know that I had early separation 
with my parents which in no doubt contributes to my current feelings. However, this 
pain does not feel like only an enactment of this past life event. It feels like as if it 
dwells in me, as if it is innate in me.  
I have always been told to trust the process and tolerate the uncertainty, which 
implicitly implies a sense of (positive) movement as a result. According to Gendlin’s 
(1995) theory of focusing, if we slow down, attend to our felt-sense and wait, 
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symbolisation and relief will come. However, I thought in the midst and mist of my 
pain, ‘what if I would never understand or make sense of it, what if I would never 
know what this rush of pain comes from?’  
Some believe that psychotherapy is a process of bringing integration and 
coherence to a chaotic life through developing a coherence narrative ((Lieblich et al., 
2004). Yet, writing about Nietzsche, Butler (2005:13) reminds us that ‘life entails a 
certain amount of suffering and injury that cannot be fully accounted for through 
recourse to the subject as a causal agent’. As Frank (2013:112) points out, ‘modernity 
has a hard time accepting, even provisionally, that life sometimes is horrible’. People 
listening to the chaos narrative that has no narrative order often deny this horror that 
can only be faced but never be solved, and the fact that sometimes there are no way 
out from it (Frank, 2013).  
In response to my struggle to understand and make sense, my therapist 
appreciated my self-awareness and spoke with a hope about waiting to see where the 
current understanding and continuous exploration would take us. This has also been 
what I sometimes tell my clients. However, as a client and a therapist, I hold this 
question, ‘what if I will never know’. What if life, not the life in trauma or illness that 
Tamas (2009) and Frank (2013) talk about, but the life that each of us lives, is illogical 
and chaotic in nature. We explore the unconscious in therapy room but we do not 
surrender to the unknown. There is, I think, an implicit hope or belief that the unknown 
will somehow become some kind of known, that the unknown is knowable. It brings 
a sense of horror when I think of surrendering to the thought that ‘I will never know’, 
and this chaos, illogicality and disorder of life. The depressing darkness this brings 
almost threatens my existence. I wonder about the ‘let’s see where it would take us’ 
comment my therapist made to me and which I made to my client, and my therapist’s 
encouragement to me regarding talking in my mother tongue when I found talking 
difficult. Are they attempts to escape this horror and threat? Is the emphasis on 
narrative coherence an act of escape and denial?  
With this thinking, I found particular resonance in Butler’s (2005:65) writing: 
In the language that articulates opposition to a non-
narrativizable beginning resides the fear that the absence 
of narrative will spell a certain threat, a threat to life, and 
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will pose the risk […] of a certain kind of death, the death 
of a subject who cannot, who can never, fully recuperate 
the conditions of its own emergence.  
However, she goes on to explain this as a necessary death of ‘a fantasy of 
impossible mastery’ and a ‘necessary grief’ (ibid). To say the self must be ‘narrated’ is 
to say we cannot survive with the unconscious (ibid), or perhaps survive the 
unconscious. 
Surprisingly, I find that after the initial threat, the acknowledgement of the 
possible innate horror, suffering and injury of life that cannot be attributed to the causal 
agency of self nor be put into narrative form brings me a relief. It takes away to some 
extent the sense of ‘failure’ and shame in the struggle of making sense and articulation. 
Indeed, as Butler (2005) argues, to hold oneself accountable for one’s life in narrative 
forms (with a suspect coherence) requires a ‘falsification’ of that life. I think of my 
clients who become apologetic, frustrated and ashamed for the inability to make sense 
and articulate. I wonder whether tolerating incoherence and relinquishing coherence 
in the sense of sequence, order and causality would bring relief in therapy room also.  
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Piece 2, April 2018 
In his book ‘Real Mysteries: Narrative and the Unknowable’, Abbott (2013) 
cites a short story by J.G. Ballard called ‘The Drowned Giant’ for his discussion about 
the literal representation of the ‘unknown’. The story begins with a handsome drowned 
giant being washed up on the shore after a storm. The curious crowd, after initially 
hesitating, touch him, climb on his body, blow in the caverns of his nostrils, and 
examine his hands and skin. Everyone has an explanation for or idea about his origin 
and how he got here. However, where he comes from and how he came into being are 
entirely inexplicable. The story ends with the ‘trivializing of this wonderful being, of 
origin unknown’ (Abbott, 2013:48). People’s interest in him fades as time goes by, and 
he is merely remembered as, if remembered at all, a large sea beast.  
For me, the image of this giant speaks about the unknowability of our internal 
and external worlds and how it might be forgotten in our pursuit for knowing and 
explanation.  
Approaching the end of my personal therapy has confronted me with this large 
giant which can both be wonderful and threatening to my very existence. I was so 
deeply sad that I could not stop crying in one session. I have always known that endings 
and separation are difficult for me. I have looked at my childhood, talked through the 
major separation from my parents in my childhood, examined my attachment to 
significant others. I have become aware of my role as a sibling abortion survivor. I 
have striven to understand the path I have taken over these years. I have processed the 
significant events that I used to trivialise. I thought I had reached some understanding 
after a few years of personal therapy by now, but I do not understand. Perhaps the 
approaching ending of therapy acts as the storm. It washed up this giant onto the shore 
of my awareness. It was upon touching this giant at this time that I realised it has 
always been in the sea of my inner world but I was too scared to look at it. Instead of 
the image of a drowned giant, a black hole is an analogy closer to how it feels like if I 
have to describe it in some way. I have always lived life earnestly and hardly feel 
world-weary. I engage in various activities. I pursue and I form relationships with 
people. I would like to think I live a meaningful life with purpose. It was not until I 
confronted this black hole in the ending process of my therapy that I realised what I 
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had been avoiding thinking about. 
The black hole confronted me with the fact that life can lack inherent meaning 
and purpose, in spite of the striving for them, and we are alone in facing our worlds, 
internal and external. And ultimately, we are alone in facing death (Jacobsen, 2007). 
I cannot describe the intensity of emotion I felt then. I was deeply sad, lonely 
(even in the room with a therapist), horrified, astonished and panicky. 
I do not understand where it comes from. I cannot give a reason why it is there. 
What I do know – I knew it the moment I was in touch with it – is that it exceeds my 
childhood experience and my relationship with and separation from my parents. It feels 
much bigger than childhood origin, attachment, or separation anxiety. It asks questions 
about my existence. The black hole does not come from any theoretical reading, but 
was deeply felt. I call it the black hole because, again for no clear reason, I knew almost 
without any doubt that it is not some kind of wound or trauma. It is the life that I live. 
It cannot be ‘healed’ or cured. Actually, it does not ask for cure.  
Bruner (2002) holds the view that one of the core aspects of stories is that 
something runs awry, otherwise, there would not be anything to tell about. He goes on 
to point out that ‘the story concerns efforts to cope or come to terms with the breach 
[in the expected state of things] and its consequences’ (Bruner, 2002:17). This can 
almost be viewed as an implicit script for counselling and psychotherapy. The client 
comes to therapy because something goes or feels ‘wrong’. They tell their stories about 
it, with expectation to make sense of the feeling of ‘wrongness’, and then cope or come 
to terms with it. The ending of this script is either the success or failure in ‘coming to 
terms with’ or ‘making sense of’.  
We are deeply influenced by the discourse available to us or the pre-given 
stories (Frank, 2010; Mattingly, 1998). The widely used ‘healer’ metaphor of therapist 
implies a story that the wounded goes to the healer then leaves feeling better in some 
way to some extent. This script of counselling and psychotherapy becomes the 
‘unchosen choice’ (Bourdieu, 2000, cited in Frank, 2010:25) acting as template for 
therapy experience. The client comes to therapy to talk, to tell their stories which, as 
Frank (2010) puts it, not only gives information but also gives form – coherence, 
meaning, intention and orientation. Interpersonal approaches, as Mitchell (1993) 
argues, always involve questions and inquiries about what happened, who did what to 
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whom and when, as if there is a definite sequence that can be told. Stierlin (1963) 
describes us human beings as the heir to the law of causality. Order, coherence and 
continuity indeed are what we are deeply concerned with and even our sense of self 
rest on them (Mattingly, 1998). These are what narrative and stories entail.  
However, life lacks form (Frank, 2010; Mink, 1987). Existentialism 
particularly catches my attention regarding this topic after my experience described 
above. Opposite to the view that life possesses meaning which gives definite answer 
to the troubling questions of our existence, existentialists claim that life is absurd 
(Wartenberg, 2008). In existentialism, absurdity specifically refers to the contrary of 
reason (ibid). Some existentialists believe that the crucial ontological fact about human 
beings is that we inherently ask things to make sense and the world to be rational (ibid). 
Yet, from the existentialism’s point of view, the world is neither rational nor irrational; 
it exists in its own way without regard to anything. Because of the absurdity of life, 
our desire to seek meaning, reasons and purpose is doomed to failure (ibid). Therefore 
our anguish comes: ‘we long for meaning conveyed by a universe that cares but 
discover only an empty sky’ (Flynn, 2006:47). In terms of our experiential world, we 
desire the same reasonableness, meaning and order. We would love to experience our 
lives as ‘personal, generally coherent, emotionally meaningful, narratively knowable, 
and tellable’ (Richardson, 1997:62). We would love to ‘see ourselves as conscious, 
creative guarantors of meaning’ (Tamas, 2011:64). Yet, this deep human concern of 
order and coherence is not in accord with our experiences of life, as some 
anthropologists argue (Mattingly, 1998). When we capture our formless life 
experiences with ordered and coherent narrative, we are also taming our experiences 
(ibid). To quote Mattingly (1998:34), who elaborates on some narrative theories that 
doubt the structure of lived experience and narrative have much to do with each other: 
‘Narrative […] is a mythical imposition of coherence on what is otherwise formless 
experience’.   
I struggled when I wrote about what I call the black hole above. I gave it a 
name so it is easier to communicate it to you as my audience. Yet, writing and telling 
about it, in spite of the amendments and caution in choosing the ‘right’ words, I feel 
that I have failed it. I almost thought I offended it for that I have misrepresented it in 
my words. The only moment that I could be truthful to it was the moment when I cried 
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for it, when it resided in my heart. I wrote about the black hole on the same day when 
I regained some distance from it – it was only then that I could write about it. However, 
though the sadness it brought crept in, I could not grasp it bodily anymore. Words felt 
pale. Any words and sentences I could think of feel small compared to how the black 
hold felt to me at that moment. Any writing about it inevitably involves trying to 
explain it to you, my audience, yet I do not know how to ‘leave intact the experience 
of unknowing’ (Abbott, 2013:43) while using the language of known and how to 
produce understanding for the inapprehensible.  
This failure of my representation find resonance in Meister Eckhart’s (cited in 
Abbott, 2013:27) writing about the ‘expressive impossibility’: 
And if He is neither goodness nor being nor truth. What 
is He then? He is nothing. He is neither this or that. Any 
thought you might still have of what He might be – He 
is not such at all.  
Although Meister Eckhart is talking about God here, it well expresses my 
inability in capturing the black hole. Every way that I have to describe it, it is not that 
at all. Tracing the origin of the words ‘narrative’, ‘narration’, ‘to narrate’, and so on, 
White (1980) points out that they derive via the Latin gnārus which means ‘knowing’, 
‘acquainted with’, ‘expert’, ‘skillful’, ect., and narrō which means ‘related’, ‘tell’ from 
the Sanskrit root gnā which means ‘know’. This very idea of ‘knowing’ in the root of 
narrative, narration and the act of narrating is in contrast to this impossibility of 
expression. As Butler (2005:63) agues, the requirement for narrative coherence might 
foreclose the acceptance of ‘the limits of knowability in oneself and others’.   
Turning to existentialism’s view on the absurdity of life, I propose that too 
much emphasis on narrative coherence in counselling and psychotherapy allies with 
the human concern and desire for meaning, coherence, order and reason, but alienates 
the innate absurdity of life. Thus, insisting on coherence can cause people anguish and 
shame. This is what Tamas (2009) describes in her traumatic experience. She says that 
it is not that we are broken or lost that brings despair, but the impression that everyone 
else is not. There is a dominant view that behind the chaotic or fragmented narrative 
is ‘sickness’ and ‘inability’ needing healing. However, it can also be, as Sahlins (1985, 
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cited in Mattingly, 1998) mentions, that the experience of self lacks coherence and is 
in nature fragmented; continuity itself is an ‘illusion’. Butler (2005) calls it an ethical 
violence to demand of ourselves and others complete coherence: this demands the 
manifestation and maintenance of self-identity at all times which is impossible to 
satisfy in a temporal horizon.  
On an existential level, Butler (2005:79) raises that when little space is given 
to the self-unknowingness and the non-narrativisable self, the livability of the person 
relies on their narrativisability: 
The postulation of the non-narrativizable poses a threat 
to such a subject, indeed, can pose the threat of death […] 
[I]t can take this form under situation of moral duress: If 
I am not able to give an account of some of my actions, 
then I would rather die, because I cannot find myself as 
the author of these actions, and I cannot explain myself 
to those my actions may have hurt […] Perhaps death 
would be better than to continue to live with this inability 
to render myself ethical through an account that not only 
explains what I do but allows me to assume greater 
agency in deciding what to do.  
Experientially recognising the absurdity of life allows me to revisit my 
comment on myself as ‘a person without stories to tell’. I realised that it is about not 
knowing how to tell. The senses of loneliness and melancholy have always pervaded 
my emotional life. I never understood them despite searching. The most significant 
anguish it brings was in my therapy. I never knew how to talk about them because I 
could not give causes, reasons or satisfactory interpretation about them. I wished I had 
something more concrete to tell, to share with the therapist, to complain about, like 
‘normal’ people. I had always thought that it was because of my insecurity and self-
reliance that I could not open myself to people around me. This is true to some extent, 
but it is not all. There are people that I truly trust. I could not talk about this with them 
because I really do not know how. The inability to talk about my sadness, loneliness 
and melancholy, especially in therapy, left me feeling deeply ashamed. I thought I was 
69 
 
ill in some way or just was making a fuss. Sometimes, I even wished that I could have 
a label such as ‘depression’, as if it could make how I feel legitimate. There is a 
tendency in us human beings to believe that whatever receives a name has a being of 
itself and an existence of its own (Mitchell, 1993). In my case, I hoped a ‘thing’ such 
as ‘depression’ could offer a reason. My attempts in therapy to find reasons, to make 
sense, to talk about it logically did not take me anywhere but feeling ashamed. Finally 
giving space to the absurdity of life and the incoherence of experience brought relief.  
When I talked about the black hole, the ultimate aloneness of life and the 
inevitable death, my therapist reminded me that we could make life meaningful in spite 
of death. I am not against the searching for meaning. The black hole does not at all tell 
me not to live. What I do not agree with is the attempt to shy away from the important, 
though threatening at first, existential question I was confronted with by bringing up 
the ‘ought-to-be’ meaningfulness. This implies that what I experienced could be 
‘healed’. Tillich (1960:10) might say that my therapist at that moment was trying to 
remove or treat my basic anxiety – anxiety about ‘being bound to the law of coming 
from nothing and going to nothing’, whereas the anxiety of having to die, of becoming 
guilty and of lacking a meaning in life is not removable or answerable by the therapist.  
If I tap into the sadness, melancholy and loneliness I feel in my life, it is about 
life. Counselling and psychotherapy are concerned with empathy and ‘being with’. 
One aspect of the power of therapy is breaking the isolation one might feel through 
being understood by another. Talking serves as a tool to achieve this. However, I think 
that the aloneness of life is easily kept at bay as it threatens the basic striving of our 
profession – being with another in their world. It is hard for us as counsellors and 
psychotherapists to think that ‘each of us is alone in our experience of our world’ 
(Jacobsen, 2007:50) and that what is experienced by one is inaccessible to others 
(Mattingly, 1998). To quote Gabriel Marcel (cited in Flynn, 2006:24), ‘no two beings, 
and no two situations, are really commensurable with each other: to become aware of 
this fact is to undergo a sort of crisis’. Indeed, to envisage this brings to me crisis 
personally and professionally. In spite of the company of friends, family and therapy 
which has brought connection, care and love, I am confronted with the fact that I am 
alone in my experience of the world. As the example Jacobsen (2007) gives about a 
cancer patient who feels alone in spite of the surrounding kindness and care, we often 
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find ourselves stand alone in crucial moments. We therapists talk because we want to 
understand, to enter the client’s inner world. However, language as a communication 
tool to achieve understanding and empathy inevitably fails to bring the togetherness 
that we would like to think we can achieve. This takes me to a session with one of my 
clients.  
In a session with this client, I found that I could only respond ‘I don’t know 
what to say’. This is a client who actively engages in getting help. However, deep 
inside he knows that he is trying to get ‘better’ and talk about the ‘depression’ for the 
sake of others, because he knows deep down that there is a place where no one can 
enter or help. Every talk he gives about this place is an ‘edited version’ of this place. 
The client refers to it as depression but it is not as knowable and clear as this. People 
around him encourage him to talk about it and expect that he would feel better 
afterwards. However, he often finds himself being in a place beyond communication. 
I felt helpless sitting with him, perhaps because I could not enter that exact place 
neither. I was trying to grasp something that he felt impossible to communicate, and at 
the same time, I had to communicate my limited understanding through limiting words. 
I was deeply touched and tearful. Yet, I struggled to find words for empathic response. 
I thought any descriptive words would be just as taming as the label ‘depression’ for 
something that is much more profound. It is not a response that I am satisfied with, but 
the only thing I could say at that moment was ‘I don’t know what to say’. I deeply felt 
the failure of language. At the same time, I respected the aloneness that others cannot 
‘cure’ for him.  
Despite knowing that this place of aloneness cannot be shared through 
communication, this client still talks. He said he talked from a place of obligation. 
Perhaps he talked from a place of obligation when he was in the room with me too.  
To tell a story of oneself is an action towards and requires another (Butler, 
2005). An account of oneself is always given to another (ibid). I wonder in this case 
whether to some extent narrative coherence serves for the therapist rather than the 
client. The client gives accounts, tells stories of themselves, narrating what is 
narratable and cutting off, as Butler (2005:21) would say, ‘a necessary opacity in our 
understanding of ourselves’. Being in the client’s chair, did my client feel obligated to 
impose a narrative form that his experience does not possess (Mink, 1987)?   
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As a client, I perhaps have felt obligated to my therapist. When my personal 
therapy was approaching an end, I tried to find an alternative to therapy. Writing was 
what I could think of. I tried to write a ‘life story’ of my own, but what I wrote was not 
temporally and causally organised into a sequence (Shapiro & Hudson, 1991). It does 
not possess the temporal ordering that Baerger & McAdams (1999) propose as a 
primary device that establishes coherent narrative. Instead of linear stories, I wrote 
fragments of events and experience. What I produced was more like beads in a bowl 
than on a string. It was in this process of writing that I realised the pervasive aloneness 
I have been feeling since I was a child. However, when I imagined talking to my 
therapist about what I had written, I had a sense of annoyance and I thought I would 
not have reached the same place if I were not writing but talking. It is often believed 
that coherent narrative needs to be meaningful (e.g. Shapiro & Hudson, 1991). My 
annoyance came from this meaning making and it strongly connects to the need to 
make sense for the therapist as my audience. I took it as my responsibility to articulate 
myself in order to allow my therapist to understand me. And I could not shake this 
responsibility off me. Writing alone allowed me not to make sense. It allowed me to 
be ‘meaningless’. Only the paper listened. It remembered but did not push, respond or 
get confused. By the end, nothing might make sense, yet I felt at ease. It did not bring 
me as much shame. I could not be as messy as I was with my pen and paper in the 
therapy room.   
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Chapter 5 Writing about Sandplay 
Piece 1, May 2018 
Sandplay Session 2  The World Beyond Reach  
 
It is a world beyond my reach. It exists before and after time. The word ‘ancient’ 
is not enough to describe it. It exists before me, and will exist after me. It is right there 
in front of me, but it is far away beyond the horizon. It is there, just be.  
I find myself holding on to the edge of the sand tray. Yet, I know I have to let it 
go.  
Figure 1 The World beyond Reach 
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The elf with weird green hair stands in the corner. I feel protective of him, but 
I know, I need to let him go. More importantly, I know now he is okay. Innocent and 
genuine, always with good will, I thought he was not aware of the danger of ‘our 
world’. He opens his arms; he invites and accepts. I thought that he was not prepared 
for what would come along, that he just did not understand. Seeing him in this world 
that is beyond my reach, I realise it has always been me who feared, who worried and 
was vigilant for him. I ought to protect him I thought. Seeing him in this world in front 
of and far away from me, I understand that he does not feel insecure. Yes, he is 
innocent but he is not as vulnerable as I thought. Perhaps, it is time to open my arms 
too, to let go and to welcome. My little weirdly green-haired elf brother is okay.  
I know I want to be there in this world that is so far away from me yet somehow 
so close to my heart. Its dry woods, which I think have the quality of stone, strong, firm, 
calm, and gentle, give me comfort. It calms me down. Imagining myself in this world, 
I can run between those woods; I can take a rest leaning on them. They would be just 
Figure 2 The Elf with Green Hair 
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there, being there for me. Perhaps not actually for me. I wonder, whether they care, 
whether I matter. Or am I too small as a human-being to them as what exist beyond 
time. Perhaps, it is not that they do not care. It is that they do not have the concept of 
our man-made linear time. No quick, nor slow, they just be.  
They are calm, as if nothing can disturb the calmness. Is it the father I always 
long for? Calm and gentle, grounded and patient, not easily anxious. This is the father 
I need in my times of distress and happiness. The elf brother of mine (or perhaps it is 
the ideal baby me) is there with dad. The elf feels secure, calm, light, and supported, 
and he knows that he would be able to stand on his own feet. He can. He is strong. 
Now I can let him go, knowing he is in this world, the world which I want to go but do 
not belong. 
I asked for a parent in my personal therapy. I said that I just wanted to be a 
child for a little while. My therapist told me that I needed to parent my inner child 
myself. I know it is true. However, it hurts to ask again and again for a parent to lean 
on just to be told that is not possible. I did not know how to separate this adult me and 
child me. At those moments, it was the whole of me wanting a parent and to abandon 
all the responsibilities. The adult me is tired and wants to be looked after too. I felt 
hopeless. If I could not long for what I long for even in personal therapy, there was 
nowhere I could turn to for what I deeply want. Am I just being unreasonable? 
At this moment, I understand, this sand world beyond reach is being there for 
me as what I have been asking for, the parent that I would not get elsewhere. The 
shapeable nature of the sand and the world in sand make it capable of being what I 
desire it to be, without defences or rejection, but just be.  
I am deeply attached to this world, though I know I don’t belong. I know that I 
can’t go there, otherwise I’d not want to come back.  
I tried to speak to this world, to the elf. However, I have a sense that this world 
and everything in it speak a different language from mine. They have a different sense 
of time. The world is not in the past, not in the future and is not merely in the present. 
It is none of them and it is all of them. It is beyond reach in this sense too. The man-
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made concept of linear time cannot catch it. Isn’t the concept of time another of our 
ways of gaining control?  
There are only a few things that I can understand about this world. I don’t 
know why I choose any of these figures and objects, why they are in certain places, 
why there is a fruit in the corner. At the same time, I don’t feel I need to know. There 
are no stories in it in terms of when, where, who does what, and before, then, after. 
This world and everything in it just exist, being there. While I hardly understand 
anything about it logically, I know it in my heart and body. 
  
My sandplay experience makes me realise the paradoxical feelings of wanting 
to tell about myself and to be known on one hand, and wanting to refrain from this 
telling and explaining due to the frustration of the doomed effort of telling.  
There was a need to share, a need to be known. I wanted to tell the therapist 
how I felt and what I thought in my sandplay. I wanted to know what she thought about 
my sand world and how it made her feel. At the same time, paradoxically, in the telling 
between us, there was a sense of intrusion. When we looked at my sand world and 
talked about it or my relation to it, both of us became the observers of my sand world. 
The therapist offered comments that inspired me. For example, she mentioned how 
this world I built brought the word ‘ancient’ to her which made me realise the central 
element of ‘time’ in the world. However, the therapist’s comments and my 
communication with the therapist were a ‘third’ standing between the sand world and 
me. It pulled me away from my immersion in the world.  
It takes effort to be known. I stepped out from my exclusive attachment with 
the world, and tried to describe in a language shared by my therapist and me what does 
not speak the same language. The therapist tried to understand, never perfectly, this 
world through my imperfect translation. This imperfection is the price I pay for my 
need to be known which perhaps can never be fully met. In this sense, the effort to be 
known, that is to not be alone, paradoxically confronts me with the fact that I am alone 
in this never perfectly translated world.  
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I was able to make sense and share what I wrote above to some extent during 
the session. However, the majority of it only came out in my writing. The freedom to 
roam on paper without the otherness of the therapist and the need to ‘translate’ allowed 
me to connect. This reminds me of my personal therapy session where I connected 
with the black hole, I was with the therapist but I was also alone in the connection with 
the black hole. I think the therapist’s presence is crucial. I would not have connected 
to the black hole certainly, perhaps also this world beyond reach, without the presence 
of a therapist. Nonetheless, in those profound moments I was alone, and I could only 
be alone.  
Despite this, it is the effort from both the therapist and me, though bringing 
frustration at times, that matters. 
As a therapist myself, I do not think that I can completely be in the client’s 
shoes, taking each step as they do. The need for language, for talking to each other is 
a proof that we are not absolutely at one with another. There is a need for this medium 
to bond us together. We strive to know and to be known, while the fully knowing and 
being known is doomed to failure. Yet, it is not to say therapy is doomed to failure. 
The striving delivers a message ‘I care’. I see this as sitting at the core of therapy. 
I worked with a client who found it difficult to articulate his wants and needs. 
In the initial session, he could not articulate what went ‘wrong’ and what brought him 
to counselling. It was difficult for him to believe that anyone cares about him. A 
message that I explicitly and implicitly let him know again and again during our work 
together is that I care, not only because it is my job to listen, but also because I care 
about him as a person. We only had a limited time to work together. Near the end of 
our work, the client started to take better physical care of himself. He found it a little 
bit easier to ‘give others a chance’, to start to trust. However, he could not articulate 
what exactly allowed the changes to happen. He had not developed from ‘inability’ to 
articulate to articulation. He felt better yet could not articulate how different it was and 
what made it different. However, is the articulation necessary? Could it be enough to 
be content with the transformation without knowing why? I am reminded of my own 
development throughout my training, of how I felt different as a person yet could not 
fully explain it. What is the articulation for? Always searching for logic and 
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explanation, naming what has happened and how it happened give us a sense of control. 
Being clearer about the needs being met could help us take care of these needs better 
in the future. Thus, knowing gives us a sense of control towards the future. However, 
as in this client’s and my own experience, I question that we can fully know. In the 
later stage of my work with this client, he said that he struggled to believe that others 
would care, when he himself could not make himself logically understandable to others. 
If I had pushed him to articulate either his ‘problems’ in the beginning or his 
development near the end, it could be contradictory to the message that I want to 
convey to him: I care. I care about him including the unarticulated and unarticulatable 
aspects. I try to understand, despite knowing there is so much that could not be 
communicated and that my understanding can only be partial. Though, there will 
always be a paradox in that I care and strive to understand the unarticulatable which 
in itself requires converting the unarticulatable into (incomplete) articulation. What 
matters is the space I give to the unarticulated and that I do not see articulation as a 
necessary indication of therapeutic change nor the goal of therapy.  
The transformation and therapeutic changes which have no words and do not 
need words (Ammann, 1991) are what bring my appreciation to sandplay. My own 
experience of sandplay freed me from logic. In this beyond-logic-world on the sand, I 
do not have to explain myself. I said lots of ‘I don’t know’ during the sessions and did 
not feel ashamed by it. Instead, I laughed with playfulness.  I did not tell any stories 
with sequences, but talked about my feelings towards some parts of my sand world. 
Not having to know brought contentment. It seemed to enable me to relinquish 
legitimising my feelings.  
I have known the black hole for years, not cognitively, but bodily. I was 
frightened without clearly knowing it. I feared that once I got closer, I would get suck 
into it. Perhaps, this was the reason why I could not look straight at it previously. My 
body knew it well long before my cognitive mind. My body finds its language when 
touching the sand. This is perhaps why sand always attracts me. My body is heard by 
the sand where logic and explanation are not needed. The sand listens but does not 
interpret. Being with another person when I encountered the black hold and built my 
sand world seemed to be important. I seemed to come to realise some aspects of my 
being when I was seen by the therapists. However, this otherness of the therapists can 
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also be frightening as intrusion. In my sandplay, at times, especially in the beginning 
when I played with the sand, I found it difficult to be under the therapist’s gaze. 
Although the sand is also an ‘other’, it is completely receptive. It does not ask anything 
from me and does not give anything to me. It is formless and shapeless. Yet, my hands 
can give it shape and form. When I touched the sand, I felt as if the unspeakable finds 
a way to speak and find another who can listen without translation. 
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Piece 2, June 2018 
Sandplay Session 3  Story of the Yellow Fish 
 
This is a story about the yellow fish. In the deep sea, the yellow fish and her 
families and friends live together. This day, they are heading to a party. The yellow 
fish and her mum and dad lead the way, and her friends follow. Even the turtle who is 
never a party animal joins in. Even the strangers whom nobody knows join in. This is 
kind of a big day, because it is a farewell party. The little yellow fish has a talent. Yes, 
as a fish, she can fly. This is the day she sets off to the far away mountain. No map or 
compass, no idea of how far it might be, and no fear, she looks forward to the future. 
She wants to fly to the mountain and knows that she will get here. In the farewell party, 
they all dance with the music and swim through the colour-changing seaweed. To say 
goodbye today means that no one knows when they will see the little yellow fish again. 
If she misses home, how could she come back to see her families and friends? What if 
she gets lost? Farewell is sad, but they turn it into a celebration. Everyone dances, 
Figure 3 Story of the Yellow Fish 
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sings and laughs. There are no tears. The yellow fish is of course sad to leave home 
and everyone at home behind. She will miss them very much. However, this does not 
stop her from looking forward to the world above. She does not think about her 
possible homesickness and she is not worried about what she could do then. She knows 
that she will have a new life and make new friends on her way to the mountain. In the 
music and laugher, with the best wishes from friends and families, the yellow fish 
swims up towards the open air and will soon fly towards the sky where future awaits, 
heading to the far away mountain of her dream.     
 
The real story is not as neat. I have left out things that do not fit into the story 
and are at odds with the general mood of the story. I felt scared when I put down the 
three crabs on the upper right corner. They reminded me of spiders. They seem to trap 
and forcefully occupy the starfish. I do not know how they relate to the rest of the sand 
world. In the lower right corner stands the seahorse who is not joining in the festive 
atmosphere. Instead, he is just looking at all of these at a distance.  
I also twisted certain aspects of the sand world to create this story with a 
coherent storyline and general mood. The sharks on the left hand side of the tray were 
not friendly in the beginning. I remember looking at them and thought that they would 
do something bad. There was something evil in them. This feeling towards them turned 
when I looked at parts of the tray more closely while I was sharing with the therapist. 
These sharks also became part of the group of friends. The men with swimming suits 
were strangers to the sea. They came to search for some treasure that they were 
commanded to look for. I do not know what they were searching for, who is their 
commander. They have no connection to the yellow fish and her friends and family. 
And they do not care about what is going on around them as all they are ‘programmed’ 
to do is treasure hunting. The blue whale on the left-hand-side of the yellow fish is not 
simply one of the parents. It is the ‘ideal dad’ the yellow fish wants. His existence is 
difficult to describe. He is materialised and he was there in the party rather than just 
an ideal image or fantasy. At the same time, he is not real. There is no interaction 
between him and others including the yellow fish.  
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That the yellow fish sets off to the mountain saying goodbye to her family and 
friends was the main theme of this sandplay. When I thought about telling about this 
sand world, this story was the foreground focus. When I wrote this story, all the other 
feelings and facts I described above were present, but it felt impossible to include them 
all if I wanted to tell it as a story. I can try to talk about everything including the horror 
brought by the crabs, the indifference of those men in swimming suits, the shifting 
identities of the sharks, and the blue whale whose existence is difficult to describe. 
However, then what I would be telling about is this sand world full of complexity and 
contradiction, but not a story. As Mink (1987) points out, we implicitly recognise in 
the recounting of a ‘coherent narrative’ what is relevant and irrelevant. When I was 
telling this story, I was holding the criteria of relevance in mind. It stopped me from 
telling everything. I thought that if I did not cut off and edit some parts of the sand 
world, the storyline, and the consistency and logic of the story would be constantly 
interrupted. Thus, the story would somehow be a broken one. For me as the story teller, 
it had felt disturbing to tell all the bits and pieces of the sand world and how they made 
me feel, and at the same time hold on to the process of telling a ‘story’. I wanted the 
story to be presentable and readable to readers. Therefore, the story presented has 
become a simplified one.  
If the sand world is an externalised and materialised inner world of ours, telling 
a coherent story of our inner world, according to my experience of telling a story of 
this sand world, would also include a process of editing and excluding. The increased 
sense of coherence does not necessarily mean that different elements of the inner world 
are coming together to service a main storyline better, it might only mean that the 
storyteller is better at selecting and editing in their storytelling, or perhaps is just 
merely more willing to do so. This selection and edition include distortion and 
exclusion. It includes distorting what does not fit into what fits better, even if it is not 
how it actually feels. For instance, I refer to the blue whale as one of the yellow fish’s 
parents instead of calling it the ‘ideal dad’ to avoid further explanation that would take 
me and the audiences off the track of the main story. It includes exclusion of what are 
at odds, for instance, the men with swimming suits, the crabs and the seahorse. While 
narrative coherence is highly thought of, coherence in this occasion can be seen as 
alienating parts of our inner world in order to fulfil how a story is expected to be.    
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When I put the objects down on the sand, I did not have in mind a storyline, 
any characters or relationships between different objects. I simply put them down 
according to whether it felt right to me. I shared most of the parts of the tray with the 
therapist. I told her about how the sharks, the crab, the yellow fish, the blue whale 
made me feel. My feelings towards some of the characters changed during the telling. 
The sharks became friendlier when I looked at them more closely and when I talked 
about them. I dialogued with the yellow fish and asked where they were heading to. It 
was then I had an answer from her that she was going to the mountain and she could 
fly. The storyline emerged during my verbal sharing with the therapist. I also started 
to feel connected to the yellow fish and realised she is me. I started to see how I also 
left home, family, friends, left the ‘water’ that I was living in, and flew to another 
country – the far away mountain – by myself.  
While I was telling the story to the therapist, I blamed the yellow fish for being 
naïve and selfish. I blamed her for not being considerate enough before she sets off: 
how is she going to come back to visit her family and friends if she misses them; if she 
does come back, would all her previous journey to the mountain be in vain; how does 
she know the direction? She is not only lacking consideration but is also naïve to 
believe that things will just work out and that she will eventually get to the mountain 
that she knows nothing about. This blame shifted when the therapist said she envied 
this yellow fish. It was then I realised something precious about the naivety of the 
yellow fish. As much as I blamed it, I also wanted to protect this part of her. I wanted 
it not to be contaminated by the requirement from the rational world which perhaps 
means the ‘grown-up’ world. I wanted her to be carefree and go after what she wants, 
to go into the world, to be adventurous. I was able later to appreciate the courage and 
optimism she has to embrace the unknown future.  
When I walked to the opposite side of the tray and saw the sand world from a 
different angle, the scene completely changed. The yellow fish did not look naïve 
anymore. She looked grown-up. Ironically, now she has lost the naivety which I was 
very harsh on and became what I wanted her to be, I missed this naivety of her. I 
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judged and pushed this part of her so much, but when it was gone, I wanted her back 
badly.      
 
While sometimes the talking and sharing with the therapist got in the way of 
my connection with the sand and my sand world, I noticed this time talking facilitated 
the development of a storyline. In telling the story, it helped me to make connections 
and make sense. I also realised that this sand world, compared to all the others, is the 
one which I feel I can talk about the most with another person. Knowing its connection 
to my personal life, my place in the sand world, and how it speaks about my life makes 
me want to share it with the therapist. I did not talk about my own life and its 
connection to the sand world during this session, but when I wrote about this session, 
I was excited that I had a little story of myself to tell and I wanted to tell it to the 
therapist. I wanted to tell the therapist how I had dreamt a life far away from the place 
in which I was living when I was a teenage girl, how a twenty-hour train ride took me 
to Beijing, and how later I flew all the way to another part of the world. I wanted to 
tell her how many people I have met and lost, how many goodbyes I have said, and 
my struggle of feeling selfish doing what I am doing.  
It makes me feel good that I can have this story to tell, a story with a main 
theme, a linear timeline, a ‘once-upon-a-time’. Indeed, there is a sense of coherence. 
This brings a desire to talk about it, believing that it is worth being listened to. I am 
confident that it is a story that makes sense, even has a dreamy quality to it that people 
would probably like: a girl from a small city with a dream of going out to see the world 
makes efforts to make her dream come true. This script has desire to be told and be 
heard. There is no shame. There is a sense of completion, order, and ‘sanity’, which 
undeniably feels good.  
When there is a story, it wants to be told and heard. The problem is to force 
what is not a story to fit in the shape of a story resulting in alienation and distortion.   
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Sandplay Session 6  The Abandoned World 
 
Compared to the eagerness to tell a story in session three, session six was 
extremely difficult to write. When I tried to write about this session after it finished, I 
felt there was not much to write about. I felt stuck, which frustrated me. I felt the need 
to write for the sake of my research project. It took me a couple of days to think about 
it and try to write more about it, but the difficulty remained. 
Reading my reflections of other sessions, I realised where the difficulty came 
from. There is no storyline and no main characters in this session. It is a world of 
abandoned shells. They have been forgotten for a very long time. Each of them seems 
to lack a history or story. Why have they been forgotten? Were they ever remembered? 
Who abandoned them? There are no answers to these questions. There is no 
relationship between each of the shells. Each of the objects, the shells, the glass stones, 
the dry bark, they are all just being there without reasons and interaction. This world 
seems to exist in another dimension of time, different from our tick-tock time. When 
Figure 4 The Abandoned World 
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there is a story, when there is something happening, it wants to be told and heard. 
However, a world like this struggles in even needing to be told. In other worlds, though 
most of the other sand worlds also lack storylines, there are usually some main 
characters that evoke feelings in me that I can write about. I do not have strong feelings 
towards any part of this world, in comparison to other sessions. There is a sense of 
detachment this time, which makes my experience with this world difficult to describe.  
How I feel about this world interestingly changes over time. The first time was 
when I looked at it from the opposite angle. It somehow gave me a sense of hope. As 
time went on and as I looked at the pictures of this world again and again, I realised I 
started to appreciate the beauty of this world. While there was a sense of not good 
enough no matter how I arranged the coloured glass stones, they looked just right later 
when I looked at the pictures. Not only the glass stones, but also the shells and 
everything else, they seem just right.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
Sandplay Session 4 and 5  The Scarred Shell 
Touching the Sand 
My sadness and loneliness that are usually unspeakable are told by my hands.  
I touch the sand, immerse in the touching. At times, random thoughts cross my 
mind. At times, my mind is just empty, as if it falls into sleep awake. The sand is not 
waiting for me to tell it what is going on in my mind. It is not even watching me. It is 
simply being there. It does not wait. Waiting implies that something will happen. The 
sand does not wait. It is being there, no expectations, nor desire to know. I touch it, 
smooth its surface, bury my hands and watch each grain of the sand run through my 
fingers. The sand follows me, but it is not manipulated. It is willing to go where I go, 
in the way I want. At the same time, I also have a sense that I follow the sand, as it 
runs through my fingers and moves according to my hand movements. 
My mind sometimes runs busy, sometimes stands still, moves and stops, without 
rhythm. From nowhere, my sadness comes. I cannot tell whether it raises from my 
chest then goes through my hands which tell it to the sand, or it raises from my hands 
then finally reaches my heart. What I know is that I feel it there in my heart. Unlike 
most of the other times, it is allowed this time by the sand and by me. Its irrationality, 
lack of causal explanation, its coming from nowhere and going perhaps nowhere are 
all allowed. The sand is not confused and does not ask why. It just receives and accepts. 
There is nothing from the sand that I feel obligated to.  
It does not feel like it reaches out to me. It does not offer extended arms. It is 
being receptive but without being destroyed, intimidated, or scared by my feelings. It 
allows, receives, and accepts. Isn’t it also what we want to offer in therapy?  
I finally feel like a child, not being and not needing to be rational, just feeling 
what I feel, no matter if it is sadness coming from nowhere or stubbornness. Putting 
objects on the sandtray and creating something, especially under the gaze of the 
therapist, sometimes bring me the feeling of obligation to share it later with the 
therapist. Although I am comfortable to say ‘I don’t know why’, there is a process or 
a need to make sense. In comparison, the touching, just spending time with the sand, 
is completely free from words and rationality. There is a sense of intimacy that I share 
with the sand. Most of the time, I do not share it verbally with the therapist.  
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The video of myself touching and playing with the sand also shows me this 
intimacy. Watching my hands on the sand gives me a sense of togetherness. Although 
my hands and the sand are different in almost every respect, somehow watching the 
video does not give me a sense of ‘otherness’. From the video I also see how they 
follow each other.  
I made prints on the sand with my fingertips, then erased them. I made prints 
again and erased them again. There is something comforting about being able to make 
prints freely and erase them easily if I want. Yes, we can change what we say as well, 
but the difference is that once it is said, it cannot be undone. I can modify it, but I can 
never erase it from someone else’s mind. Whereas sand listens but it also lets go.  
The in-oneness and otherness often penetrate my writing about sand and my 
relationship with sand. I write about the feeling of being in one with the sand and being 
immersed in the touching of sand. At the same time, the sand is always the other, the 
other who is being there, grounded, who allows, receives, listens, and accepts. The 
sense of having another indicates the sense of separation which seems to be opposite 
to the in-oneness. And I seem to need both. I need to feel the sand as another who 
listens and yet also need to feel in one with it. I imagine the sand and I as two streams 
of flow, meeting each other, speaking the same language in the silence. We can be 
separated but can also be immersed as one like currents joining into the sea.  
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The World with the Scarred Shell 
 
This world seems like a return of the World beyond Reach that appeared in 
session two. This time it gives me peace and warmth. The loneliness of mine is 
accompanied. However, it does not mean that the loneliness is gone. The loneliness is 
accompanied but it is still itself. There is a paradox here: how can loneliness still be 
when it is truly accompanied? However, it is how I feel and it is the most therapeutic 
part for me. Winnicott’s (1965b) concept of ‘being alone in the presence of another’ 
says about how one can experience their inner world in the environment another 
creates but without intrusion. In comparison to this concept which emphasises being 
with oneself, what I experience is about being with another – this world of sand – 
without needing to change.  
Figure 5 The World with the Scarred Shell 1 
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This is what the world of sand teaches me as a therapist. Receive, allow, and 
accept, even when things do not make sense to us as the listener or audience. It needs 
to be accepted that not everything can be healed or developed into what suits our 
logical understanding. As Baggini (2018:8) reminds us, sometimes a philosophical 
approach to problems of living that does not offer treatment nor cures is needed, as 
‘[l]ife is difficult and full of problems, and there is no cure for living’.  
 
I had been avoiding this scarred shell for few weeks until this session. I like to 
put down shells in my sand worlds, but I never used this one. I almost feel disgusted 
by it. I could not bear to see its scars which are unrecoverable and irremovable. After 
some rearrangement, I have found its place in this tray. Surrounded by the bark, it 
Figure 6 The Scarred Shell 
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finds its safe place. It feels like having a warm sand bath. The scar will never recover 
nor vanish, but it is protected and taken care of.    
 
I initially put the scarred shell on the right-hand side. Something else was put 
on the spot surrended by the drywoods. But it somehow doesn’t feel right. I took it 
away and left this spot free. Afterwards while I was talking about the scarred shell, I 
tried to move it to this spot and it gave me a sense of ‘it is just right’. I felt a sense of 
comfort and relief when I found this place for it.  
There is no logic or explanation at all about this scarred shell, yet I know that 
it has a crucial connection to me and my inner world. I do not have any ideas about 
where the scars come from, how the shell is wounded. I did not have any plan of where 
it should go on the tray. I did not have any ideas that the spot that I left free would be 
the safe space for the shell. And the shell feels safe and comfortable though knowing 
that the wound would never recover and the scars would never vanish. I wonder how 
this can happen in talking therapy too? Again, the client who felt a lot better by the 
Figure 7 The World with the Scarred Shell 2 
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end of therapy but did not know how and why comes to my mind. Even though 
research gives importance to the positive impact of being able to tell the therapeutic 
story (Adler et al., 2007), there are therapeutic effect that happens without logic and 
storyline. It might be as random as how my scarred shell finds its place. And against 
the recovery story, therapeutic effect can happen without the wound being ‘healed’ or 
‘cured’. Not only the client’s experience but also the therapeutic experience can be 
wihtout or beyond logic and explanation.  
 
 The shell showed up again in the fifth session.  
Figure 8 My 5th Sand World 
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This is the first time I could bear to let the scars on the shell face upward. The 
shell knows its wound and scar well. It also accepts that the scars will always be there. 
However, it cannot be alone. It needs protection and wants to be taken care of. There 
are so many things nearby wanting to help – feathers, wood sticks, bark, stones, but 
nothing feels enough. I struggle so much to make it right but my effort always fail. I 
change the positioning of things, especially the feather, numerous times – on two sides, 
in a circle, one next to or behind another – but it always feels too close, or too far 
away, covering too much or too little. I place the feathers up like a screen around the 
shell, but it makes the shell unable to see the world. The shell wants protection but 
also wants to breathe and see the world. I rearrange it, but then the shape the feathers 
are forming do not look good enough. I realise that the shell is not in pain but it feels 
exposed. It seems nothing can help even though everything wants to help with good 
will. It is near the end of the session and I still cannot find a right way. I am anxious 
and almost panicked when time is almost up. I am also surprised by how much I am 
affected by this shell and how important it is to find a place that feels right and safe 
for it.   
Figure 9 The Scarred Shell 
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I reach out to the therapist for help. There is little she can do but she notices 
the fruit I placed on the upper left corner which has appeared a few times in my sand 
worlds. I put it next to the shell. And by the end I finally find a way to protect the shell 
with feathers on top without completely covering it.  
The shell is vulnerable and fragile, and it is also breave and honest. It is so 
fragile that it needs something that has to be just right, that cannot be even just a little 
bit more or less. What a horrible world it is when you desperately need something or 
someone because you are so afraid, but you do not know what it is that you are looking 
for, what it is that you need. As a result, even if there is help offered, you are still alone 
and scared. Perhaps there is even anger towards the help offered which cannot meet 
the needs that are unspeakable. This is perhaps how we sometimes sadly miss each 
other.  
Compared to the actual act of putting the fruit near the shell, what matters more 
to me is simply the fact that the therapist sees my worlds and remembers. Neither of 
us know what the fruit and the shell represent. And I do not think that I require her to 
know. It matters to me that the therapist makes the suggestion rather than letting me 
struggle alone. What touches and warms me is that she tries to offer and in the offering 
is the fact that she sees and remembers.  
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Chapter 6 Post-Sandplay Writing: 
Piece 1, June 2018 
The theme of ‘self and other’ has emerged from both my pre-sandplay writing 
and my writing about my sandplay sessions. I addressed the black hole that I have 
gotten in touch with as an ‘other’: I tried to describe it in words and felt as if I offended 
it because of my inadequate description of it. I experienced sand as an other who 
silently and acceptingly listened to me and with whom I could sometimes feel 
immersed as one. The sandplay therapist and my personal therapist were others I 
mentioned in my writing. Even when I wrote alone, I sometimes held my potential 
audiences in mind, whether it was my supervisors, examiners or future readers of my 
thesis. Interestingly, when I did not think of other people, I regarded the paper as 
someone who was listening, as I wrote on the second paper prior to the sandplay: ‘Only 
the paper listened’. 
This shows the innate relational dimension of language. As Butler (2005) 
points out, an account of oneself is always given to an other. Entering into a 
communicative environment, a child is firstly addressed by others, which introduces 
the child into language, then the child in turn learns certain ways of addressing (ibid). 
I have mentioned this in my previous writings. Here, I would like to emphasise the 
connection between this relational dimension of language and Wittgenstein’s (1972) 
notion of ‘language game’.  
For Wittgenstein, the use of language is rule-governed and is strongly 
connected to the community or context in which we are living. Like playing a game, 
we learn the set rules when we speak language. Also as in a game, we would not be 
able to participate if we do not follow the rules. As Lynch (1997) articulates, in 
Wittgenstein’s understanding, language is an outward journey for one to relate to the 
words and metaphors of their culture. What becomes apparent here is the relational 
dimension of language. A primary reason for following the rule of language game is 
to be involved with, to connect to and to be understood by others.  
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This relational dimension of language can be demonstrated in the act of naming. 
As Wittgenstein (1972) points out, children are brought up and trained to ask ‘what is 
it called’. Names are given after the question then we address the thing using the new 
name. We give things names so we can talk about them or we can refer to them in our 
talks. Therefore, naming and language in general serve the need for communication.  
Imagine that we create a unique new word for an experience, if we want people 
to understand it, as Wittgenstein (ibid) argues, we have to do so by means of the 
existing language system and words. Instead of referring inwardly to what is 
experienced, we search outwardly to find an acceptable and understandable description 
or label in the community in which we live for what is experienced inwardly. The 
description is not correspondent to what is experienced but it is about striving to get 
as close to the experience as possible on the premise of being understandable. Playing 
the language game means to understand the language (Arsith, 2011) and be understood. 
In other words, it is to learn and work with certain rules embedded with the language 
spoken so that a level of communication can be achieved in a certain context. 
The relational dimension of language bears a sense of obligation. The 
obligation is to make ourselves understandable, to provide good enough conditions for 
the listener of our speech to understand us. I see narrative coherence as embedded with 
this obligation. As McAdams (2006) argues, audiences of a narrative usually have 
certain structural expectations including, for example, causality, temporality, goal, 
intention or a sense of closure which allow them to make sense of the narrative. 
Consequently, a narrative that fails to meet these expectations may strike audiences as 
incoherent (McAdams, 2006). What is incoherent is usually difficult for audiences to 
follow and understand. In our daily life, the obligation of various authors and tellers to 
their audiences are obvious: news, novels, films or theatre offer audiences stories that 
they can follow so that audiences remain in the audience position. In comparison, the 
obligation of clients to be coherent in their dialogue with their therapists is much 
subtler to identify.  
A challenge in my personal therapy was that I did not know how to tell my 
uncomfortable feelings to the therapist in a more understandable way. This bothered 
me and made me feel inadequate as a client. I remember few years ago when I 
apologised to a previous therapist of mine: ‘I am sorry that I am not providing you 
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enough material to work with’. As a narrator, to see the audience confused can be a 
difficult experience. There was a client who apologised to me when she thought she 
was not making sense. ‘You looked so confused’, she said. And her apologetic face 
and voice stuck with me. Both my client and I took on our obligation as the client to 
provide materials that help our therapists to do their job which is to help us (to help 
ourselves). To make our narrative coherent assists the therapist to work – whether it is 
to empathically understand us, to offer interpretations, to challenge us, or to use other 
interventions.  
I see the sense of obligation mentioned above as a manifestation of Foucault’s 
(1977) disciplinary power in the therapeutic unit. ‘Discipline’, for Foucault (1977:215), 
is ‘a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, 
techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a ‘physics’ or an ‘anatomy’ 
of power, a technology’. Disciplinary power has the characteristic of gradual invasion, 
as Foucault (1977:170) argues, ‘discipline ‘makes’ individuals’. Disciplinary power is 
subtle and modest, yet it penetrates into every small element, altering mechanism and 
imposing procedure. It is a network of relations from top to bottom as well as from 
bottom to top; ‘it ‘holds’ the whole together’ (Foucault, 1977:177). Here, we can look 
at the therapeutic relationship under the light of Foucault’s disciplinary power.  
Tracing back to the time of Freud, Freudian patients came to the doctor 
disclosing their dreams, fantasies and free associations to enable the doctor to 
psychoanalyse. There are certain inevitable and necessary behaviours and expectations 
of behaviours that bind the therapeutic unit together. Certain obligations are embedded 
in the actions and behaviours of both parties in order for the therapeutic function to 
work. What is presumed in the therapeutic relationship is that being in the therapist’s 
chair is to listen, to understand, and being in the client’s chair is to talk and to be 
understood. As a seeker of help, clients ought to tell their therapists what bring them 
into the therapy room, through which their therapists could arrive at some level of 
understanding and offer help. 
Imagine a client who seeks help from a therapist but could not tell why, the 
therapist might help the client to articulate how s/he feels, what might have happened, 
what s/he expects from counselling, etc. Some therapists might also encourage the 
client to offer information about his history. These are the common questions that 
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therapists usually ask from their clients. Mostly it is hoped that throughout the course 
of psychotherapy, the client achieves a higher level of narrative coherence or be able 
to tell a story of their own, which they are not doing in the beginning of the therapy. 
Here, what is outside of the regularity – the unknown, inarticulate, incoherent, or 
unorganised – is encouraged to reshape itself to fit the regularity – making sense, 
articulated, coherent, or organised.  
In his analysis of the birth of the asylum, Foucault (1967) points out with the 
appearance of asylum, external constraint and punishment are replaced by internal 
ones. Physical punishment, constraint, or isolation turn into an internal gaze of oneself. 
A madman is made morally responsible for any disturbance he might cause. Instead of 
punishing the madman’s guilt, the system of asylum organises it as a consciousness of 
himself; it intervenes the madman’s existence (Foucault, 1967:247): 
[…] the madman became an object of punishment 
always vulnerable to himself and to the Others; and, 
from the acknowledgment of his status as object, from 
the awareness of his guilt, the madman was to return to 
his awareness of himself as a free and responsible 
subject, and consequently to reason.  
This internalised moral responsibility, for Foucault, is violent. Returning to the 
therapeutic relationship, in the emphasis on narrative coherence, doesn’t this violence 
also exist? Think about my apologies to my therapist and my client’s apologies to me 
when our narratives failed to make sense, weren’t we also subjecting ourselves to this 
internal gaze? Didn’t we also feel responsible and guilty for the disturbances we may 
have caused to the therapeutic process? Doesn’t the striving to turn to narrative 
coherence resemble the returning to reason? Looking in this light, narrative 
incoherence might have been somehow treated as some sort of madness that is out of 
regularity. The pursuit of narrative coherence might be stemming from discipline and 
relational power than merely for the good of helping clients. 
When the collective assumptions about how a story is supposed to be like is 
not met, the story told might not be recognised as a story at all (Baerger & McAdams, 
1999). Canonical model of story not only makes narrative recognisable as stories but 
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is also intuitively satisfying (ibid). When I wrote the story about the yellow fish, I was 
turning a gaze on myself in terms of what constitutes a coherent story that is easy to 
read and comprehend. I told a story that fits what a ‘story’ requires. This was to satisfy 
the potential audiences as well as myself who is also an audience placing an internal 
eye on myself. In the emphasis on a coherent story as a manifestation of well-being 
and therapeutic change, could therapists also fall into this implicit desire for a 
satisfying story, driven by intuitive longing for satisfaction? Yet, what is unique about 
therapy is to hear what cannot be heard even by the client themselves. Based on this 
belief, it is exactly what does not fit into the canonical model of story, what is thus 
often unrecognisable, edited, and cut off, that needs to be heard.  
In my previous writings, I often mentioned a sense of relief that talking therapy 
fails to bring me when I write or play. In my second pre-sandplay writing, I imagined 
talking to my therapist and I thought I needed to make sense for the therapist, and ‘I 
could not be as messy as I was with my pen and paper in the therapy room’. In 
comparison, when I wrote, ‘[o]nly the paper listened. It remembered but did not push, 
respond, or get confused’.     
Playing with the sand, I often experienced the sand as someone who ‘listens 
but does not interpret’, who ‘is not confused and does not ask why’, who ‘just receives 
and accepts’ and ‘[t]here is nothing from the sand that I feel obligated to’.  
These writing reveal that it was the relinquishment of the obligation to the 
therapist that I have often felt bringing me relief. This being free, at least to some 
extent, from obligation then brought me a sense of immersion in my inner world, which 
also brought contentment. Butler (2005:64) writes against the ethical violence in 
requiring someone to offer a coherent narrative account of oneself, and says that ‘if 
violence is the act by which a subject seeks to reinstall its mastery and unity, then 
nonviolence may well follow from living the persistent challenge to egoic mastery that 
our obligation to others induce and require’. For me, challenging the requirement for 
narrative coherence is challenging this egotic mastery brought by the obligation to 
others.  
One of the reasons that draws me to this research project is the anguish brought 
by having to articulate my development over the course of my training, especially my 
personal development. My sense of contentment was invaded by the requirement for 
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articulation which was never satisfactorily met and was experienced by me as being 
for others rather than for myself. This relates me to one of Wittgenstein’s (1972)  
aphorisms which asks us to imagine an encounter with someone who states that for 
him understanding, for instance, knowing how to play chess, is an inner process. When 
we want to know whether he can play chess, what we would do is to draw his attention 
to the criteria which demonstrates his capacity even he says the knowing for him is an 
inner process. As Wittgenstein (1972:181) writes, ‘[e]ven if someone had a particular 
capacity only when, and only as long as, he had a particular feeling, the feeling would 
not be the capacity’. So, you have to be able to tell, to convince, in order to demonstrate 
your capacity, this is for others to know rather than the individual. This induces me to 
think about the justification and explanation that we often need to do for our inner 
states.  
My practice in a university setting requires me to write reports for student 
clients’ mitigating circumstances. I once had a client who had been feeling anxious 
since she was a child. The level of anxiety had reached to a point where it disabled her 
from attending lectures and studying. After the first session, she told me that what she 
got the most from our session was that she could feel how she felt without having to 
justify it. What she had been fearing was having to explain what made her feel this 
way because she did not know. Not having an anwer to this made her feel that her 
feelings were invalid. Ironically, while the client regarded not having to justify her 
feelings as the most important in our sessions, I had to justify it when I wrote the 
mitigating circumstances report for her. The report would not be ‘convincing’ enough 
if I just wrote down how she felt. There is a need for more details, e,g. what had 
happended that was out of the client’s control to cause the difficulty. I wanted to protect 
the space for the client where she could just own her feelings without justifying them, 
at the same time, I felt helpless facing the system that asks for justification.  
In addition, looking from the light of Wittgenstein’s philosophy on language, 
participating in language game indicates a sense of discipline. Following the rule of 
the language game keeps us as an insider of the community. Just as in the short story I 
previously mentioned titled, ‘The Drowned Giant’, although intrigued by it initially, 
people gradually lost interest in what they could not understand and could not know. 
The unknowable is forgotten and abandoned eventually.  
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As in my experience of my sandplay sessions, in spite of the frustration, I had 
the desire to share with the therapist what was happening in my sandplay and to be 
known. Perhaps, the fear of being forgotten and abandoned drives us to shape our 
experiences into a knowable and understandable form. As Arsith (2011:15) says, 
‘learning and use of a language of a community can be undertaken as linguistic 
conformity, generated by the need for people to communicate and feel protected by the 
possibility of being understood by their peers’. Therefore, apart from being an 
obligation to others, coherent thus understandable narrative also stems from our desire 
to be known and related, even at the price of distortion of individual experience. Again 
as Arsith (2011:15) writes in the same paper, language: 
[…] classified things for us, it allows us to label the 
individual experiences as generalities that we reach 
ultimately to manage them socially. In this process, 
which is the individual, it is necessarily suppressed. But 
this is the price that must be paid for social security. 
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Piece 2, July 2018 
Weeks after I completed my sandplay sessions, an event led me to reconnect to 
a childhood trauma that I had for long not recognised as a major trauma in my life. 
Although I had always known it rationally, I somehow was not able to access it 
experientially. I did not recognised its major impact on my life even after speaking 
about it in my personal therapy previously. Being able to recognise it as a trauma now 
allows me to connect to the scarred shell that appeared in my sandplay. While I saw 
the scarred shall as an ‘it’ then, I now see it as ‘me’. Now, I can see and own these 
scars as mine. The scar shell is wounded and frightened, so is my body. The scarred 
shell struggles to feel safe. The protection and help offered never feel right or adequate.  
At the time when the childhood trauma happened, I was not protected as a child and 
did not know where to seek help. Just like the scarred shell, the wounded child within 
me wants to hide.  
When I first recognised what happened in my childhood as a traumatic 
experience, I was by myself reflecting on the specific event that reconnected me with 
the trauma. My realisation started with this sentence in my head ‘my body was hurt’. 
Then I went on: ‘it wanted to be close to people, but it was so scared…’ Naturally, 
without clear intention, I started to engage in an imaginary telling to a person whom 
was involved in the event that led to my realisation. My realisation and recognition of 
the trauma unfolded in the telling. For the first time, I listened closely to and really 
cried for my hurt body. At the same time, in the midst of the intense realisation that 
inevitably brought pain, the imaginary telling became a therapeutic means for me.  
Initially, I had felt a strong longing to tell this person and be known by him. I 
rehearsed in my mind what I wanted to tell him. In my imagination, I told him about 
how my body felt, how it was not heard by me and how it had been affecting my way 
of being with others. In the telling, I processed these at the same time, which then 
allowed me to understand and accept them. When I saw this person in reality, for 
various reasons, I did not tell him anything that I rehearsed in my mind. However, in 
the following few weeks, I continued to engage in my imaginary telling. I told him 
again and again about myself. I imagined that I shared the picture of the scarred shell 
with him and told him about the scars of mine. I had ended my personal therapy prior 
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to this event. However, unexpectedly, this imaginary telling had become a substitute 
for personal therapy. Surprisingly, after few weeks of these repetitive imaginary telling, 
when I was offered a place in a counselling agency which I contacted when I first 
started to process the trauma, I did not feel the need to talk with a therapist anymore. 
I was by myself in this process in reality. Perhaps I needed to be alone. 
However, there is no doubt that I needed to tell someone. I use the word ‘telling’ here 
because I notice that it was never an imaginative dialogue between two parties. I 
imagined the content of my speech and the physical environment in which the telling 
was taking place, but little about this person’s response, at lease verbal response. What 
was important to me was the act of telling and perhaps being received by the imaginary 
other. Maybe I did not want, or even rejected, a response.  
This experience of imaginary telling reminds me of my sandplay. In my 
sandplay, I often saw touching the sand as a kind of telling: telling that does not need 
words. The sand is simply being there. As I wrote at the time, ‘[I]t does not feel like it 
reaches out to me. It does not offer extended arms. It is being receptive but without 
being destroyed, intimidated, or scared by my feelings. It allows, receives, and accepts’.  
This telling to an imaginary other easily draws connection to the theory of the 
dialogical self which sees the self as a dialogical narrator with others in the self-
structure (Hermans et al., 1992). Bakhtin’s polyphonic novel is one of the central 
notions from which the theory of the dialogical self is developed (Angus & McLeod, 
2004b; Hermans et al., 1992). A central characteristic of polyphonic novel, as 
discussed in Bakhtin’s (1984) examination of Dostoevsky’s novel, is the plurality of 
independent voices and consciousness that each has its own world and are unmerged 
with each other in the unity of the event. In other words, there is no single author or 
narrator in a single objective world, but multiple voices with their own independent 
views. Similarly, in the theory of the dialogical self, self is regarded as not a unified 
one, but a ‘society of mind’ (Hermans, 2002; Hermans & Dimaggio, 2004). It is argued 
in the dialogical self that I can move between multiple even opposite positions 
(Hermans, 2002). These I-positions are relatively autonomous and each of them has 
their own stories to tell regarding their experience from their own stances (Hermans, 
2002; Hermans, 2004). These different voices interact with each other and engage in a 
process of questioning and answering, agreeing and disagreeing (Hermans, 2002). And 
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these voices are qualitatively different (Hermans, 2004). As often described in 
literature about the dialogical self (Hermans, 2002; Hermans, 2004; Hermans et al., 
1992), these voices are similar to characters in a story who exchange information about 
their respective Mes, which results in a complex self.  
One of the central notions in the dialogical self is addressivity (Hermans, 2011). 
Hermans (2011) suggests that as in external dialogue with real people, different selves 
address each other in their interchange with each other. They talk with each other. 
Different Is, as subject, talk and respond to each other from their own positions; they 
talk about themselves which is the Mes, as object. These interchanges, as external 
conversation with others in daily life, can change the selves’ view on themselves 
(Hermans, 2011).  
For me, addressivity is at the centre of my processing of the childhood trauma. 
There was a need to tell someone about it. Imaginarily telling it to a person served me 
therapeutically. However, instead of talking with, which indicates a two-way dialogue, 
I talked to the person in imagination about my realisation. It is suggested that in the 
telling of their stories, the client also listens to their stories through the therapist’s 
empathic reflections (Angus & McLeod, 2004b). I think that for me, in the telling, I 
was also listening to myself and my wound again and again, but not through the 
response of another but simply through the telling. Therefore, instead of a dialogue, 
what I needed seemed to be a monologue that was received or witnessed by another. 
This also happened in my reflection of my sandplay sessions. After some of the 
sandplay sessions, I wrote letters that were addressed to some of the figures in my sand 
world, for example the elf with green hair and the scarred shell. However, most of the 
time I did not have imaginary two-way conversations with them. This leads me to think 
about my experience beyond my sandplay. There were times I rehearsed in my head 
something I would like to say to my therapist, but when I actually said it out loud, it 
felt different from my monological ‘rehearsal’. Most of the time, the actual speech did 
not feel satisfactory. Interestingly and similarly, I have mentioned in my previous 
writing that I found it therapeutic to write about myself and when I wrote, ‘only the 
paper listened’, but I had a sense of annoyance when I imagined telling it to my 
therapist. In my monological telling, I told an imaginary other about myself in the way 
I needed – I might say something repeatedly, disregard the chronological order, or 
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restart and reorganise my telling at any point. In the telling to a person in reality, I need 
to take the audience into consideration and I often amend my telling according to their 
reaction and response.  
Considering the obligations to others in language and narrative that I have 
discussed previously, I seem to want to break free from this obligation not only in 
interpersonal communication but also in intrapersonal imagination. 
In the theory of the dialogical self, self is seen as social: positions in the multi-
voiced self are occupied by others (Hermans, 2004). The I takes another person as a 
position that I can occupy, which offers an alternative perspective regarding the world 
and the Me (ibid). My experience resonates with the dialogical self in the crucial place 
of an other in the self. I seem to need an other even when I am not engaging in actual 
conversations: in my sandplay sessions, my writing, my processing of childhood 
trauma, and my sand world. However, instead of moving between various I positions 
and engaging in an exchange among these positions, I seem to need an other to allow 
me to further immerse into the place I am at and be the person I experience myself as 
at those particular moments. From the perspective of the dialogical self, for me, the 
other, whether it is an imaginary person, sand, paper, or figures in my sand world, is 
the ‘alter ego’, is ‘another I’ (Hermans, 2004:21). However, instead of speaking from 
their own perspectives, they usually act as an other that is being there and receiving 
my perspective. They need to be an other that I feel less obligated to, if not completely 
free from obligation.  
To summarise, on one hand, the needing of an other resonates with the concept 
of self as dialogical. On the other hand, in my experience, there is a central role of a 
monologue that is being received yet not actively responded to, which I relate to the 
obligation to others.   
Butler (2005) talks about Foucault’s struggle when he was asked to give an 
account of himself in an interview, How Much Does it Cost for Reason to Tell the Truth. 
The account he gave does not offer causal explanation of why he came to think and 
act the way he did. Butler emphasises that Foucault’s account was given in the 
interlocutory scene in which Foucault was reacting to the questions and 
presuppositions of the interlocutor. Then Butler (2005:112) raises that question: ‘Is he 
telling the truth about himself, or is he responding to the demands that his interlocutor 
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imposes upon him?’ This is a question that I am asking in relation to therapeutic setting. 
In talking therapy which is also an interlocutory scene, is the client telling stories about 
themselves, or responding to the demands that the interlocutor – the therapist in this 
case – imposes upon them? When the therapist asks the client what brings them to 
therapy, there is a demand imposed upon the client: tell me your story which explains 
your current action.   
Following these questions of truth-telling, Butler (2005) looks at Foucault’s 
theory of confession. In her reading of Foucault, confession is an act of publishing 
oneself in words and engaging in self-verbalisation which makes one appear for 
another. The act of externalising and publicising oneself, Butler (2005:113) goes on to 
say, ‘assimilates confession to the violence of self-scrutiny and the forcible imposition 
of a regulatory discourse’. In confession, which is an act of manifesting oneself, the 
inwardness of the self dissolves and the self is reconstituted in its externality. The 
violence here for me is what Butler (2005:114) writes later: ‘manifestation does not 
“express” a self but takes its place, and it accomplishes that substitution through an 
inversion of the particular self into an outward appearance’. It is not an unfamiliar idea 
to relate religious confession to psychotherapy (e.g.Richardson & Stewart, 2009; 
Worthen, 1974). Similarly, in the therapy room, as in confession, through giving a 
verbal account of themselves, the client makes himself/herself appear not only to but 
also for the therapist, as discussed previously. In spite of the particular privacy offered 
by therapy, narrating in therapy is an act of externalising and publicising oneself. It 
may be argued that it is this externalising that serves the client therapeutically. 
However, I encourage attention to the violence that penetrates the demand of external 
telling. As ‘a certain performative production […] within established public 
conventions’ is required therein and is the aim of confession (Butler, 2005:113), this 
performative act is also involved in telling one’s story to another within a specific 
setting, in this case, the therapeutic setting, which comes with its own convention. This 
again closely relates to Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power. From my perspective, 
to become this externalised and publicised self, and this performative act entails loss. 
As Butler’s (2005:114) elaboration of Foucault suggests, it requires one to give oneself 
over to the ‘publicized mode of appearance’. In other words, one needs to move out of 
the solitude of oneself to become a self that is situated in the public and social relation. 
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The loss involved here is the inwardness that is pre-constituted. I see my monological 
telling as an act of resisting this moving-out of myself.  
In my monological telling, I seem to situate my need in the absolute centre. 
Psychotherapy is relationship-centred. It requires each of the party to move out of 
themselves and situate themselves in a specific setting which comes with its own 
norms and conventions. Ironically yet importantly, this moving out and publicising 
oneself, so is the loss involved, are necessary for the connection between the two, as 
interpersonal relationship is always situated socially. An account of oneself is always 
addressed to another and it always takes place in the normative structure (Butler, 2005). 
Therefore, my verbal and non-verbal monological telling that almost refuses an active 
response from another seem to be a resistance to the loss of the solitary self. I place 
the I that I am at those moments and the Me that this I experiences in the absolute 
centre which cannot be obtained in a narrative that is given to an active other.  
The telling involves the need to be known. Regardless of whether it is 
integrated, fragmented, coherent, or incoherent, I want to be known as who I am at this 
moment of telling. Thinking about the scarred shell, at the time it appeared, I just 
needed it to be there without enquiring into the meaning of it. I did not need and could 
not tell why, how and what about it.  
My discussion above raises the question about the constitution of self which is 
worth elaborating. It is easy to see that I am taking the stance that there is an inward 
self. However, I am not proposing a notion of self as a complete self-contained isolated 
entity that is separate from and vulnerable to the social demands.  
The resonance among the theory of the dialogical self, Foucault’s, and Butler’s 
philosophy is the place of the other in the ontological constitution of the self and one’s 
relation to oneself. The dialogical self sees the self as social with the other inside the 
self’s construction (Hermans et al., 1992). Foucault, according to Butler (2005), sees 
one’s relation to oneself as social and public. Butler (2005) sees the ontological 
constitution of the self as inherently relational: self emerges in being addressed by and 
addressing to others within context that is out of one’s control or not of one’s choice. 
As Winnicott’s (1975:99) famous quote says, ‘there is no such thing as a baby’, 
Butler (2005) stresses the relationality and dependency in the very basic psychological 
formation of the self. Without this ‘you’, she claims, ‘I’ am nothing. My need of the 
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telling as described previously affirms this central place of addressivity. I seemed to 
need this ‘you’ to know myself. According to Butler (ibid), it is from this being 
relational with others and the dependency that lies at the core of our very formation 
where the opacity of the self arises. The other is implicated in the formation of the self 
which generates the foreignness in oneself that cannot be fully narrated. We cannot 
fully talk about ourselves and give reason to our every action due to the opacity of the 
formation of self.  Drawing on Adorno, Butler (ibid) elaborates that it is in the push 
and pull of wanting to know, to rationalise, and yet being unable to fully know and 
remaining in the midst of myth thus also remaining impressionable to others and open 
to injury that we become human. That is to say it is in the distress of this predicament 
that we become human. Therefore, to require a coherent narrative at all times is to deny 
the limit of self-knowing and knowing others, to ignore the relationality and 
dependency in our very formation, and to disavow the predicament of the human 
community.  
Standing in line with Butler, in my writing above, I am not proposing that I 
withdraw into myself and reject external or internal two-way dialogue because there 
is an inward self that I can fully experientially know but cannot tell. Rather, I cannot 
bypass the epistemic limits concerning myself  (Butler, 2005; Hodapp, 2013). I am 
resisting the obligation to others and the normative frame in my telling; however, this 
act of resistance is also situated within the obligation and norm from which I can never 
break free.  
Apart from the foreignness in the formation of self, there is also the foreignness 
of language. From Bakhtinian perspective which I see as resonating with 
Wittgenstein’s idea of language as social and cultural, narrative is generated through 
the individual’s encounters in the social world (Skinner et al., 2001).  Language, for 
Bakhtin (1981:293), ‘lies on the borderline between self and the other’. He argues 
(Bakhtin, 1981:293-294): 
The word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes 
“one’s own” only when the speaker populates it with his 
own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the 
word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive 
intention. Prior to this moment of appropriation, the 
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word does not exist in a neutral and impersonal language 
(it is not, after all, out of a dictionary that the speaker 
gets his words!), but rather it exists in other people’s 
mouths, in other people’s contexts, serving other 
people’s intentions: it is from there that one must take 
the word, and make it one’s own. 
The foreignness of words, for me, is the limitation of language and narrative. 
While Bakhtin thinks that one can convert the foreignness of language into one’s own 
by appropriation, I hold the view that one can perhaps familiarises oneself with the 
foreignness, but one can never make the foreignness their own. As I discussed 
previously in relation to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, when one speaks, it is an outward 
journey to the social and cultural, it is to participate in the rules of the language game, 
which is a process in which what is individual is necessarily supressed (Arsith, 2011).  
Whenever I speak, there exists the intrusion of this outsider that is foreign to 
me. From here arises the value of not talking, the non-verbal, the touch of the sand, the 
need not to talk about my sand world, and the need to not give reason or explanation, 
though there always still exists a need to be known. There is another push and pull here: 
the need to resist the foreignness and the need to be known which inevitably involves 
the foreignness. 
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Piece 3, August 2018 
A transcript of one of Winnicott’s (cited in Davis & Wallbridge, 1991:35) 
lectures reads as follows: 
. . . in the quiet moments let us say that there is no line 
but just lots of things they separate out, sky seen through 
trees, something to do with mother's eyes all going in and 
out, wandering round. Some lack of need for any 
integration. That is an extremely valuable thing to be 
able to retain. Miss something without it. Something to 
do with being calm, restful, relaxed and feeling one with 
people and things when no excitement is around. 
(Suspension points original) 
Here Winnicott describes the infant’s return to a ‘restful unintegrated state’ 
(Davis & Wallbridge, 1991:35). According to Winnicott, as elaborated by Davis and 
Wallbridge (1991), the unintegrated state is a state in which there is no ‘me’ nor ‘not-
me’ for the infant. In other words, no separation from the environment is experienced. 
It emerges initially in a stage of absolute dependency. The infant is merged with the 
mother. The unintegrated state experienced in the very beginning of life, to some extent, 
as Davis and Wallbridge describe (1991), is an extension or a continuation of the state 
before birth.  
In the holding phase of parental care, the infant’s ego changes over from the 
unintegrated state to a structured integration (Winnicott, 1960), or from the primary 
unintegrated state, integration gradually appears (Winnicott, 1965a). Reliable holding 
provides ego-support for the infant and allows a sense of trust in the mother and the 
environment to develop over time (Davis & Wallbridge, 1991). A healthy process in 
this stage enables the infant to obtain what Winnicott calls ‘unit status’: the infant is 
able to become an individual person (Winnicott, 1960:590). It is worth noting that 
although Winnicott proposes this changeover from the unintegrated state to integration 
in the holding phase, he does not propose these two states as separate nor propose the 
changeover as a linear process. Winnicott believes that a return to the unintegrated state 
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in infant is the precursor of the capacity to relax and enjoy solitude in adult life (Davis 
& Wallbridge, 1991). In healthy development during holding phase, the continuation 
of reliable maternal care allows the infant to re-experience the unintegrated state 
(Winnicott, 1960). And this return to the unintegrated state is not necessarily 
frightening when there is a sense of security given by the mother, and this return can 
take place along with reintegration without anxiety (Winnicott, 1965a). 
The above quotation from Winnicott  describing the infant’s return to a ‘restful 
unintegrated state’ connects me to a scenario I wrote in my pre-sandplay writing where 
I was in the therapy room yet felt like I was lying on a bamboo mat in a childhood 
afternoon. It was a state of asleep yet awake, absorbed into myself yet connected with 
another and the environment. Winnicott’s beautiful writing above speaks to the heart 
of this experience of mine: sky seen through threes, lack of need for any integration. I 
see ‘sky seen through trees’ as a beautiful analogy for some realm of my experience. 
In there, experience is sky seen through the irregular net of leaves: it might be seen as 
fragmented as it lacks continuity; however, there is a sense of being whole though it 
cannot be visually seen. And this is how it should be: there is no need to remove the 
leaves to see the clear sky, I just rest under the tree and feel the wholeness unseen. 
Winnicott (1965a) is certain about that rest for the infant means a return to the 
unintegrated state, which, as described above, involves merging with the mother and 
the environment. In my piece of writing about this particular therapy session, I used 
the word ‘immersion’ and described talking as pulling me away from this immersion. 
This speaks a quality of Winnicott’s the unintegrated state. Additionally, in later page 
of this piece of writing, I described my experience in the therapy room as an experience 
of ‘holding’ in the therapeutic relationship. Then drawing on Butler (2005), I mentioned 
the ‘indescribable dimension of holding’. Looking at the notion of the unintegrated 
state, if narrating oneself includes telling oneself to someone else, how could this 
unintegrated state in which there is no ‘me’ nor ‘not-me’ be narrated? If there is no ‘me’ 
who tells and there is no ‘you’ to whom the telling is addressed, there is an impossibility 
of narration. This seems to be part of where the indescribable dimension of holding lies. 
Winnicott (1960) believes that during the phase of holding, the dawn of intelligence 
and the beginning of a mind is initiated. From here, the symbolic functioning emerges 
(ibid). Thus, language as symbolic system does not yet exist in the holding phase.   
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If I was experiencing the quality of the unintegrated state where language, logic, 
and reason do not exist and where neither ‘you’ nor ‘I’ are experienced, then it is 
understandable how having to talk about it brings agony. Also, integration, according 
to Winnicott (1965a), is linked to more definite emotions, such as excitement and rage. 
In comparison, the unintegrated state seems to involve less excitement and be subtler; 
therefore, more difficult to put a definite emotional label on, which also makes it 
difficult to talk about even when we want to. I see enforced narration of experience like 
this as separation and impingement, which my following writing will expand on further.  
I previously wrote about the inevitable and necessary separation from one’s 
immediate experience when the experience is being narrated. I emphasised how having 
to talk about my experience pulled me away from my experience. I looked at this from 
the perspective of the third position. This can also be looked at from the Winnicott’s 
(1960, 1965a) proposal of the three overlapped phases of satisfactory parental care: 1) 
holding; 2) the mother and the infant living together and 3) the mother, the father and 
the infant all living together. The holding phase, according to Winnicott (1960, 1965a), 
is prior to the notion of living with. The holding experience in therapy room can be the 
same. Speaking from this experience of mine, it was an experience of immersion and 
restfulness. It was close to the feeling of being content alone, though knowing the 
presence of another. In this stage, having to talk seems to me to be bringing forward 
the fact of ‘living with’ – there is another person with his/her own needs, thoughts, and 
feelings. Once I start to talk, I am no longer by myself or within myself in the presence 
of another. There is another person whom I address and who responds. I have the full 
awareness of another and decide my action with consideration of the other. It brings 
me back to Wittgenstein’s language game. When language is in use, there is an 
inevitability of engagement with the rules of the game which cannot be achieved when 
we are in full immersion with our individual experience. Therefore, the possibility is 
that the act of narrating in the experience of holding can draw one out of the very 
experience itself.  
Narrating can also act as an impingement in the holding experience. One of the 
functions of a holding environment is to minimise impingement to which the infant 
reacts (Winnicott, 1960). Impingement can be understood as external stimuli here. In 
the holding environment, which provides security and succeeds in protecting the infant 
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from physiological insult, ‘a continuity of being’ is developed (ibid). Alternative to 
being is reacting which results from impingement, and it brings annihilation to personal 
being (ibid). As I have discussed previously, there is always foreignness in language 
which, in my opinion, we can never convert into our own. And narrative is generated 
from our encounter with the world (Skinner et al., 2001). From this perspective, the 
foreignness of language can be viewed as an impingement from outside. According to 
Winnicott (1960), satisfactory maternal care for the infant in early stages includes 
taking account of the infant’s lack of knowledge of anything else but its self. In therapy, 
if a holding environment and this acknowledgement of lack of knowledge is to be 
provided, it is possible that in some circumstances, it would mean to protect the client 
from the impingement of words. Winnicott (1965b) starts his paper about the capacity 
to be alone by appreciating the silent phases or moments in psychoanalysis, viewing it 
as an achievement on the part of the client as it can indicate the client’s ability to be 
alone. This again may facilitate the re-experiencing of the unintegrated state which is 
different from disintegration. Disintegration indicates a loss. It is undoing what has 
been gained, thus it is painful (Winnicott, 2006). On the contrary, unintegration is 
regarded by Winnicott as valuable, restful and calm (Davis & Wallbridge, 1991) 
The unintegrated state, holding and the capacity to be alone are all closely 
related. Being able to experience a return to the unintegrated state is a basis for the 
capacity to be alone which is a significant sign of maturity in emotional development 
(Davis & Wallbridge, 1991; Winnicott, 1965b). The capacity to be truly alone has its 
origin in being alone as an infant or a child with the presence of the mother or mother-
substitute (Winnicott, 1965b). Winnicott (1965b) calls it being alone in the presence of 
someone. Being alone here in Winnicott’s definition is not being actually physically 
alone. In my reading of it, it talks about a situation where there is no intrusion or 
external demand which allows one to be with oneself or where external stimuli is 
managed by the individual without being felt as violation. Winnicott (1965b) argues 
that it is only in being alone, the infant’s own personal life can be discovered by him. 
I see this as what psychotherapy should facilitate.  
In the immature stage, the infant’s weak ego organisation is supported by the 
reliable presence of the mother, which allows the infant to be alone (Winnicott, 1965b). 
This relationship between the infant and the ego-supportive mother is termed by 
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Winnicott (1965b) as ‘ego-relatedness’. In this relationship exists two people, one or 
both of whom is/are alone, however, the presence of each other is important (ibid). 
Over the course of time, the ego-supportive environment provided by the mother or 
mother-substitute is internalised in the individual’s inner world and the capacity to be 
alone develops (ibid). However, the presence of someone is always there equating 
unconsciously with the mother figure: ‘the state of being alone is something which […] 
always implies that someone else is there’ (Winnicott, 1965b:34). 
This idea that someone else is always present even when one is alone with 
introjected ego-supportive environment reminds me of one of the themes that came out 
from my previous reflective writing: there is always a need for an other who is there 
without introducing a demand; whether from a person, disciplinary power, or the rule 
of language game. I need to be alone yet I also need the presence of someone else, 
which is the essence of my monologue that was addressed to an imaginary other. The 
therapeutic function of my monologue seems to be providing the ‘ego-relatedness’ that 
is crucial in early development. Similarly, being in the sandplay sessions with the silent 
presence and witness of the therapist and the sand also offered me the experience of 
being alone with the presence of another.  
My second piece of pre-sandplay writing concerns the innate aloneness of life 
that each of us faces. I see an overemphasis of talking and narration in therapy as a 
defence against, and denial of this aloneness, which alienates aspects of our experience 
in life.    
This aloneness of life that I wrote about is not the same as Winnicott’s capacity 
to be alone with the presence of another. While for Winnicott, the capacity to be alone 
comes with contentment with solitude and sense of safety, the aloneness of life that I 
wrote about can bring horror and despair, which is one of the reasons there can be 
defence and denial against it. Nonetheless, as Macquarrie (1972) thinks, the experience 
of feeling profoundly alone, despite the loneliness it brings, can also bring a sense of 
uniqueness to an individual. Echoing this is Winnicott’s opinion, as mentioned above, 
that it is only in being alone that the infant’s unique personal life is discovered by 
himself. What this brings to the application in psychotherapy is the therapist’s capacity 
to allow the client to be alone and not to intrude the client’s process for our own desire 
to empathically understand.  
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There is perhaps little doubt that relationship is paramount in psychotherapy. 
We believe that it is the relationship that heals. We see the value of therapy as two 
persons meeting each other in emotional depth. It is about understanding and being 
understood. It is about being together. Montaigne (1927:237-238) writes that ‘[w]e 
must reserve a little back-shop, all our own, entirely free, wherein to establish our true 
liberty and principal retreat and solitude’. As therapist, perhaps we expect our clients 
to feel safe to open up this ‘little back-shop’ to us in the therapy room. However, can 
we accept or stand that the client has this place all to themselves, entirely free, also 
from us? Can we allow our clients to retreat and have solitude back in the little back-
shop of their own without seeing it as the client’s defence or resistance? Can we allow 
the client not to talk, not to tell us their stories? 
A client of mine mentioned a ‘weird’ feeling she had during the week. It was a 
sense of wanting to be with others but not wanting to be actively engaging in 
conversation or activities. This feeling was also present during the session. She talked 
about it with puzzlement. Winnitcott’s concept of being alone with the presence of an 
other appeared in my mind. It seemed to me that what the client wanted was to be alone 
in the presence of someone. Therefore, instead of trying to help her to make sense of it 
or find the right words to articulate, I simply offered her the opportunity to simply sit 
in silence with me, to simply not engage with any external activity, including talking. 
By doing so, I suspended both my and her tendency to explain and to know.  I sat there 
with her without knowing what was going on, why she was feeling that way. The 
silence lasted for a few minutes, followed by an exploration of something significant.  
Different therapists would have different ways to approach this session. My 
approach then was simply to stop, to be silent. As therapists, we strive so much to 
understand. Sometimes we omit the possible benefit of allowing the client to be ‘alone’. 
It is perhaps not easy to tolerate the fact that the client has their own process going on 
that we cannot engage with and cannot know. Just as a parent would need to tolerate at 
a stage that they would never know as well as they use to be about what is going on in 
their child’s life, otherwise they would become intrusive. 
It is worth pointing out that Davis and Wallbridge (1991:35) address in their 
elaboration of Winnicott’s work that the return to the unintegrated state in infancy is 
the precursor of the adult ability ‘to be inconsequential’. What I find valuable in here 
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is that to be inconsequential – that is to say not to follow logic and relinquish the need 
for worth and significance – in adulthood is acknowledged as an ability.  
Answering the simple question ‘how has your week been’ often troubles me. 
My mind often goes blank for few seconds then I search for something sounds good 
enough to tell. When nothing significant and interesting enough – whether it is a 
holiday trip, something I succeed or fail, something to look forward to or dread about 
– can be offered, I start to feel lame and insufficient. But it does not do justice to the 
fresh autumn leaves I see when I cross the meadows, the street lights covered by the 
mist, the starry nights that often accompany me while I am walking home. When 
subjected to the question, the demand of a narrative, the act of telling, all these fade 
away and are lost in the answering. In the act of narrating lays the idea that something 
is worth telling about, something significant and meaningful enough happen. As 
Sartwell (2000) points out, narrative devotes itself to what is important, significant and 
worth remembering. He  notes that narrative comes apart in the moment of 
insignificance (Sartwell, 2000). And it ‘has already come apart everywhere, all the time, 
wherever people are breathing, or walking around, or watching TV, and not getting 
anywhere narratively speaking’ (Sartwell, 2000:65). Instead of sweeping our lack of 
significance into narrative, Sartwell’s (2000:65) recommendation to life, as Freeman 
(2008) effectively summarises, is just chill: 
You cannot narrate if you cannot breathe, so shut up for 
a moment and take a deep breath. Pull yourself away 
from significance for a moment and let yourself feel the 
sweet, deep, all-enveloping insignificance all around 
you. And take comfort in the triviality of your life-
project and your failure in realizing it.  
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Piece 4, September 2018 
I started to read Darian Leader’s (2009) book The New Black: Mourning, 
Melancholia and Depression initially for professional and personal interests without 
even slightest research intention. However, when I read Leader’s writing into the 
symbolic impasses of melancholia, connections were made in my head between this 
research project and melancholia. Reading through my writings, struggle in 
explanation, loss, and melancholy are reoccurring themes. The ending of my personal 
therapy had brought me intense pain that I do not understand. Later on, I wrote about 
the sense of melancholy that often penetrates my emotional life that I have never been 
able to fully talk about and explain. Therefore, I went back to read my previous 
writings under the light of Leader’s book and Freud’s (1917)  original writing on 
mourning and melancholia. This piece of writing can be regard as my attempt to make 
sense of my life and sandplay experience through these theories on melancholia in 
relation to the impossibility of language and giving a narrative account.  
I am writing this piece in relation to melancholia not with the intention to 
explain why I did not know how to speak about some of my experiences. I am in no 
way making a ‘diagnosis’ of myself. Instead, it is an attempt to convey the sense of 
expressive impossibility with the help of theory related to melancholia. It is another 
attempt of mine to look at the failure of language and narrative from a theoretical angle 
with which my experience resonates.  
I will start with Freud’s (1917)  discussion on mourning and melancholia with 
critiques on his pathologising of melancholia. After an experimental application of 
Freud’s theory on my own experience, I will move on to Leader’s (2009) discussion 
which I find more satisfying.   
For Freud (1917) , there are three preconditions for melancholia: the loss of a 
loved object, ambivalence between love and hatred, and identification with the lost 
object which leads to self-reproach.  
Early in his essay Mourning and Melancholia, Freud (1917)  points out a main 
difference between mourning and melancholia which is related to the explanation of 
feeling and behaviour. Freud points out that although mourning and melancholia can 
bring the same intensity of pain, same level of loss of interest, and inhibition of any 
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kind of performance, the only reason why mourning, unlike melancholia, does not 
strike people as pathological is that it can be easily explained. Freud argues that 
compared to mourning, in the case of melancholia, the loss is more notional in nature. 
Mourning can occur for not only the death of a loved one but also for a loss in an 
abstract form, for example, for freedom, or an ideal. However, what is lost is easily 
identified. In the case of melancholia, the loss may well be a real or concrete loss of a 
loved one through events such as death. Alternatively, it can be the loss of the loved 
one as a love-object, for instance, being abandoned. However, in some cases, Freud 
says, it is difficult to see what has been lost. In other words, the melancholic is not 
conscious of what has been lost. In some other cases, what or who is lost is clear, but 
the melancholic is not aware of what it is about that person or that thing s/he has lost. 
Therefore, Freud relates melancholia to the loss of an object which is withdrawn from 
consciousness, whereas in mourning, ‘no aspect of the loss is unconscious’ (Freud, 
1917:205).This, for me, indicates how melancholia can be hard to talk about as it is 
situated in the unknown, the unexplainable.  
My problem with Freud’s pathologising melancholia lies on my critique in the 
inquiry of casual agency and responsibility on us when we are asked to give an account 
of ourselves illustrated in my first piece of pre-sandplay writing. Continuing to see 
melancholia as pathology because of its lack of clear reason as opposed to mourning 
which can be easily explained as Freud suggests is to reinforce the act of giving an 
account of oneself. When a clear explanation is lacking, we are guilty of being 
abnormal. However, I wonder, does not each of us have the experience of losing 
something or someone without being aware of it, or being aware of a loss yet never 
fully apprehend what that loss really entails?  
Freud (1917)  writes about melancholia in relation to mourning. Both of them 
are related to the reaction to a lost beloved object. However, Freud (1917:203)  
conceives melancholia as pathology in relation to unresolved grief in which the lost 
object cannot be let go. However, there are challenges to this view of seeing 
melancholia as pathological especially in the social and political context of disavowed 
losses (Farley, 2018). In the context of colonialism, there is the haunting presence of 
‘the felt loss of a treasured past’ that has been comprehensively destroyed thus even 
mourning it is impossible (Frosh, 2013:8). Eng and Han (2000) depathologise 
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melancholia as everyday group experience for Asian Americans regarding the 
experience related to immigration, assimilation and racialisation. Apart from 
arguments from social and political angles, melancholia is also argued to be a more 
general and basic emotional state that can be experienced by everyone. Elaborating on 
Kristeva’s work, Stillwaggon (2017) explains that the individualisation of the child as 
they are introduced to language is experienced as a loss by both the mother and the 
child. It is a loss of the previous identity in the stage where the child’s survival is 
completely dependent on the mother’s active presence. There is no return to this 
identity through language and it brings an unspeakable grief. Referring to Freud’s later 
work, Eng and Kazanjian (2003:4) recognise melancholia as necessary and a 
precondition for mourning, as ego is composed of ‘the residues of its accumulated 
losses’. What is proposed by these arguments is the depathologising of melancholia. 
This is the stance I take. I see melancholic attachment to loss as a potential universally 
shared experience in human life.  
Returning to Freud’s discussion on mourning and melancholia, he observes 
that a significant difference between mourning and melancholia is the self-reproach 
that is involved in melancholia, which is described by his famous statement ‘in 
mourning, the world has become poor and empty, in melancholia it is the ego that has 
become so’ (Freud, 1917:206) . Freud explains self-reproach in melancholia through 
the theory of identification and ambivalence in the relationship. In mourning, in spite 
of the resistance and the great deal of time it might require, the libido previously 
invested in the lost object is eventually being adjusted and investment in substitutes 
becomes possible. Thus after successful mourning, the ego can be left free and 
uninhibited again. In comparison, in melancholia, the letting go of the object becomes 
impossible. In order to perpetuate the lost object and the love for the lost object, 
melancholic identifies with the object. The object is incorporated into the ego 
(Quinodoz, 2009). In other words, ‘loving’ the object becomes ‘being’ the object (ibid). 
In this way, the loved object is never lost nor needing to be given up. According to 
Freud, this identification which takes the form of narcissistic regression also brings to 
the fore the ambivalence between love and hatred. As a part of the ego that is identified 
with the ego is developed, the hatred that is directed to the external object is then 
directed to oneself. Therefore the self-reproach of the melancholic is actually an 
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unconscious attack on the lost loved object.  
As I read Freud (1917) , I enter a playful and experimental place of interaction 
between his theory of melancholia and my own life experiences. In the light of Freud’s 
theory, I can see my one-year separation from my parents when I was seven as indeed 
catastrophic to not only my external but also my internal connection to them as loved 
objects, which speaks the meaning of object loss (Roth, 2009). The abortion in my 
family due to China’s one-child policy stripped away my chance to be an elder sister 
along with the loss of the possibility of a different life. The childhood trauma I 
experienced altered my sense of self, which can also be a loss of the ideal self and ideal 
world. To sustain the attachment to what was lost in reality and what could have been 
lost internally, the process of narcissistic identification with the lost object might have 
happened and the hatred that turned back to myself might contribute to the sadness I 
feel in life. While these possible explanations and (of course over-simplified) analysis 
make sense rationally and theoretically, they do not feel satisfying enough. What 
touches me and brings relief is the impossibility of symbolisation in melancholia as 
argued by Leader (2009).  
A choice of identification with the dead or the lost object for the melancholic, 
according to Leader (2009), is to die with them, physically or psychically. This situates 
the melancholic in a particular position of in-between two worlds: the world of the 
dead and the living. It is a state of utter solitude (Leader, 2009). It becomes a torment 
to find words that can describe this dual existence, this impossible experience of being 
in two places at the same time.  
I have realised through writing, including those in this thesis and those that are 
not, a sense of loneliness and separation from others in my life. I experience this place 
as somewhere no one can enter. It also feels impossible to effectively invite others to 
enter. When I read my reflection on my second sandplay session, where I built ‘the 
world beyond reach’ after I encountered Leader’s writing on melancholia, I found 
myself seeing the quality of ‘in-between’ in my experience of this sand world.  
It is a world where I ‘want to go but do not belong’. It is the home where the 
lost ideal parent I long for, the lost could-have-been sibling, and the lost ideal baby-
me live. ‘I am deeply attached to this world, though I know I don’t belong. I know that 
I can’t go there, otherwise I’d not want to come back.’ Creating this world allowed me 
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to concretely access this status of ‘in-between’. This world beyond reach is full of 
beauty as well as losses. Perhaps its beauty lies in the fact that it contains what I have 
lost and can no longer obtain. Being with this world in the sandplay session was being 
in the gulf between social reality and the utter solitude Leader mentions (2009). The 
phrase ‘I’d not want to come back’ easily delivers a message about death. Being with 
this sand world is touching both the world of the living and the dead at the same time.  
From the very start of my series of writing, I presented ‘explanation’ as a 
struggle for me. In the second piece of pre-sandplay writing, I wrote about the 
‘expressive impossibility’, the ‘neither this or that’ (cited in Abbott, 2013:27). 
Thinking about the loneliness and melancholy I have always felt, I realised then, ‘it is 
about do not know how to tell’. And this do not know how to tell brings me difficulty 
in therapy.  
Leader (2009) acknowledges that a part of melancholia’s difficulty is to do 
with finding the way to express the impossibility. Wanting to express is itself a part of 
the problem. As impossible as the expression feels, there is also a necessity to convey 
the impossibility. I find that this impossibility and the necessity to convey summarise 
an important theme that comes out from my reflective writings. I started this research 
project with a sense of frustration and resistance to, as well as rebellion against 
narrative and narrative coherence. However, as this research project proceeds, I also 
recognise the need to tell, to either an actual or an imagined other.  
Following my writing on the world beyond reach, I recognised ‘the 
paradoxical feelings of wanting to tell about myself and be known on one hand, and 
wanting to refrain from this telling and explaining due to frustration of the doomed 
effort of telling’. Then in the doomed effort of telling, I am confronted with the utter 
solitude.  
Leader (2009) explains the melancholic’s struggle with language based on 
Freud’s (1917)  argument. According to Freud’s theory, there are two psychical 
systems involved in thinking. One is linked to perception of things which he calls thing 
representation and the other is linked to words and speech which he terms word 
representation. Thing representation, which consists of collection of memory traces of 
things, and word representation, which is constituted by acoustic and semantic aspects 
of language, are usually linked together. Mourning is made possible through the 
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moving between thing representation and word representation. Through the pathway 
of preconscious, the unconscious ambivalent battle between love and hate towards the 
lost object is made conscious. In the case of melancholia, this pathway is blocked. 
Unconscious thing representation cannot be reached through conscious word 
representation. Therefore, as Leader (2009:189) concludes, ‘at the heart of 
melancholia is a problem to do with language. Words and things seem radically 
separated for the melancholic’. A symbolic impasse is then present for melancholic 
(Leader, 2009).  
Leader (2009) identifies parts of the melancholic’s self-reproach and self-
denigration as contributed by the failure to speak properly and articulately about the 
lost object and their relation to it. Since for melancholic, words fail to touch their 
referent, ‘making them do so may involve violence’ (Leader, 2009:192). Though not 
exactly the same, this can also be linked back to Butler’s (2005) argument on the 
violence involved in asking one to give an account of oneself while the formation of 
self involves inevitable enigma.  
Again, it brings me back to the shame I feel about not being articulate enough. 
I experienced this shame as a client and also see this shame from my client in my 
practice. A requirement for articulation, I would argue that even the help to articulate 
something that is impossible to express, can intensify this shame and self-reproach 
which can be already strong. As Leader (2009:190) recognises, there is an ‘abyss 
separating language and its referents’ for melancholic. Then he asks a question based 
on the struggle that melancholic faces (Leader, 2009:190-191):  
If melancholia means that the passage from things to 
words is blocked, would the aim be to reverse this? Or, 
taking the idea of impossibility seriously, to try less to 
access so-called thing representations than to allow the 
person to find words to index the impossibility of the 
passage from thing to word representations, from one 
representational system to the other: to find words to say 
how words fail. (Italics original)   
‘To find words to say how words fail’. Isn’t it exactly what I have been doing 
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in this research project? When words fail and when coherence cannot be obtained or 
need not to be obtained, in the times of impossibility, the therapeutic task is not to help 
the client to gain words that is good enough to symbolise experience, but to allow the 
failure, the incoherence, the impossibility or simply the lack of need for coherence or 
narration. Leader (2009) sees finding words to say how words fail as one of the 
functions of poetry. I do agree. At the same time, my sandplay also gives me an 
expression for the impossibility. The space for not talking when I engage with the 
expressive impossibility and the world in-between is one of the main therapeutic 
function of sandplay for me. Perhaps what is important for me in my sandplay is not 
that it enables me to express but it is that it offers me a space to not express (in order 
to be understood) and still be with the impossibility? 
Earlier, I raised the question whether each of us has the experience of losing 
something or someone without being aware of it or being aware of a loss yet never 
fully apprehending what that loss actually entails. What I am proposing through this is 
that melancholia does not necessarily refer to clinical depression as we would call it 
today. I propose that elements of melancholia are something that we may all feel at 
times in our lives. Therefore, the symbolic impasses, the expressive impossibility are 
what we might all possibly experience. I would go so far as to argue that the 
inevitability of death confronts us with the loss of an ideal life. When we became aware 
of death, the finitude of life, something catastrophic happens to our relation to 
ourselves and the world.  
I think of an experience I had related to this ‘in-between two worlds’. I was on 
the second deck of a bus, and I had just finished my work with a bereaved client earlier. 
I was three chapters into a touching book about loss and death. At a certain point, I 
started to burst into tears. I wiped my eyes and they were soon filled with tears again. 
I looked out of the window, watching everything that were passing by outside of the 
bus window. Sitting at the front of the top deck of the bus gave me a distant yet clear 
view of the outside world. It was late afternoon in a crisp spring day. It was still bright 
everywhere. I watched people entering the playhouse, bars and cafés, cars meeting at 
the junction of the roads. Through the glass window of an Italian eatery, I saw people 
enjoying their meals alone or with companions. I saw people at the bus stops checking 
the noticeboard waiting for the right bus to come. Everyone lives, everything is alive, 
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the walking, talking, eating people, the moving cars, the trees, the breeze, the sun. Yet 
I sat on the bus, through these aliveness, death pounded my heart, harder than ever. I 
started to realise my tears were coming from a place of grief. I was grieving for life, 
for the inevitability of loss to death. At the same time, through death, I saw life again. 
While hit by the inevitable loss and pain, I saw the beauty and preciousness of life. 
This brings me back to the existential topic I touched on previously. I believe 
this experience does not only come from a personal place but also a shared place. It 
comes from a loss and grief that we all encounter whether we decide to look right at it 
or shy away from it. It is part of what brings my melancholy. It is situating in-between, 
a never-ending grief for life, a sustained mourning. If melancholia is a sustained 
mourning (Freud, 1917) , then far from pathology, a melancholic attachment to this 
destined loss is one that none of us can avoid, therefore, so is the impossibility of 
narration.   
 
Afterthoughts 
Initially I ended this piece of writing about loss, grief, melancholia and death 
with a note ‘I don’t know how to end this piece yet’. None of my previous writings are 
finished with a neat, conclusive ending. However, how to end this piece bothers me 
particularly. Few months later, I still do not know how to bring this piece to a closure. 
Interestingly enough, the very struggle of melancholic is concerned with closure 
(Freud, 1917) . Melancholia is mourning without an end, a refusal to detach from the 
loved lost object (ibid). Perhaps it is not merely a coincidence that I ended my series 
of writing with a piece on loss and melancholia. The closer I approach to the end of 
this research project, the more resistant I am to draw it to an end. The fantasy is that 
by the end of a doctorate project, I should be able to find out something definite and 
draw a presentable conclusion. However, it feels nothing more than a start. In the 
resistance to end this piece and draw the whole thesis to a neat conclusive closure lays 
a parallel to my challenge to narrative coherence as unity, harmony, closure and 
linearity (Freeman, 2010) which is often regarded as desirable.     
Given what have been said, it is perhaps not difficult to imagine my struggle in 
writing a conclusion to this thesis. I sensed the significance of loss and melancholia in 
this whole thesis as I read through after I produced my first draft, and I could not make 
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sense of it. There needed to be a place for it in the conclusion chapter but I did not 
know how and where it should be. This struggle entangles with my struggle to end this 
particular piece of writing. As the refusal to closure not only belongs to this piece of 
writing, but also carries a significance for the whole thesis, my resolution to this 
struggle is to carry it into the next chapter, the conclusion chapter. As Eng and 
Kazanjian (2003) argues, the productive and creative potential of melancholia, unlike 
in mourning where the devotion to the lost object is relinquished and can be replaced, 
lies in its continuous engagement with the loss and its remains. The act of continuation 
from this chapter to the next perhaps is a continuous engagement with the 
unarticulatable loss. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
Returning to Elegy 
I am still having problems producing a satisfactory conclusion. I particularly 
struggle with writing down the sense of loss and melancholia to which I need to give 
a place in this conclusion. There is a visceral urge to have it written here, but it feels 
impossible. I cannot make more sense of it, and I know there is more than what I have 
known. I have written writing as elegy in chapter 3 and devoted a whole chapter to 
loss and melancholia, however it does not feel enough. There is more needing be said, 
and yet I am not able to say it. I feel trapped in limbo.   
Maybe the whole thesis is an elegy? It is locked into the order of sign, 
displaying my entrapment in language, and it somehow confirms what it critiques 
(Sartwell, 2000). Words and narratives are all I have here after all. The more I write, 
the more I sense what cannot be written. Throughout this thesis is the presence of the 
absence, that is the ‘unspeakable absence’ of loss as an ‘ineffable presence’ 
(Stillwaggon, 2017:60). Perhaps the whole thesis holds a melancholic attachment to 
the unspeakable that is lost in my writing. I think of my methodological decision on 
writing and presenting my thesis as variations on a theme, returning to it from different 
places and angles. I wonder whether it is an unconscious melancholic returning to the 
lost object again and again, refusing to ‘move on’. At the same time, it is exactly this 
refusal that holds the creative power (Eng & Kazanjian, 2003) that makes this thesis 
possible. 
I do not know how to write what I cannot write but it needs to be written, so I 
am writing about this impossibility to write, exercising what Leader (2009) suggests. 
Perhaps more will come to me as time passes. And this is the uncertainty and 
unpredictability that I have devoted myself to in my methodological approach. For 
now, I shall move on to other parts of this conclusion. 
 
126 
 
Reviewing my writings, I realised the value of the multiple perspectives I was 
taking in my writing. I speak from the positions as a therapist, as a researcher, and as 
a client in both talking therapy and sandplay sessions. I also speak from my talking-
self, non-verbal self, child-self and adult-self, the part that longs to talk and the part 
that refuses to talk, the part that finds comfort in narrative and the part that is frustrated 
by it, the part that engages with theories and the part that finds them inadequate in 
speaking of experience. This multiplicity of positions and perspectives within this 
thesis offers unique insight into the topic about narrative in/coherence in counselling 
and psychotherapy. 
In spite of some resistance to offer conclusion and closure, I would like to 
conclude my thesis with two main messages: letting go and holding on. As will be 
made clear in my writing later, these are also my suggestions to the application of my 
ideas to counselling and psychotherapy.    
Letting Go 
Referring back to Strawson’s (2004a, 2004b, 2010) critique of the 
Psychological Narrative thesis which claims that human-beings conceive and live our 
lives as narratives or stories, and the Ethical Narrative thesis which believes that a 
richly narrative outlook of life is essential to a good life, my thesis urges the letting go 
of these two claims. Like Strawson (ibid), I believe that there are other ways of 
experiencing that do not necessarily take a narrative form and there are good ways to 
live which are deeply non-narrative.  
My writing and reflection on my sandplay experience, my personal therapy and 
other life experience confront these two theses with the limitations of telling stories 
about ourselves and offering an account of ourselves.  
What is repeatedly emphasised about coherent narrative is its function in 
providing life with some degree of unity, purpose, and meaning (e.g. Adler, 2012; 
McAdams & McLean, 2013). It is undeniable that succeeding in giving a coherent 
narrative account of oneself brings a degree of satisfaction. Yet, the obsession with 
meaning and purpose, shown through the constant searching for a coherent narrative, 
leads to the fallacy of mastery. It denies the unknowingness of self and other, the non-
127 
 
narrativisable self, assuming a greater agency and explainability than we can hold 
(Butler, 2005). Counselling and psychotherapy often hold a contradiction. We 
emphasise the ability to tolerate the unknown, yet with a hope that some sense can 
somehow be made eventually, whether it is through the therapist’s interpretation or the 
client’s own realisation. For example, while recognising that the unconscious is often 
not available to symbolisation and is part of each person’s psychical life, 
psychoanalysis often strives to bring the unknown into known; and the falling apart of 
a coherence narrative is recognised as a sign of pathology (e.g. Freud, 1953). Isn’t this 
itself, to some extent, saying that we cannot satisfactorily live with the unconscious 
and the unknown? When confronted with the black hole, my melancholy and pain, I 
am convinced of what exists beyond narrative coherence, narrative, and narrativity. As 
Sartwell (2000:65) writes, ‘[n]arrative comes apart at the extremes; […] it comes apart 
in ecstasy, in writhing pain, at death’. To insist on a coherent narrative at all times is 
to shy away from the fact that life sometimes is horrible, chaotic, and absurd (Frank, 
2013), and that a lot of times we are left alone to face what life brings to us. It serves 
to alienate and exclude the part of experience that is beyond coherent narrative 
characterised by order, logic, linearity, and causality. As Sartwell (2000) points out, if 
one sees one’s life as narratable and intelligible, then in the course of narration one has 
to elide the parts of one’s life that are incompatible with this view. To insist on a 
constant coherent narrative excludes people who do not experience their life as 
coherent narrative structure, including the Episodics as Strawson (2004a, 2004b, 2010) 
proposes, and people who for some reason cannot narrate linearly, whose speech is 
unintelligible , e.g. people with dementia (e.g. Freeman, 2008) or who have a brain 
injury (e.g. Brockmeier & Medved, 2010). To insist that human-beings are narrative 
in nature, that human experience is constructed by narrative, that coherent narrative is 
essential for a good life, is to brutally strip humanity from people who are different. It 
was this emphasis on the psychological Narrative and the ethical Narrative theses that 
had brought me shame and doubt about myself. I now realise that doing this research 
project somehow has served me as salvation. Being open to parts of me that are not so 
together, nor coherent, and relating to people with similar experience through 
engagement with literature have released me from seeing my incoherence as a shame 
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and inadequacy. Reading Goronwy Rees’s (cited in Strawson, 2004a:438) 
bewilderment of being different and excitement of finding companion, I see myself: 
For as long as I can remember it has always surprised 
and slightly bewildered me that other people should take 
it so much for granted that they each possess what is 
usually called ‘a character’: that is to say, a personality 
[or personality-possessing self] with its own continuous 
history … I have never been able to find anything of that 
sort in myself … How much I admire those writers who 
are actually able to record the growth of what they call 
their personality, describe the conditions which 
determined its birth, lovingly trace the curve of its 
development. … For myself it would be quite impossible 
to tell such a story, because at no time in my life have I 
had that enviable sensation of constituting a continuous 
personality … As a child this did not worry me, and if 
indeed I had known at that time of Der Mann ohne 
Eigenschaften [The Man without Qualities, a novel by 
Robert Musil], the man without qualities, I would have 
greeted him as my blood brother and rejoiced because I 
was not alone in the world; as it was, I was content with 
a private fantasy of my own in which I figured as Mr. 
Nobody. (Italic, suspension points, and brackets 
original). 
When I was asked to give a coherent account of my professional and personal 
development at the end of my training course and was to talk about what I found 
inexpressible in my personal therapy, I thought there must be something wrong with 
me. Now, I am relieved that I can see myself without pathologising, and that there are 
other ways of living and experiencing life. 
As I wrote in the introduction of this thesis, I had the thought of myself being 
someone without stories to tell. This runs a risk of dichotomy, as if it is saying that 
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some people have stories to tell, and some do not. What is ironic is that in my telling 
about myself feeling without stories to tell, I was actually telling a story about myself. 
Through the process of doing this research, this thought about myself as someone with 
no story to tell coupled with shame it had brought faded away. It is not that some 
people have stories to tell and some other do not or cannot tell stories. It is that 
sometimes we can tell stories about some experiences and sometimes some 
experiences cannot be told as stories; sometimes we desire to tell our stories and 
sometimes we just simply do not wish to, just as sometimes I feel telling itself betrays 
some of my lived experiences. When we cannot or do not wish to tell a coherent story, 
it does not necessarily mean deficiency. Perhaps, some people simply have more of 
these ‘cannot’ and ‘do not wish to’ moments than others. In these moments, how about 
letting it be without demands, just as the sand does. ‘It is fine’ – perhaps this simple 
sentence is what I want to tell myself and others including those who have similar 
experience and who work with people have similar experience in therapy.   
Letting go of the requirement for a meaningful coherent narrative allows me to 
‘chill’ (Freeman, 2008), to appreciate the unintegrated state (Winnicott, 1960; 
Winnicott, 1965a) we might sometimes return to, and to see being inconsequential in 
adulthood as an ability (Davis & Wallbridge, 1991) rather than an inadequacy. As 
Sartwell (2000:66) says, we live in an age of anxiety: 
For while the disciplinary matrix inscribes us, it also 
makes us anxious: anxious to please it, anxious to allow 
ourselves to be inscribed, anxious that our inscriptions 
have not been recently-enough updated, anxious that 
some present moment is not being turned to account, 
anxious that we are failing in our rationality, anxious that 
we are not perfect instruments, anxious that we are not 
the perfect masters of instruments, anxious of finding 
ourselves out, anxious of incoherence, anxious about the 
future of projects, anxious about living in the present, 
anxious about the sacred. 
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We live under a gaze and we turn an internal gaze (Foucault, 1967) on 
ourselves. We must perform in a certain way to be a sane person, a good client, or a 
good therapist. We long be significant, to tell stories, to tell stories that are worth 
telling, and to be coherent. We are anxious when we cannot be. To recognise the 
unintegrated state in therapy and let go of the demand for stories and narratives in these 
moments are to let go of the anxiety of goals, making sense and to be significant. These 
moments of doing nothing, even feeling nothing or nothing significant are especially 
precious in this modern time we live. Instead of turning insignificance into significance 
by narrating, it is a precious thing to do to just chill (Freeman, 2008) and to 
occasionally be inconsequential in therapy too. As if we just rest under the tree, looking 
at the sky through the leaves, which we, as adults in modern time, often forget to do.   
My thesis urges readers to pay attention to what might be behind the obsession 
with coherent narrative. A coherent narrative does not merely serve for the client. The 
client talks for themselves and for the therapist. We talk with a sense of obligation and 
are anxious when it is not sufficiently met. My thesis also raises the possibility that the 
emphasis on narrative coherence partially derives from the fact that a story that meets 
the assumption of narrative structure is intuitively satisfying for the audience (Baerger 
& McAdams, 1999) and from the audience’s – the therapist in the case of counselling 
and psychotherapy – discomfort with what does not meet the canonical model of story, 
which again goes back to narrative coherence as alienation and exclusion.  
My first message to counsellors and therapists here is to let go. Letting go of 
the emphasis on and even obsession with coherent narrative is to see the possibility of 
a different way of living a good life that is not within the narrative framework and to 
acknowledge the unknowingness of the unconscious and the human psyche. By 
‘knowing’ too well what a ‘healthy’ coherent story is supposed to be and rendering 
what does not suit the coherent model as pathological, we risk the danger of being a 
mother who ‘knows too well’, which does not leave space for the infant to create a 
unique response from the mother with their own unique performance or behaviour 
(Winnicott, 1960). Just like I am able to chill, relinquishing the obsession with and 
emphasis on coherent narrative perhaps may allow our clients to chill too instead of 
inducing anxiety and shame. 
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Holding On 
What I seek in speech is the response of the Other...There is no speech without 
a reply, even if it is only met with silence.  
(Lacan, 1995, cited in Kokanovic & Stone, 2018:21) 
My thesis is not against narrative. On the contrary, I realise through the process 
of doing this research project how much I need to tell and be received, even if a lot of 
the time the reception and response I need were silence. I remember how much I 
wanted to tell my story to the sandplay therapist when I knew that there was a story 
that could be told in one of my sand worlds. I needed to hold on to this speech that is 
given to an other.  
It has become obvious in my writing that I desire to tell and I want to be known. 
It was the impossibility of expression and the necessity to tell and be known that bring 
me difficulties. I often feel stuck in this liminal space. This corresponds to some 
people’s experience of trauma and catastrophe. For example, in his diary about the life 
in the Warsaw Ghetto, ‘Cups of Tears’, Abraham Lewin (cited in Andrews, 2010) talks 
about both the impossibility and the necessity of expressing his thoughts and feelings. 
In the case of melancholia, Leader (2009) recognises the necessity to speak about loss 
creatively in the form of language that suits each individual and to have a listener to 
address – a listener who can receive the communication of the impossibility. The 
emphasis on coherent narrative, from others or/and myself, had trapped me in a limbo. 
In my wordless touch with sand, my silent encounter with the sand worlds, my messy 
writing process, my repetitive imaginary telling about my childhood trauma, I freed 
myself from the external and internalised, explicit and implicit requirement and 
obligation to make sense, and to be consequential. It was important for me that the 
silent presence of the sand, the figures in the sand worlds, the pen and paper, and the 
imaginary other did not expect nor even wait. This has allowed me to express, connect 
to, and immerse in myself, in my own way and pace, in the presence of an other who 
is free of their own even slightest agenda, demand, expectation and so forth. A main 
difficulty I have with narrating to another is indeed the pulling away from myself, 
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however subtle it is. It comes with the nature of narrative itself, as Sartwell (2000:66) 
writes:  
When I take up more and more of my past life into 
narrative, I find there a distance. This effort reflects a 
need to put things in order, and then I lose a succession 
of present moments; that is, I lose precisely what I am 
also trying to hold onto the narrative.  
This distance was made clear in my experience of the unintegrated state and 
holding in my personal therapy, and my effort in describing the black hole. As soon as 
I started to narrate, to tell, something that was present in that experience was lost. 
Narrative fails to allow everything to live within it. What is ironic is that the need for 
narrative and language in order to communicate itself is a proof that we can never fully 
be with each other and that we are always to a certain extent left alone in some 
experiences of ours. Nonetheless, there is always the longing to tell and to be known 
by an other, despite the doomed to failure effort of being fully known. Yes, there are 
other forms of expressive therapeutic means, but even in sandplay therapy, when I 
wanted to connect to the therapist, it did feel like words were all I have left. Edkins 
(2003, cited in Andrews, 2010:155) articulates this well for me: ‘[I]t is both impossible 
to speak, and impossible not to speak’. As what is argued about traumatic testimony, 
in communicating my experience to the therapist, the narrative form it takes lends to 
it a framework – coherence, structure, meaning, comprehensibility – which it lacks 
(Andrews, 2010). Nonetheless, in spite of the inadequacy, it is important that I do say 
it (ibid). The significance is simply that something is said (ibid). What, however, is 
lacking is the acknowledgment of the inevitable failure of words and narrative form. 
It is perhaps seldom acknowledged by therapists to their clients, that I strive to be with 
you but I cannot exactly be there with you. And sometimes, my presence itself that 
requires a coherent narrative, can even act as an intrusion, taking you away from your 
immersion with the present moment. Winnicott’s concept of being alone in the 
presence of an other is particularly helpful here. It speaks about the capacity of the 
therapist to tolerate the fact that they do not know what is going on in the client’s inner 
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world but still being able to be present with the client without intrusion, the capacity 
to allow the client to be alone.  
What is most significant, in my opinion, is that despite the inevitable failure of 
narrative, of language, and of being completely understanding, as therapists, we still 
try. We make an effort regardless. The message this conveys is a simple but a crucial 
one: I care.  
I remember that when the sandplay therapist could not rescue me in the session 
where I was in panic about the scarred shell, what mattered to me was simply that she 
made an effort and she remembered. Thinking again about my client who felt much 
better by the end of therapy but did not know why, what stayed with me was that I 
really cared and I repeatedly showed and told him this. To hold onto the striving to 
narrate, to hear narratives, coherent or not, is to show one cares.  
There is something to learn from the sand: to receive without demand (though 
not completely possible) and to be silent. Returning to Wittgenstein (1922, 1972), if 
language is a tool that we use in order to communication, when it fails, one can only 
be silent: ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’(Wittgenstein, 
1922:90).  
Yet, we do not need to abandon narrative all together. There is another thing to 
learn from the sand: we can be together in the silence, together in our aloneness; and 
to listen to the unsayable, unnarratable and let them be.  
To Play 
I started this research project with ambivalence and it will not end with 
certainty.  
‘Words have magical power’, as Freedman (2017:69) says, they can bring ‘the 
greatest happiness or the deepest despair’. Language can be ‘a force for good, for 
healing, for containment; a reassuring connection with a trusted other; a forgiving and 
loving experience’, thus holds a curative power, as in confession, prayer (ibid), and, 
as we would like to believe, in psychotherapy. However, they can also be used as ‘a 
malignant and toxic weapon’ and it can dominate and silence others’, as in curse and 
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dissemination of deceptive, harmful information (ibid). This too applies to narrative. 
As made clear in previous sections of this conclusion, while there is healing power, a 
need and necessity to tell our stories to a caring other, the obsession and demand on 
narrative coherence without caution silence and alienate. The need for meaning, 
through the creation of coherent narrative, brings pressure and anxiety (Sartwell, 2000). 
Sartwell (2000) finds relief of this pressure and anxiety in caring for his children and 
playing music when he does not have a goal, a project to finish, manage, or master, or 
when he immerses himself in the insignificant. He then says that he wishes to play 
more. Giving the message of letting go and holding on as conclusion and application 
of my discussion to psychotherapy might seem to create a limbo and a trap-in-between. 
However, what I want to put forward here is the value of playfulness.  
I propose that we can be playful with the concept of coherence and incoherence. 
In a case study presented by Brockemeier (2004), the co-construction of a story 
between a 6-year-old boy and an adult interviewer is shown. The boy told a story about 
a letter in his own way without explaining the temporal order and causality between 
events. These elements are developed by the questions from the adult. This vividly 
shows that when children learn to establish culturally and socially recognised coherent 
narrative, they have to temporally and causally organise a narrative into a sequence 
that is culturally and socially meaningful (Shapiro & Hudson, 1991). However, instead 
of ‘incoherence’, why don’t we open the possibility to see what does not fit so well 
into the culturally and socially recognised form as returning to or re-entering the 
playful place where we tell our stories in our own ways like the 6-year-old boy? It 
might be a form of individuality that is otherwise lost in the focus on culturally and 
socially accepted and assumed concept of coherence. Leader (2009) criticises that the 
well-intended act to teach schoolchildren emotional literacy to articulate their and 
others’ feelings is sadly tantamount to brainwashing, as it imposes on the individual a 
shared language and coerces them to use it in place of their own unique ways of 
expressing themselves. To depathologise what we call incoherence, to allow space for 
less recognised forms of telling and silence, to blur the boundary between coherence 
and incoherence are to give space back to this individuality. 
Leader’s (2009) solution to the pre-set language forced on children is art and 
creativity. This is well recognised in the field of counselling and psychotherapy, which 
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is the source of the emergence of different creative therapy approaches including play 
therapy, art therapy, dance movement therapy and so forth. However, why don’t we 
play in talking therapy too? What I mean by play here is not the physical act of playing, 
but the attitude of entering a playful place with the client, with care and without 
demand. Just like the sand, to witness a construction of a story or a world, to accept 
and be with the unspeakable, to respond to the most delicate touch and survive the 
most violent blow (Aite, 2007).  
Perhaps sometimes being in therapy with the client is like seeing the sky 
through trees together. We can see different bits of the sky through the net of leaves as 
it changes its shape according to seasons and weather, or as it moves with the wind. 
There are also parts that we cannot see nor describe although they are up there. 
Sometimes, the client might want to point some part of the sky to us and share with us 
what shapes they see. In these times, we are there to listen and receive. At other times, 
the client might want to rest under the tree looking at the sky without saying anything. 
In these moments, we sit beside them and let them be.    
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Epilogue: Letting Go and Holding on to the Work 
[…] the work is finished, but it is not done. 
(Romanyshyn, 2013:345) 
 
It is a week before submission and I am still here struggling. It has been three 
months since my first attempt to produce an epilogue. And yet, my every attempt to 
use words is ‘a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure’ (Eliot, 1944:21). Every 
attempt is a revisit to the acknowledgement that I do not have full control of this work. 
It renders me vulnerable, yet it is also this place that holds the mystery of this work 
alive and from which the meaning of this work arises (Romanyshyn, 2013). Every 
word of certainty fails the work of mystery. So I am returning to sandplay where this 
work started. 
This time, there is only silent and intimate interaction between my hands and 
my silent listener – sand, as if together, we reject any presentation to the outside world. 
Perhaps we are reserving this ‘little back-shop’ that is ‘all our own, entirely free’ 
(Montaigne, 1927:237-238), speaking a language that no one else can understand and 
perhaps that does not need to be understood. So I shall keep silent here also, and let 
the sand and my hands speak (or not) the presence of the absence.  
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Now, the work is finished, but it is not or perhaps will never be done.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Last Sandplay 
138 
 
Reference 
Abbott, H. P. (2013) Real mysteries: narrative and the unknowable. Columbus: Ohio 
State University Press.   
Adler, J. M. (2012) ‘Living into the story: agency and coherence in a longitudinal study 
of narrative identity development and mental health over the course of psychotherapy’, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(2), pp. 367-389. 
Adler, J. M., Wagner, J. W. & McAdams, D. P. (2007) ‘Personality and the coherence 
of psychotherapy narratives’, Journal of Research in Personality, 41(6), pp. 1179-
1198. 
Aite, P. (2007) Landscapes of the psyche: sandplay in Jungian analysis. Milan: IPOC 
di Pietro Condemi.  
Albert, S. C. & Paulo, S. (2015) Sandplay therapy with couple within the framework 
of analytical psychology. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 60(1), pp. 32-52. 
Ammann, R. (1991) Healing and transformation in sandplay: creative processes 
become visible. Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company. 
Andrews, M. (2010) ‘Beyond narrative: the shape of traumatic testimony’, in 
Hyvärinen, M., Hydén, L., Saarenheimo, M. & Tamboukou, M. (eds.), Beyond 
narrative coherence. Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., pp. 147-166.      
Angus, L. E. & McLeod, J. (2004a) ‘Toward an integrative framework for 
understanding the role of narrative in the psychotherapy process’, in Angus, L. E. & 
McLeod, J. (eds), The handbook of narrative and psychotherapy: practice, theory, and 
research. London: SAGE, pp. 366-374.  
Angus, L. E. & McLeod, J. (2004b) ‘Self-multiplicity and narrative expression in 
psychotherapy’, in Hermans, H. J. M. & Dimaggio, G. (eds.), The dialogical self in 
psychotherapy. New York: Brunner-Routledge, pp. 77-90. 
 
139 
 
Arsith, M. (2011) ‘Ludwig Wittgenstein and language games (a literary application)’, 
Acta Universitatis Danubius, 5(2), pp. 14-21. 
Baerger, D. R. and McAdams, D. P. (1999) ‘Life story coherence and its relation to 
psychological well-being’, Narrative Inquiry, 9(1), pp. 69-96. 
Baggini, J. (2018) ‘The philosophy gap: there's no treatment for life’, BACP University 
and College Counselling, 6(1), pp. 4-9.  
Bakhtin, M. M. (1981) The dialogic imagination: four essays. Austin: University of 
Texas Press. 
Bakhtin, M. M. (1984) Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Balfour, A. (2005) ‘The couple, their marriage, and Oedipus: or, problems come in 
twos and threes’, in Grier, F. (ed.), Oedipus and the Couple. London: Karnac, pp. 49-
71. 
Bochner, A. & Riggs, N. (2014) ‘Practicing narrative inquiry’, in Leavy, P. (ed), The 
Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 
195-222.  
Bochner, A. P. (1997) ‘It's about time: narrative and the divided self’, Qualitative 
Inquiry, 3(4), 418-438. 
Boik, B. L. & Goodwin, E. A. (2000) Sandplay therapy: a step-by-step manual for 
psychotherapists of diverse orientations. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Bondi, L. (2013) ‘Research and therapy: generating meaning and feeling gaps’, 
Qualitative Inquiry, 19(1), pp. 9-19. 
Bondi, L. & Fewell, J. (2016) ‘Why does research so often alienate practitioners and 
what can be done about it?’, in Bondi, L. & Fewell, J. (eds.), Practitioner   research   
in   counselling   and   psychotherapy :  the   power   of   examples. London: Palgrave, 
3-21. 
Borg, K. (2018) ‘Narrating Trauma: Judith Butler on Narrative Coherence and the 
Politics of Self-Narration’, Life Writing, 15(3), pp. 447-465. 
140 
 
Bradway, K. & McCoard, B. (1997) Sandplay: silent workshop of the psyche. London: 
Psychology Press. 
Britton, R. (1993) ‘The missing link: parental sexuality in the Oedipus complex’, in 
Breen, D. (ed.), The gender conundrum: contemporary psychoanalytic perspectives   
on masculinity and femininity. London: Routledge, pp. 83-96. 
Britton, R. (2004) ‘Subjectivity, objectivity, and triangular space’, Psychoanalytic 
Quarterly, 73(1), pp. 47-61. 
Brockmeier, J. (2004) ‘What makes a story coherent?’, in Braco, A. U. & Valsiner, J. 
(eds.), Communication and metacomminication in human development, Greenwich: 
Information Age Publishing, pp. 285-306. 
Brockmeier, J. & Medved, M. I. (2010) ‘Weird stories: brains, mind, and self’, in 
Hyvärinen, M., Hydén, L., Saarenheimo, M. & Tamboukou, M. (eds.), Beyond 
Narrative Coherence. Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., pp. 17-32. 
Brown, B., Nolan, P., Crawford, P. & Lewis, A. (1996) ‘Interaction, language and the 
“narrative turn” in psychotherapy and psychiatry’, Social Science & Medicine, 43(11), 
pp. 1569-1578. 
Bruner, J. (1986) Actual minds, possible worlds. London: Harvard University Press. 
Bruner, J. (2004a) ‘Life as narrative’, Social Research, 71(3), pp. 691-710. 
Bruner, J. (2004b) ‘The narrative creation of self’, in Angus, L. E. & McLeod, J. (eds.), 
The handbook of narrative and psychotherapy: practice, theory, and research. London: 
SAGE, pp. 2-14. 
Bruner, J. S. (2002) Making stories: law, literature, life. London: Harvard University 
Press. 
Butler, J. (1997) Excitable speech: a politics of the performative. London: Routledge. 
Butler, J. (2004) Precarious life: the powers of mourning and violence. London: Verso. 
Butler, J. (2005) Giving an account of oneself. New York: Fordham University Press. 
141 
 
Byrne, B. (2003) ‘Reciting the self: narrative representations of the self in qualitative 
interviews’, Feminist Theory, 4(1), pp. 29-49. 
Carey, L. J. (1994) ‘Family sandplay therapy’, in Schaefer, S. & Carey, L. J. (eds.), 
Family play therapy. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., pp. 205-220. 
Carey, L. J. (1999) Sandplay Therapy with Children and Families. Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
Carr, D. (1991) Time, narrative, and history, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Colman, W. (2007) ‘Symbolic conceptions: the idea of the third’, Journal of Analytical 
Psychology, 52(5), pp. 565-583. 
Connelly, F. M. & Clandinin, D. J. (1990) ‘stories of experience and narrative inquiry’, 
Educational Researcher, 19(5), pp. 2-14. 
Crites, S. (1971) ‘The narrative quality of experience’, Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion, 39(3), pp. 291-311. 
Crossley, M. (2003) ‘Formulating narrative psychology: the limitation of 
contemporary social constructionism’, Narrative Inquiry, 13(2), pp. 287-300. 
Davis, M. & Wallbridge, D. (1991) Boundary and space: an introduction to the work 
of D.W. Winnicott. London: Karnac Books. 
Day, R. & Day, C. (2012) Creative therapy in the sand. Warwickshire: Brook Creative 
Therapy. 
Derrida, J. (1997) Deconstruction in a nutshell: a conversation with Jacques Derrida. 
New York: Fordham University Press. 
Donelan, J. (1999) What makes sandplay unique? Sandplay therapists' views on how 
sandplay relates to verbal techniques and the beneficial effects of using these 
modalities concurrently. PhD thesis. California School of Professional Psychology, 
Alameda.  
Douglass, B. & Moustakas, C. (1985) ‘The heuristic inquiry -- the internal search to 
know’, Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 25(3), pp. 39-55. 
142 
 
Eliot, T. S. (1944) Four Quartets. London: Faber and Faber Limited. 
Eng, D. L. & Han, S. (2000) ‘A dialogue on racial melancholia’, Psychoanalytic 
Dialogues, 10(4), pp. 667–700. 
Eng, D. L. & Kazanjian, D. (2003) ‘Introduction: mourning remains’, in Eng, D. L. & 
Kazanjian, D. (eds.), Loss:  the   politics   of   mourning. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, pp. 1-25. 
Farley, L. (2018) Childhood beyond pathology: a psychoanalytic study of development 
and diagnosis. New York: SUNY Press.  
Flynn, T. R. (2006) Existentialism: a very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Foucault, M. (1967) Madness and civilization: a history of insanity in the Age of 
Reason. London: Tavistock Publications. 
Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and punish : the birth of the prison. London: Allen 
Lane. 
Frank, A. W. (1998) ‘Just listening: narrative and deep illness’. Families, Systems, & 
Health, 16(3), pp. 197-212. 
Frank, A. W. (2010) Letting stories breathe: a socio-narratology. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Frank, A. W. (2013) The wounded storyteller: body, illness, and ethics. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Freedman, R. S. (2017) ‘Cross-cultural treatment issues in psychoanalysis’, Language 
and Psychoanalysis, 6(1), pp. 66-98. 
Freeman, M. (2008) ‘Beyond narrative: dementia's tragic promise’, in Hydén, L. & 
Brockmeier, J. (eds.), Health, illness, and culture: broken narratives. London: 
Routledge, pp. 169-184. 
Freeman, M. (2010) ‘Afterword: 'even amidst': rethinking narrative coherence’, 
Hyvärinen, M., Hydén, L., Saarenheimo, M. & Tamboukou, M. (eds.), Beyond 
Narrative Coherence. Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., pp. 165-186 
143 
 
Freud, S. (1953) ‘Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria’, in Strachey, J. (ed.), 
The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol VII 
1901-10-5: A case of Hysteria, three essays on sexuality and other works. London: 
Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, pp. 1-122.    
Freud, S. (1917) On murder, mourning and melancholia. London: Penguin, 2005.  
Frosh, S. (2013) Hauntings: psychoanalysis and ghostly transmissions. London: 
London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Gendlin, E. (1995) ‘Crossing and dipping: some terms for approaching the interface 
between natural understanding and logical formulation’, Minds and Machines, 5(4), 
pp. 547-560. 
Gendlin, E. T. (1997a) Experiencing and the creation of meaning: a philosophical and 
psychological approach to the subjective. Evanston, Illinois.: Northwestern University 
Press. 
Gendlin, E. T. (1997b) ‘The responsive order: a new empiricism’. Man and World, 
30(3), pp. 383-411. 
Gendlin, E. T. (2004) ‘The new phenomenology of carrying forward’, Continental 
Philosophy Review, 37(1), pp. 127-151. 
George, C., Kaplan, N. & Main, M. (1996) Adult attachment interview. Unpublished 
manuscript. Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley. 
Greenberg, L. & Geller, S. (2001) ‘Congruence and therapeutic presence’, in Wyatt, 
G. & Saunders, P. (eds.), Rogers’ therapeutic conditions, Vol 1: congruence. 
Herefordshire: PCCS Books, pp. 148-166. 
Grice, H. P. (1975) ‘Logic and conversation’, in Cole, P. & Morgan, J. L. (eds.), Syntax 
and Semantics, Vol 3: Speech Acts. New York: Academic Press, pp. 41-58. 
Guilfoyle, M. (2018) ‘Storying unstoried experience in therapeutic practice’, Journal 
of Constructivist Psychology, 31(1), pp. 95-110. 
Habermas, T. & Bluck, S. (2000) ‘Getting a life: the emergence of the life story in 
adolescence’, Psychological Bulletin, 126(5), pp. 748-769. 
144 
 
Hermans, H. J. M. (2002) ‘The dialogical self as a society of mind’, Theory & 
Psychology, 12(2), pp. 147-160. 
Hermans, H. J. M. (2004) ‘The dialogical self: between exchange and power’, in 
Hermans, H. J. M. & Dimaggio, G. (eds.), The dialogical self in psychotherapy. New 
York: Brunner-Routledge, pp. 13-28. 
Hermans, H. J. M. (2011) ‘The dialogical self: a process of positioning in space and 
time’, in Gallagher, S. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hermans, H. J. M. & Dimaggio, G. (2004) ‘The dialogical self in psychotherapy: 
introduction’, in Hermans, H. J. M. & Dimaggio, G. (eds.), The dialogical self in 
psychotherapy. New York: Brunner-Routledge, pp. 1-10. 
Hermans, H. J. M., Kempen, H. J. G. & Loon, R. J. P. v. (1992) ‘The dialogical self: 
beyond individualism and rationalism’, The American Psychologist, 47(1), pp. 23. 
Hesse, E. (1999) ‘The adult attachment interview: historical and current perspectives’, 
in Cassidy, J. & Shaver, P. R. (eds.), Handbook of attachment: theory, research, and 
clinical applications. New York: Guilford Press, pp. 395-433. 
Hodapp, C. (2013) ‘Giving an account of oneself’. Review of Giving an account of 
oneself, by Judith Butler. The Pluralist, 8(1), pp. 115-118. 
Hope, A. D. (1971) A midsummer eve's dream: variations on a theme by William 
Dunbar. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd. 
Hyvärinen, M., Hydén, L., Saarenheimo, M. & Tamboukou, M. (2010) ‘Beyond 
narrative coherence: an introduction’, in Hyvärinen, M., Hydén, L., Saarenheimo, M. 
& Tamboukou, M. (eds.), Beyond Narrative Coherence. Amsterdam: John Benjamins 
B.V., pp. 1-16. 
Jackson, A. Y. & Mazzei, A. L. (2012) Thinking with theory in qualitative research 
viewing data across multiple perspectives. London: Routledge. 
Jackson, A. Y. & Mazzei, L. A. (2013) ‘Plugging one text into another: thinking with 
theory in qualitative research’, Qualitative Inquiry, 19(4), pp. 261-271. 
145 
 
Jacobsen, B. (2007) Invitation to existential psychology: a psychology for the unique 
human being and its applications in therapy. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons. 
Kalff, D. M. (1991) ‘Introduction to sandplay therapy’, Journal of Sandplay Therapy, 
1(1). 
Kalff, D. M. (2004) Sandplay: a psychotherapeutic approach to the psyche. California: 
Temenos Press. 
Kenny, G. (2012) ‘An introduction to Moustakas’s heuristic method’, Nurse 
Researcher, 19(3), pp. 6-11. 
Knouse, N. R. (2007) ‘Moravian music: introduction, theme, and variations’, Journal 
of Moravian History, 2(Spring 2007), pp. 37-54. 
Kokanovic, R. & Stone, M. (2018) ‘Listening to what cannot be said: broken narratives 
and the lived body’, Arts and Humanities in Higher Education: An International 
Journal of Theory, Research and Practice, 17(1), pp. 20-31. 
Kosanke, G. C., Puls, B., Feather, J. & Smith, J. (2016) ‘Minimizing intense relational 
dynamics to enhance safety: a thematic analysis of literature on sandtray work with 
adult trauma survivors’, British Journal of Psychotherapy, 32(4), pp. 502-516. 
Kreiswirth, M. (1992) ‘Trusting the tale: the narrativist turn in the human sciences’, 
New Literary History: A Journal of Theory and Interpretation, 23(3), pp. 629-57. 
Kukard, C. (2007) Exploring the use of Sandplay Psychotherapy in overcoming a 
language barrier whilst supporting a young vulnerable child. MEd dissertation. 
University of Pretoria. 
Lanman, M. (2005) ‘The painful truth’, in Grier, F. (ed.), Oedipus and the couple. 
London: Karnac Books, pp. 141-162. 
Leader, D. (2009) The new black: mourning, melancholia and depression. London: 
Penguin Books. 
Lieblich, A., McAdams, D. P. & Josselson, R. (2004) Healing plots: the narrative 
basis of psychotherapy. London: American Psychological Association. 
146 
 
Linde, C. (1993) Life stories: the creation of coherence. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Lu, L., Petersen, F., Lacroix, L. & Rousseau, C. (2010) ‘Stimulating creative play in 
children with autism through sandplay’, The Arts in Psychotherapy, 37(1), pp. 56-64. 
Lynch, G. (1997) ‘Words and silence: counselling and psychotherapy after 
Wittgenstein’, Counselling, May, pp. 126-128. 
Lysaker, P. & Lysaker, J. (2002) ‘Narrative structure in psychosis: schizophrenia and 
disruptions in the dialogical self’, Theory and psychology, 12(2), pp. 207-220. 
Macquarrie, J. (1972) Existentialism. Philadelphia: Westminster Press. 
Main, M. (1991) ‘Metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive monitoring, and singular 
(coherent) vs. multiple (incoherent) model of attachment’, in Parkes, C. M., 
Stevenson-Hinde, J. & Marris, P. (eds.), Attachment across the life cycle. London and 
New York: Routledge, pp. 127-159. 
Marcus, S. (1976) ‘Freud and Dora: story, history, case history’, Psychoanalysis and 
Contemporary Science, 5, pp. 389-442. 
Maree, J. G., Ebers, H., Liesel & De Villiers, D. A. (2012) ‘Combining Ericksonian 
and sandplay approaches to therapy with children who manifest depression as a 
developmental barrier’, Journal of Psychology in Africa, 22(2), pp. 221-226. 
Mattingly, C. (1998) Healing dramas and clinical plots: the narrative structure of 
experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McAdams, D. P. (1985) Power, intimacy, and the life story: personological inquiries 
into identity. Illinois: The Dorsey Press. 
McAdams, D. P. (1997) The stories we live by: personal myths and the making of the 
self. New York: Guilford Press. 
McAdams, D. P. (2006) ‘The problem of narrative coherence’, Journal of 
Constructivist Psychology, 19(2), pp. 109-125. 
147 
 
McAdams, D. P., Josselson, R. & Lieblich, A. (2006) ‘Introduction’, in McAdams, D. 
P., Josselson, R. & Lieblich, A. (eds.), Identity and story: creating self in narrative. 
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
McAdams, D. P. & McLean, K. C. (2013) ‘Narrative identity’. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 22(3), pp. 233-238. 
McCormack, D. (2014) ‘Trína chéile: reflections on journaling in the border country 
of doctoral research’, Studies in the Education of Adults, 46(2), pp. 163-176. 
McLeod, J. (1997) Narrative and psychotherapy. London: London: SAGE. 
McLeod, J. (2001) ‘Developing a research tradition consistent with the practice and 
values of counselling and psychotherapy: why counselling and psychotherapy research 
is necessary’, Counselling and Psychotherapy Research, 1(1), pp. 3-11. 
McQuillan, M. (2000) ‘Introduction: aporias of writing: narrative and subjectivity’, in 
McQuillan, M. (ed.), The Narrative Reader. London: Routledge, pp.1-34. 
Meier, S. T. (2012) Language and narratives in counseling and psychotherapy. New 
York: Springer Publishing Company. 
Mink, L. O. (1970) ‘History and fictions as modes of comprehension’. New literary 
history, 1(3), pp. 541-558. 
Mink, L. O. (1987) Historical understanding. London: Cornell University Press. 
Mitchell, S. A. (1993) Hope and dread in psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books. 
Mogenson, G. (2016) Greeting the angels: an imaginal view of the mourning process. 
London: Routledge. 
Montaigne, M. de. (1927) The essays of Montaigne. Vol. 1. London: Oxford University 
Press. 
Moustakas, C. E. (1990) Heuristic research design, methodology, and applications. 
London: SAGE. 
Nasab, H. M. & Alipour, Z. M. (2015) ‘The effectiveness of sandplay therapy in 
reducing symptoms of separation anxiety in children 5 to 7 years old’, Jurnal UMP 
Social Sciences and Technology Management, 3(2), pp. 5-10. 
148 
 
Neile, C. S. (2013) ‘Our stories, our companions: a conversation with Arthur W. Frank’, 
Storytelling, Self, Society, 9(2), pp. 261-276. 
Neimeyer, R. A., Herrero, O. & Botella, L. (2006) ‘Chaos to coherence: 
psychotherapeutic integration of traumatic loss’, Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 
19(2), pp. 127-145. 
Pals, J. L. (2006) ‘Constructing the 'springboard effect': causal connections, self-
making, and growth within the life story’, in McAdams, D. P., Josselson, R. & Lieblich, 
A. (eds.), Identity and Story: creating self in narrative. Washington DC: American 
Psychological Association, pp. 175-199. 
Payne, M. (2006) Narrative therapy: an introduction for counsellors. London: SAGE. 
Pelias, R., J. (2011) ‘Writing into position – strategies for composition and evaluation’, 
in Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y. S. (eds.), The Sage handbook of qualitative research. 
4th edition. London: Sage, pp. 659-668. 
Pelias, R. J. (2004) A methodology of the heart: evoking academic and daily life. 
Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press. 
Pellauer, D. (1991) ‘Limning the liminal, Carr and Ricoeur on time and narrative’, 
Philos. Today, 35(1), pp. 51-62.  
Pennebaker, J. & Seagel, J. (1999) ‘Forming a story: the health benefits of narrative’, 
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 55(10), pp. 1243-1254. 
Polany, M. (1983) The tacit dimension. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith. 
Polkinghorne, D. (1988) Narrative knowing and the human sciences. Albany: State 
University of New York Press. 
Polkinghorne, D. (2005) ‘Language and meaning: data collection in qualitative 
research’, Journal of Counseling Psychology, 52(2), pp. 137-145. 
Prince, G. (2003) Dictionary of narratology. Revised Edition. London: University of 
Nebraska Press. 
149 
 
Quinodoz, J. (2009) ‘Teaching Freud's 'Mourning and Melancholia'’, in Fiorini, L. G., 
Bokanowski, T. & Lewkowicz, S. (eds.), On Freud's 'Mourning and Melancholia'. 
London: Karnac Books, pp. 179-192. 
Rae, R. (2013) Sandtray: playing to heal, recover, and grow. Lanham: Jason Aronson. 
Richardson, J. D. & Stewart, D. N. (2009) ‘Medieval confession practices and the 
emergence of modern psychotherapy’, Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 12(5), pp.  
473-484. 
Richardson, L. (1997) Fields of play: constructing an academic life. New Brunswick, 
New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 
Richardson, L. (2000) ‘Writing, a method of inquiry’, in Denzin, N., K. & Lincoln, Y. 
S. (eds.), Handbook of qualitative research. 2nd edition. London: Sage, pp. 923-948.  
Richardson, L. & St. Pierre, E. (2005) ‘Writing: a method of inquiry’, in Denzin, N., 
K & Lincoln, Y. S. (eds.), Handbook of qualitative research. 3rd edition. London: 
Sage, pp. 959-978.  
Ricoeur, P. (1984) Time and narrative, Vol.1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ricoeur, P. (1985) ‘Narrated time’. Philosophy Today, 29(4), pp. 259-272. 
Ricoeur, P. (1991) ‘Life in quest of narrative’, in Wood, D. (ed.), On Paul Ricoeur: 
narrative and interpretation. London: Routledge, pp. 20-33. 
Riessman, C. K. & Speedy, J. (2012) ‘Narrative inquiry in the psychotherapy 
professions: a critical review’, in Clandinin, D. J. (ed.), Handbook of narrative inquiry: 
mapping a methodology. London: SAGE, pp. 426-456. 
Romanyshyn, R. D. (2013) The wounded researcher: research with soul in mind. New 
Orleans, Louisiana: Spring Journal Books. 
Ronai, C. R. (1995) ‘Multiple reflections of child sex abuse: an argument for a layered 
account’, Journal of contemporary ethnography, 23(4), pp. 395-426. 
Roth, P. (2009) ‘Melancholia, mourning and the countertransference’, in Fiorini, L. G., 
Bokanowski, T. & Lewkowicz, S. (eds.), On Freud's 'Mourning and Melancholia'. 
London: Karnac, pp. 37-55.   
150 
 
Ryce-Menuhin, J. (2015) Jungian sandplay: the wonderful therapy. New York: Taylor 
and Francis. 
Sacks, O. W. (1986) The man who mistook his wife for a hat. London: Pan Books. 
Samuels, A., Shorter, B. & Plaut, F. (1986) A critical dictionary of Jungian analysis. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Sandner, D. (1991) ‘Foreword’, in Ammann, R. (1991) Healing and transformation in 
sandplay: creative process become visible. Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 
pp. xi-xiv.  
Sartwell, C. (2000) ‘End of story: toward an annihilation of language and history’. 
New York: State University of New York Press. 
Schafer, R. (1980) ‘Narration in the psychoanalytic dialogue’, Critical Inquiry, 7(1), 
pp. 29-53. 
Sela-Smith, S. (2001) Heuristic self -search inquiry: clarification of Moustakas' 
heuristic research. PhD thesis. Saybrook Graduate School and Research Center.  
Sela-Smith, S. (2002) ‘Heuristic research: A review and critique of Moustakas's 
method’, The Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 42(3), pp. 53-88. 
Shapiro, L. R. & Hudson, J. A. (1991) ‘Tell me a make-believe story: coherence and 
cohesion in young children's picture-elicited narratives’, Developmental Psychology, 
27(6), pp. 960-74. 
Skinner, D., Valsiner, J. & Holland, D. (2001) ‘Discerning the dialogical self: a 
theoretical and methodological examination of a Nepali adolescent's narrative’, Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research, 2(3). 
Speedy, J. (2001) Singing over the bones: a narrative inquiry into  the construction of 
research and practice cultures and professional identities by counsellor educators at 
the University of   Bristol and within the UK.   PhD thesis. University of  Bristol    
Speedy, J. (2005) ‘Writing as inquiry: some ideas, practices, opportunities and 
constraints’, Counselling and Psychotherapy Research, 5(1), pp. 63-64. 
151 
 
Speedy, J. (2008) Narrative inquiry and psychotherapy. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Spence, D. P. (1982) Narrative truth and historical truth: meaning and interpretation 
in psychoanalysis. New York, W.W. Norton & Company. 
St. Pierre, E. (1995) Arts of existence: the construction of subjectivity in older white 
Southern women. PhD thesis. The Ohio State University. 
St. Pierre, E. A. (1997) ‘Methodology in the fold and the irruption of transgressive 
data’, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 10(2), pp. 175-189. 
Stierlin, H. (1963) ‘Existentialism meets psychotherapy’. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 24(2), pp. 215. 
Stillwaggon, J. (2017) ‘“A fantasy of untouchable fullness”: melancholia and 
resistance to educational transformation’, Educational Theory, 67(1), pp. 51-66. 
Strawson, G. (2004a) ‘Against Narrativity’, Ratio, 17(4), pp. 428-452.  
Strawson, G. (2004b) ‘A fallacy of our age’. Times Literary Supplement, October (15). 
Strawson, G. (2010) ‘Narrativity and non-Narrativity’, Opinion, vol. 1, 
November/December, pp. 775-780. 
Suri, R. (2012) ‘Sandplay: an adjunctive therapy to working with dementia’, 
International Journal of Play Therapy, 21(3), pp. 117-130. 
Tamas, S. (2009) ‘Writing and righting trauma: troubling the autoethnographic voice’, 
Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 10(1). 
Tamas, S. (2011) Life after leaving: the remains of spousal abuse. New York: Left 
Coast Press. 
Terrell, C. J. & Lyddon, W. J. (1996) ‘Narrative and psychotherapy’, Journal of 
Constructivist Psychology, 9(1), pp. 27-44. 
Tillich, P. (1960) ‘Existentialism, psychotherapy, and the nature of man’, Pastoral 
Psychology, 11(5), pp. 10-18. 
152 
 
Todres, L. (2007) Embodied enquiry: phenomenological touchstones for research, 
psychotherapy and spirituality. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Trabasso, T., Secco, T. & Van Den Broek, P. (1984) ‘Causal cohesion and story 
coherence’, in Mandl, H., Stein, N. L. & Trabasso, T. (eds.), Learning and 
comprehension of text. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 83-111. 
Turner, B. A. (2005) The handbook of sandplay therapy. Cloverdale: Temenos Press. 
Turner, B. A. (2017) The Routledge international handbook of sandplay therapy. 
Florence: Taylor and Francis. 
Wartenberg, T. E. (2008) Existentialism: a beginner's guide. London: Oneworld 
Publications. 
Waters, T. E. A. & Fivush, R. (2015) ‘Relations between narrative coherence, identity, 
and psychological well‐being in emerging adulthood’, Journal of Personality, 83(4), 
pp. 441-451. 
Weinrib, E. L. (2012) Images of the self: the sandplay therapy process. Cloverdale: 
Temenos Press. 
West, W. (2001) ‘Beyond grounded theory: the use of a heuristic approach to 
qualitative research’, Counselling and Psychotherapy Research, 1(2), pp. 126-131. 
White, H. (1980) ‘The value of narrativity in the representation of reality’, Critical 
Inquiry, 7(1), pp. 5-27. 
White, M. (2007) Maps of narrative practice. London: W.W. Norton & Co. 
Winnicott, D. W. (1960) ‘The theory of the parent-infant relationship’. The 
International journal of psycho-analysis, 41, pp. 585-595. 
Winnicott, D. W. (1965a) The family and individual development. London: Tavistock 
Publications. 
Winnicott, D. W. (1965b) The maturational processes and the facilitating environment 
studies in the theory of emotional development. London: The Hogarth Press and the 
Institute of Psycho-Analysis.  
153 
 
Winnicott, D. W. (1975) Through paediatrics to psycho-analysis. London: Karnac 
Books. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1922) Tractatus: logico-philosophicus. London: Routledge. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1972) Philosophical investigations. Reprint of English text with 
index. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Worthen, V. (1974) ‘Psychotherapy and catholic confession’, Journal of Religion and 
Health, 13(4), pp. 275-284. 
Zhang, W., Zhang, R., Haslam, D. R. & Jiang, Z. (2011) ‘The effects of restricted 
group sandplay therapy on interpersonal issues of college students in China’, The Arts 
in Psychotherapy, 38(4), pp. 281-289. 
Zhou, D. (2009) ‘A review of sandplay therapy’, International Journal of 
Psychological Studies, 1(2), pp. 69-72. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
154 
 
Appendix 
Information Sheet for Sandplay Facilitator 
Back ground and research focus 
This research project is for completion of my Professional Doctorate Degree 
in Counselling and Psychotherapy. This research project seeks to explore the concept 
of narrative coherence in counselling and psychotherapy through my engagement with 
and reflection on sandplay experience.   
Research methodology and method 
The methodologies I adopt for this research project are heuristic inquiry which 
believes phenomena being researched is understood within the researcher, and writing 
as inquiry which regards writing as a process of discovery and both the data collection 
and analysis process.     
In order to gain understanding of the research topic, I will engage in a process 
of short-term sandplay as the ‘player’. At the same time, I will reflect on my sandplay 
experience. This process of making sense of my sandplay experience will be the focus 
of analysis in this research project.   
Invitation for participation 
You are invited to engage in the sandplay process as a facilitator for my 
sandplay experience and process. This will be a short-term sandplay process – about 6 
sessions but negotiable between us. Although this is not usual therapy because of its 
research purpose, you will be invited to work as the way you do in your normal practice 
and work within the ethical framework in which you practice. As my analysis will 
focus on my own process of making meaning, you are not invited as a research 
participant but only a facilitator.  
Confidentiality 
Every effort will be made to anonymise identifiable information of you. My 
writing will be entirely focusing on my own process. If interaction between us in the 
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sessions needs to be mentioned in the thesis, no identifiable information about you will 
be revealed. I will also take photo of the sandworld I make in each sandplay session, 
but I will not take any photos of you nor your room.    
The commitment  
This will be a short term period of sandplay therapy. The number of sessions 
and frequency can be negotiated between us. 
As the facilitator, you will be responsible for keeping boundaries including the 
time boundary and providing the sandplay material.  
You will be required to work ethically within the ethical framework in which 
you practice.  
Benefits and risks 
You will be paid for your normal hourly rate.  
There is no anticipated risk for you in this research project. 
Further information 
If you have any questions about the research project at any time, please don’t 
hesitate to contact me through s1312015@sms.ed.ac.uk.  
If you would like to contact an independent person to discuss this project with, 
my supervisor Seamus Prior can be contacted through seamus.prior@ed.ac.uk  
If you have any complaint regarding the research project, you can contact 
Charlotte Clarke, the Head of School of Health in Social Science through 
Charlotte.Clarke@ed.ac.uk  and 0131 650 4327. 
 
Ying Liu 
Professional Doctorate in Counselling and Psychotherapy 
School of Health in Social Science 
The University of Edinburgh 
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Agreement of Participation 
I ______________ agree to participate in this research project. I have had the 
purpose and the nature of the research project explained to me. I understand that 
 The sandplay sessions are initiated for a research purpose; 
 I will be participating this study as a sandplay facilitator not a research 
participant; 
 Any identifiable information of me will be anonymised, if any of it need to be 
included in the thesis; 
 I will be paid at the hourly rate of _______ for  _____ sessions over the period 
of  _______; 
 I am required to work ethically within ______________ ethical framework; 
  I have the right to ask questions about the research at any time and I have been 
given contact details of the responsible person in the case of complaint. 
 
 
           ______________                                                                                             ______________           
Signature of the sandplay facilitator                                                              Date 
 
______________                                                                                            ______________ 
Signature of the researcher                                                                             Date 
